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Abstract
The society is run by software. Electronic processing of personal and finan-
cial data forms the core of nearly all societal and economic activities, and
concerns every aspect of life. Software systems are used to store, transfer
and process this vital data. The systems are further interfaced by other
systems, forming complex networks of data stores and processing entities.
This data requires protection from misuse, whether accidental or intentional.
Elaborate and extensive security mechanisms are built around the protected
information assets. These mechanisms cover every aspect of security, from
physical surroundings and people to data classification schemes, access con-
trol, identity management, and various forms of encryption.
Despite the extensive information security effort, repeated security in-
cidents keep compromising our financial assets, intellectual property, and
privacy. In addition to the direct and indirect cost, they erode the trust in
the very foundation of information security: availability, integrity, and con-
fidentiality of our data. Lawmakers at various national and international
levels have reacted by creating a growing body of regulation to establish a
baseline for information security. Increased awareness of information secu-
rity issues has led to extend this regulation to one of the core issues in secure
data processing: security of the software itself.
Information security contains many aspects. It is generally classified
into organizational security, infrastructure security, and application secu-
rity. Within application security, the various security engineering processes
and techniques utilized at development time form the discipline of software
security engineering. The aim of these security activities is to address the
software-induced risk toward the organization, reduce the security incidents
and thereby lower the lifetime cost of the software. Software security engi-
neering manages the software risk by implementing various security controls
right into the software, and by providing security assurance for the existence
of these controls by verification and validation.
A software development process has typically several objectives, of which
security may form only a part. When security is not expressly prioritized,
the development organizations have a tendency to direct their resources to
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the primary requirements. While producing short-term cost and time sav-
ings, the increased software risk, induced by a lack of security and assurance
engineering, will have to be mitigated by other means. In addition to in-
creasing the lifetime cost of software, unmitigated or even unidentified risk
has an increased chance of being exploited and cause other software issues.
This dissertation concerns security engineering in agile software devel-
opment. The aim of the research is to find ways to produce secure software
through the introduction of security engineering into the agile software de-
velopment processes. Security engineering processes are derived from extant
literature, industry practices, and several national and international stan-
dards. The standardized requirements for software security are traced to
their origins in the late 1960s, and the alignment of the software engineering
and security engineering objectives followed from their original challenges
to the current agile software development methods. The research provides
direct solutions to the formation of security objectives in software devel-
opment, and to the methods used to achieve them. It also identifies and
addresses several issues and challenges found in the integration of these ac-
tivities into the development processes, providing directly applicable and
clearly stated solutions for practical security engineering problems.
The research found the practices and principles promoted by agile and
lean software development methods to be compatible with many security
engineering activities. Automated, tool-based processes and the drive for
efficiency and improved software quality were found to directly support the
security engineering techniques and objectives. Several new ways to inte-
grate software engineering into agile software development processes were
identified. Ways to integrate security assurance into the development pro-
cess were also found, in the form of security documentation, analyses, and
reviews. Assurance artifacts can be used to improve software design and
enhance quality assurance. In contrast, detached security engineering pro-
cesses may create security assurance that serves only purposes external to
the software processes. The results provide direct benefits to all software
stakeholders, from the developers and customers to the end users.
Security awareness is the key to more secure software. Awareness cre-
ates a demand for security, and the demand gives software developers the
concrete objectives and the rationale for the security work. This also cre-
ates a demand for new security tools, processes and controls to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of software security engineering. At first, this
demand is created by increased security regulation. The main pressure for
change will emanate from the people and organizations utilizing the soft-
ware: security is a mandatory requirement, and software must provide it.
This dissertation addresses these new challenges. Software security contin-
ues to gain importance, prompting for new solutions and research.
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Tiivistelmä
Ohjelmistot ovat keskeinen osa yhteiskuntamme perusinfrastruktuuria. Mer-
kittävä osa sosiaalisesta ja taloudellisesta toiminnastamme perustuu tiedon
sähköiseen käsittelyyn, varastointiin ja siirtoon. Näitä tehtäviä suorittamaan
on kehitetty merkittävä joukko ohjelmistoja, jotka muodostavat mutkikkai-
ta tiedon yhteiskäytön mahdollistavia verkostoja. Tiedon suojaamiseksi sen
ympärille on kehitetty lukuisia suojamekanismeja, joiden tarkoituksena on
estää tiedon väärinkäyttö, oli se sitten tahatonta tai tahallista. Suojaus-
mekanismit koskevat paitsi ohjelmistoja, myös niiden käyttöympäristöjä ja
käyttäjiä sekä itse käsiteltävää tietoa: näitä mekanismeja ovat esimerkiksi
tietoluokittelut, tietoon pääsyn rajaaminen, käyttäjäidentiteettien hallinta
sekä salaustekniikat.
Suojaustoimista huolimatta tietoturvaloukkaukset vaarantavat sekä lii-
ketoiminnan ja yhteiskunnan strategisia tietovarantoj että henkilökohtaisia
tietojamme. Taloudellisten menetysten lisäksi hyökkäykset murentavat luot-
tamusta tietoturvan kulmakiviin: tiedon luottamuksellisuuteen, luotettavuu-
teen ja sen saatavuuteen. Näiden tietoturvan perustusten suojaamiseksi on
laadittu kasvava määrä tietoturvaa koskevia säädöksiä, jotka määrittävät
tietoturvan perustason. Lisääntyneen tietoturvatietoisuuden ansiosta uusi
säännöstö on ulotettu koskemaan myös turvatun tietojenkäsittelyn ydintä,
ohjelmistokehitystä.
Tietoturva koostuu useista osa-alueista. Näitä ovat organisaatiotason tie-
toturvakäytännöt, tietojenkäsittelyinfrastruktuurin tietoturva, sekä tämän
tutkimuksen kannalta keskeisenä osana ohjelmistojen tietoturva. Tähän osa-
alueeseen sisältyvät ohjelmistojen kehittämisen aikana käytettävät tietotur-
vatekniikat ja -prosessit. Tarkoituksena on vähentää ohjelmistojen organi-
saatioille aiheuttamia riskejä, tai poistaa ne kokonaan. Ohjelmistokehityksen
tietoturva pyrkii pienentämään ohjelmistojen elinkaarikustannuksia määrit-
tämällä ja toteuttamalla tietoturvakontrolleja suoraan ohjelmistoon itseen-
sä. Lisäksi kontrollien toimivuus ja tehokkuus osoitetaan erillisten verifiointi-
ja validointimenetelmien avulla.
Tämä väitöskirjatutkimus keskittyy tietoturvatyöhön osana iteratiivis-
ta ja inkrementaalista ns. ketterää (agile) ohjelmistokehitystä. Tutkimuksen
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tavoitteena on löytää uusia tapoja tuottaa tietoturvallisia ohjelmistoja liit-
tämällä tietoturvatyö kiinteäksi osaksi ohjelmistokehityksen prosesseja. Tie-
toturvatyön prosessit on johdettu alan tieteellisestä ja teknillisestä kirjalli-
suudesta, ohjelmistokehitystyön vallitsevista käytännöistä sekä kansallisista
ja kansainvälisistä tietoturvastandardeista. Standardoitujen tietoturvavaati-
musten kehitystä on seurattu aina niiden alkuajoilta 1960-luvulta lähtien,
liittäen ne ohjelmistokehityksen tavoitteiden ja haasteiden kehitykseen: ny-
kyaikaan ja ketterien menetelmien valtakauteen saakka. Tutkimuksessa esi-
tetään konkreettisia ratkaisuja ohjelmistokehityksen tietoturvatyön tavoit-
teiden asettamiseen ja niiden saavuttamiseen. Tutkimuksessa myös tunnis-
tetaan ongelmia ja haasteita tietoturvatyön ja ohjelmistokehityksen mene-
telmien yhdistämisessä, joiden ratkaisemiseksi tarjotaan toimintaohjeita ja
-vaihtoehtoja.
Tutkimuksen perusteella iteratiivisen ja inkrementaalisen ohjelmistoke-
hityksen käytäntöjen ja periaatteiden yhteensovittaminen tietoturvatyön toi-
mintojen kanssa parantaa ohjelmistojen laatua ja tietoturvaa, alentaen täten
kustannuksia koko ohjelmiston ylläpitoelinkaaren aikana. Ohjelmistokehi-
tystyön automatisointi, työkaluihin pohjautuvat prosessit ja pyrkimys tehok-
kuuteen sekä korkeaan laatuun ovat suoraan yhtenevät tietoturvatyön mene-
telmien ja tavoitteiden kanssa. Tutkimuksessa tunnistettiin useita uusia ta-
poja yhdistää ohjelmistokehitys ja tietoturvatyö. Lisäksi on löydetty tapoja
käyttää dokumentointiin, analyyseihin ja katselmointeihin perustuvaa tieto-
turvan todentamiseen tuotettavaa materiaalia osana ohjelmistojen suunnit-
telua ja laadunvarmistusta. Erillisinä nämä prosessit johtavat tilanteeseen,
jossa tietoturvamateriaalia hyödynnetään pelkästään ohjelmistokehityksen
ulkopuolisiin tarpeisiin. Tutkimustulokset hyödyttävät kaikkia sidosryhmiä
ohjelmistojen kehittäjistä niiden tilaajiin ja loppukäyttäjiin.
Ohjelmistojen tietoturvatyö perustuu tietoon ja koulutukseen. Tieto puo-
lestaan lisää kysyntää, joka luo tietoturvatyölle konkreettiset tavoitteet ja
perustelut jo ohjelmistokehitysvaiheessa. Tietoturvatyön painopiste siirtyy
torjunnasta ja vahinkojen korjauksesta kohti vahinkojen rakenteellista ehkäi-
syä. Kysyntä luo tarpeen myös uusille työkaluille, prosesseille ja tekniikoille,
joilla lisätään tietoturvatyön tehokkuutta ja vaikuttavuutta. Tällä hetkellä
kysyntää luovat lähinnä lisääntyneet tietoturvaa koskevat säädökset. Pää-
osa muutostarpeesta syntyy kuitenkin ohjelmistojen tilaajien ja käyttäjien
vaatimuksista: ohjelmistojen tietoturvakyvykkyyden taloudellinen merkitys
kasvaa. Tietoturvan tärkeys tulee korostumaan entisestään, lisäten tarvetta
tietoturvatyölle ja tutkimukselle myös tulevaisuudessa.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
APPLICATION
Those portions of a system,
including portions of the
operating system, that are not
responsible for enforcing the
system’s security policy
Definition in military std.
CSC-STD-003-85 (1985)
Software engineering is an extremely objective-oriented scientific and
engineering discipline. It provides the tools and methodologies aiming to
both defining the objectives of software, and the means to achieve them. In
a software product, security is a key characteristic required to make software
dependable, as defined in a taxonomy by Avizienis et al. (2004). In other
words, secure software can be relied upon, also in adverse situations. As
stated by Boehm (2006), software engineering is increasingly expanding to
include practices traditionally labeled as system engineering. To address
the security concerns in software development, security engineering is one of
these system engineering practices software development processes will have
to employ.
Software security has the goal of guaranteeing the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability of software for its authorized users. In software
development, this goal is achieved by the means of software security engi-
neering: A set of processes and practices utilized to transform the defined
security objectives into security features and functionality in the software.
This is accompanied by producing appropriate security assurance, viable
proof of security (Anderson, 2008). The desirable end result – “good” soft-
ware – is a combination of solid software engineering process, completed
with software security engineering practices, and executed to produce eco-
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nomically and technically viable software, meeting its intended objectives.
The term software security engineering reflects the aim to combine the prac-
tices of two engineering disciplines: security and software engineering. The
aim of this discipline according to McGraw (2006) is the implementation
of“secure features, not just security features”.
This chapter opens with a definition for the term “application”, taken
from an old military computer security standard. The definition serves as
an epitome of the traditional separation of duties and responsibilities in
software security. It represents a culture where the requirements and func-
tionality of the software itself are strictly separated from the requirements
for security (see Yost (2015)). In this model, security was an afterthought
and considered a hindrance to the efficiency of both the software and its
development. In a typical approach, security controls were separate prod-
ucts used to monitor and restrict the software, installed after the software
was already deployed in its operating environment. Software security was
entirely dependent on the security of its environment and depended on ex-
ternal protection (McGraw, 2006). Security requirements, however, concern
the software and the data directly. The dependency on external security
(firewalls, security monitoring, etc.) can probably not be completely re-
moved. The main benefit of software security engineering is the elimination
or mitigation of the risk to business processes introduced by software secu-
rity vulnerabilities: This can be best achieved by developing software with
validated and verified built-in security.
In the time of ubiquitous networked personal computing, the importance
of security in software products gained significant importance (Viega and
McGraw, 2002). Despite this recognized requirement, mainstream software
development methodologies remain security agnostic. The topic of security
is approached indirectly at best, from much wider perspectives of quality
assurance or architectural guidance (cf. Ambler and Lines, 2012a). In a
typical industry setting, software engineering and security engineering still
exist as detached practices. Security engineering is recognized as necessary
to protect the software and the data, but the practices are performed either
after the software engineering processes or parallel to it. This approach
necessarily requires additional resources or time and fits poorly into the
work methods of contemporary agile software development methodologies.
In software development, agility is characterized by lightweight processes
and organization, used to control an iterative and incremental development
process (Abrahamsson et al. (2002)). The agile methods were originally de-
veloped to meet the constraints of complexity, resources, and quality in soft-
ware projects. In less than two decades they have gained near-ubiquitous
mainstream dominance—largely due to their effectiveness. Security engi-
neering now faces the challenge of adaptation to the efficient agile processes,
and integrating into agile software security engineering. This transition can
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be considered a primary prerequisite for effective production of secure soft-
ware. The merger of these two fields of practice also acted as the primary
motivator for the research described in this thesis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the background and
motivation of the research are presented in Section 1.1; this is followed by
the presentation of key concepts in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3 the research
questions and the research objective are presented; Section 1.4 presents the
research in this and related fields, and Section 1.5 gives the structure of this
thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Across the many definitions of software engineering a set of core themes re-
curs. Software engineering is systematic work, and in ISO/IEC/IEEE Stan-
dard for Systems and software engineering (2010) termed as (systematic)
application of knowledge or skill, aiming to produce quantifiable and working
results. Software engineering is also defined systematic method of produc-
ing software products for computers or other electronic devices, containing
a set of key characteristics: the most important of these are functionality,
reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability and portability. From the
practitioner’s point of view, Bruegge and Dutoit (2003) approach software
engineering through its various rationale-driven activities, resulting in mod-
eling the real world into a software artifact by knowledge acquisition and
problem-solving.
The definitions provided by e.g. Sommerville (2015) describe the char-
acteristics of good software as acceptable or fit for purpose, dependable and
secure, efficient, and maintainable. Addition of security to these character-
istics is relatively recent, having taken place between 2005 and 2013. In
comparison, software safety, a related concept, is still only implicitly in-
cluded in these core definitions.
The characteristics attributed to good software by these definitions are
integral to the purpose of the engineering process and the products resulting
from it. As an emergent and applied science, software engineering is related
to computer science and system engineering; these are in turn emergent of
their relative scientific fields. The core principles of software engineering
can be epistemically and ontologically reduced to their roots in natural and
social sciences. Its independence is justified by the emergent properties
containing features that do not exist in any of the root properties. A core set
of properties attributed to a desirable software product, produced by a feat
of software engineering, contains properties such as robustness, reliability,
correctness, and effectiveness. When these are implemented in a proper
manner, a good basis for security, along with other properties, is achieved.
3
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In this sense, software security engineering, as protection from unauthorized
or unwanted use of software and the data it stores or processes, is further
emergent from software engineering (cf. Avizienis et al. (2004); Sommerville
(2015)).
Information system security and the related security assurance are typ-
ically based on the concept of “defense in depth”. This security model is
promoted by key security authorities, such as ICS-CERT (2016)1. In this
approach, security is built in layers consisting of multiple security controls
surrounding the protected information assets, described by e.g. Cleghorn
(2013). Maintaining a credible and effective security response requires skill
and resources, yet the amount of reported security breaches keeps growing
steadily according to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
tracking in the United States National Vulnerability Database (NIST NVD
(2018)) and globally to MITRE CVE (2018). Despite the coordinated global
effort, the economic and intellectual property losses resulting from the secu-
rity incidents are on the constant rise according to industry reports by e.g.
Ponemon Institute (2017, 2018). Interestingly, the reports also show a shift
in the industry’s security spending from network security towards applica-
tion and data security. The effects of this work will be evident only in the
long term, but the trend indicates a call for increased research in software
security engineering.
In the history of software engineering, standardization has been a princi-
pal driving force of security. The current ISO/IEC, IEEE, and most national
standards can directly trace their origins to the 1970s-era United States De-
partment of Defence’s standards and federal procurement guidelines. Later,
these are merged into a number of other national and international stan-
dards to form the current international software standard set. The security
standards are even more extensively based on U.S. military and other fed-
eral government specifications, according to historic recapitulations by Yost
(2007, 2015) and Bayuk and Mostashari (2013). The standardization work
started in the late 1960s—around the time when software engineering had
begun to be recognized as a discipline separate from systems engineering,
and computer science began to gain its status as an independent branch
of science. Besides providing regulations, the main purpose of standard-
ization in engineering is to maintain and share the best practices in their
representative area of expertise.
Upon their introduction, the agile software engineering methods were
criticized for having a detrimental effect on software security and lacking
characteristics necessary to comply with formal security models. These con-
cerns and criticisms were brought forth by e.g. Conboy et al. (2005). Initial
research was committed to applying security to the agile methods by e.g.
1The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
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Wäyrynen et al. (2004), basically concentrating on the feasibility of using
agile methods to produce secure software as defined by e.g. compliance re-
quirements. According to a thorough empiric research in the agile security
requirement elicitation by Ramesh et al. (2010), problems appear to rise
from the prioritization of the requirements. However, requirement manage-
ment and prioritization are among the key principles of the agile methods
(see e.g. Schwaber (1995); Beck (2000)).
Traditional security engineering processes rely on a deterministic, process-
based and sequential approach. This approach aims to minimize the secu-
rity risk by introducing more or less rigid processes to meet the various
acceptance criteria, validated at pre-fixed milestones. From the security en-
gineering point of view, agile methods are seen too feature-focused to allow
for the necessary security analysis or planning. Agile development has also
been seen by e.g. Kruchten (2010) to have negative effects on architectural
planning, including security architecture; this view is further discussed and
partially reconciled by Abrahamsson et al. (2010). As the security require-
ments are often categorized non-functional, following the agile principles is
considered likely to cause security requirements to be underprioritized as
unnecessary overhead. Despite the ongoing research effort, security practi-
tioners still encounter difficulties in applying security engineering to agile
projects, as observed by e.g. Türpe and Poller (2017).
1.2 Key Concepts
This chapter provides the terminology and definitions for software engineer-
ing and security engineering. Key research items are presented and the
research challenges positioned within their respective fields.
1.2.1 Software Engineering in Security Context
During its relatively short lifespan, software engineering has gone through
some comprehensive transformations (see Sommerville (2015)). The evolu-
tionary process of the software engineering methodologies reflects the funda-
mental transformations undergone by the software industry – and the fields
of its applications. The development in the fields of electronics, networking,
and software tools during the past few decades has been unprecedented,
as are the skill requirements to be able to use and develop them. These
changes reflect also to the methodological level, although with a delay in
wider adaptation. In software development, however, the traditional man-
agement approaches have been effectively replaced by agile methodologies
as shown by VersionOne (2018) and already noted by Abrahamsson et al.
(2002).
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Prevalent use of the adaptive, iterative, incremental and lightweight
methods contrasts the classic security engineering methodologies. The in-
creasing requirement for software security will require introduction of secu-
rity engineering techniques into software development. Software security is
more than a subset of software quality assurance. It introduces security risk
and requirement assessment techniques to form security policies, security
engineering techniques to implement the policies, and the security assur-
ance component to provide evidence of successfully met security objectives.
Software engineering and security engineering share the goal of robust, de-
pendable, reliable and economically feasible software. Managing the security
requirements and processes should not diverge from the management of soft-
ware development processes. To maintain effectiveness under strict security
requirements, convergence is necessary to perform at the methodological
level.
1.2.2 Security Engineering and Software Security Engi-
neering
A conceptual definition of security engineering by Anderson (2008) states
it is “the practice of building systems to remain dependable in the face of
malice, error, or mischance”. The practice of software security engineering
forms a distinct field within both software engineering and security engineer-
ing. It exists to mitigate man-made risks and threats to software-intensive
systems. It introduces a wide set of constraints and requirements to the
development process, typically requiring a distinct set of development-time
activities to be performed in various stages of the software development pro-
cess. Software security engineering practices and activities are integrated,
or at least directly related to the software development practices (see Viega
and McGraw (2002)).
Sommerville (2015) divides information security into three domains: in-
frastructure security, application security and organizational security. Soft-
ware engineering primarily concerns applications; software security engi-
neering may be thus defined as security engineering performed during the
software development phase of the software life cycle. In order to be effec-
tive, elements from all three domains are required.
To further specify the structure of software security engineering, the
Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) de-
fines software security engineering to consist of three security processes for
the management of security risk, security engineering, and security assur-
ance. In the development of secure software, these can be considered the
key areas to be addressed by security engineering frameworks, or security
development lifecycle models. The SSE-CMM is standardized as ISO/IEC
Standard 21827:2008 (2008). To complete this structure, also the context in
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Figure 1.1: Software Security Engineering in standard-derived Information
Security domains and contexts, as derived from ISO/IEC software security
standards
which security engineering is performed needs to be defined.
The capability frameworks generally follow with the traditional Plan-Do-
Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. The PDCA is an iterative management principle,
tracing its origin back to the statistical management methods by Shewhart
and Deming (1939). Continual improvement, a central theme in the ag-
ile methods, provides a mechanism to prevent the organizational standards
from becoming “dogmatic” by continually maintaining their relevance. It
also helps to maintain a relevant security rationale, justification of the secu-
rity effort.
The ISO standard for application security, ISO/IEC Sstandard 27034-
1:2011 (2011), uses the notion of three security contexts: normative, contain-
ing laws, standards, and other regulation; organizational, containing people,
policies, and business processes; and technical, containing the technological
assets.
These activity areas and security contexts form the basis of how secu-
rity engineering is examined in this thesis. The conceptual framework is
presented in Figure 1.1.
The diagram is made from the viewpoint of software security, and rep-
resents the relationship between the key concepts. Software security engi-
neering concerns each of the three domains, and each of the three defined
contexts. Software security engineering contains the three main processes:
risk, security and assurance as defined by the SSE-CMM.
The primary motivation of the research presented in this thesis is to
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Figure 1.2: Security vulnerabilities in software development ways to ad-
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examine how software security engineering is to be conducted in agile set-
tings, and how both security engineering activities and software engineering
methods should be adjusted to further guarantee quantifiable, working, and
secure results. In the software industry, security engineering is often prac-
ticed by following open and public precompiled guides, security frameworks
and security development lifecycle models. In addition to the organizational
and technological constraints, the security work is guided by software secu-
rity standards, and other regulation (cf. Schneider and Berenbach (2013)).
Software security engineering combines the practices of both software
engineering and security engineering and extends them. It deals with secu-
rity vulnerabilities specific to software applications introduced during their
design and development. An overview of this field is presented in Figure 1.2.
The main causes for security vulnerabilities are placed on the left, and
the methods are presented on the right, supported by organizational security
training. Arrows depict the concepts of how the vulnerabilities are addressed
in a software development process. The diagram also depicts the distinction
between the mechanisms of software engineering and security engineering
and their limitations. For example quality assurance may not adequately
verify and validate the security requirements, and security management is
needed to correctly coordinate the security objectives and to create a man-
ageable security rationale. The framework in the diagram is derived from the
body of security standards and models presented in the following chapters,
applied to software development.
Although qualitative requirements like robustness, reliability, and cor-
rectness are inherent to secure software, software security is not achieved by
quality improvement alone (Howard and Lipner (2006)). To meet the prop-
erly set security objectives, a definitive set of security engineering activities
is also required. By performing a set of tests, the absence of software security
can be verified. Poor quality, such as design flaws and implementation bugs
are a security threat even without malicious intent. Another clear distinc-
tion between traditional software engineering and Quality Assurance (QA)
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efforts is seen on the requirement level, where the verification and validation
of security-specific requirements typically require security-specific testing.
Validation, in this context, refers to the relevance of the tests themselves:
they link the security tests to the security objectives. The produced security
assurance is employed as evidence of how the security objectives have been
met, and the risk management controls implemented.
Security assurance forms a significant part of the results of security en-
gineering. It is used to provide evidence of the security implementation,
to manage security risks, and to evaluate the security of the software. As-
surance itself is produced through various assurance techniques: reviews,
interviews, analyses, and security testing. Security validation can also be
performed by an independent third party, performing security audits in the
form of witnessed tests or public reviews (Such et al. (2016)).
The foundation of software security engineering is training and skills.
The right skill set, combined with the right tools, is the best remedy for
implementation-level issues. Security training is a ubiquitous requirement
in security work and may form a significant part of the security assurance.
Skill allows the detection, avoidance and even anticipation of software bugs,
design flaws, or incorrect or missing security requirements. Clear communi-
cation with the stakeholders is another direct mechanism to reduce all types
of security vulnerabilities. A high-level coordination effort is also typically
necessary to maintain the security rationale through security objectives.
Security engineering in a software-intensive system is a composite of the
information security concepts presented above, and discussed further in the
following chapters. Research in this thesis concentrates on the security en-
gineering activities applicable to software engineering. These activities are
primarily applicable during the software development lifecycle (see ISO/IEC
Standard 15288 (2015) and ISO/IEC Standard 21827:2008 (2008)), and aim
to fulfill the security requirements of the software product under develop-
ment. Furthermore, the focus is on the methodological level: How software
security engineering can be integrated into the modern agile and lean de-
velopment methods, used to build diverse and complex software-intensive
systems.
1.3 Research Questions
The research is motivated and was initiated by the essentially important
requirement of software security. To achieve this goal and to set the scope
for the work, and to ensure the usefulness of the results, the following pre-
conditions were set:
• Industry standard software development practices, i.e., lightweight it-
erative and incremental methods are applied (agile development);
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• The mechanisms to implement software security are defined by indus-
try standard software security development life cycle processes and
maturity models.
In software security engineering, the security rationale, which can be
understood as a set of security objectives, is used to set the security require-
ments. Consequently, this research focuses on the software security engi-
neering practices used to achieve these objectives by correctly eliciting the
security requirements, ensuring the correctness of the security engineering
implementation, and the effectiveness of security assurance. This framework
helps to formalize the research objective, development and construction of
secure software products: How can secure software be produced using agile
software development processes? The research questions are derived from the
research objective, and become more specific as the security methodologies
and mechanisms are taken under scrutiny.
Part of the research objective is finding efficient and effective ways to
fulfill the security rationale, in conformance with existing software develop-
ment practices. The research focuses on the methods of software security
engineering, the practical activities involved in making software secure and
producing security assurance. Validating the use of these activities included
conceptual research, a case study, and surveying the industry practices in
software development and security engineering.
RQ1: How are software security objectives and practices aligned with ag-
ile software development?
This research question concentrates on the definition of security, and the se-
curity objectives, targets and requirements set in the software development
process. Software engineering is, by definition, translation of requirements
into functionality. Security requirements undergo the same process, but
defining the security requirements and prioritizing their implementation is a
challenge for software development organizations with conflicting objectives
and limited resources. Understanding the security objectives and correctly
defining security requirements is the basis of the software security engineer-
ing work. This research question is answered on the methodological level
by defining a concrete cross-section of software security standards, security
policies and the comparable agile software development practices related to
objective setting and requirement definition.
RQ2: How can software security engineering be integrated into agile soft-
ware development methodologies?
Security engineering during software development is performed by a set of
activities and processes, selected to meet the security engineering objec-
tives and to provide sufficient security assurance. This research question
is answered by examining the existing security maturity and security de-
velopment life cycle models both in relation to the software development
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Figure 1.3: Research objective, research questions and the related publi-
cations
methodologies, concrete software security development work, and the se-
curity objectives examined in RQ1. Specific attention is paid to fitting
security engineering tasks into an iterative and incremental development
process, done in a way that conforms with the agile and lean methods and
conforms with the agile software development practices. The research focus
is in choosing the appropriate security engineering activities and combin-
ing them into the agile software engineering processes and tools. The goal
is to enable the software development organization to achieve the security
objectives in an effective manner and in better coordination with other,
potentially conflicting objectives.
RQ3: How is security engineering affecting the agile development process
and the security of the software?
This research question is aimed to identify the challenges and security im-
pact of integrating software security engineering into iterative workflow – the
themes central to RQ1 and RQ2. Compliance with security standards and
organizational security policies, and the resulting requirements for security
assurance are considered an important factor in software security engineer-
ing. These security engineering practices and their consequent effect on the
actual improvement to the security of the software products are items of
specific research interest.
The research structure and the publications providing the main contri-
bution are visualized in Figure 1.3. The publications are described in further
detail in Chapter 4.
The research objective is to define and develop methods and techniques
for producing such software that meets its security objectives. Additionally,
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this objective has the condition of utilizing the agile methodologies currently
prevalent in the software industry. In the given descriptions, the adjective
“agile” is used to denote the software methodologies currently prevalent in
the software industry. The practices and activities characteristic to these
methods are presented in Chapter 3.
1.4 Related Research
Security engineering is an active area of research with multiple subtopics.
Agile software engineering has become a subject of research in early 2000s,
with early work conducted by Wäyrynen et al. (2004), Kongsli (2006), and
Boström et al. (2006). While much of the early research interest concen-
trated on the feasibility of agile software security engineering in general, Ge
et al. (2007) made one of the initial efforts to develop and describe agile ar-
chitectures. Agile quality mechanisms were examined by Huo et al. (2004).
More conceptual agile software engineering research was conducted by Baca
and Carlsson (2011), with empirical experimentation by e.g. Ayalew et al.
(2013), Oyetoyan et al. (2016), and with some noted challenges, by Türpe
and Poller (2017). Security assurance in agile development has been focused
on by Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) and ben Othmane et al. (2014). A sim-
ilar objective to this research has been chosen also by Stirbu and Mikkonen
(2018), aiming to achieve regulatory compliance more efficiently by utilizing
agile methods, concentrating on the field of software safety.
From a software engineer’s point of view, software security engineering
requires an understanding of the security objectives (what and why), and
awareness of a wide array of security techniques to implement the required
security features and functionalities. Requirements engineering, risk man-
agement, quality improvement, estimates and metrics, and formal methods
are among the closest practices required to further develop software secu-
rity engineering. The improvement process will start at security awareness,
created by security research and training. Security is a relatively new focus
area in software engineering, and increasing regulatory security constraints
force the industry – and research – to meet the demand in an economical
and efficient way, inherent to prevalent software engineering methods. The
future of security engineering is shared with software engineering, and this
requires confluence and compatibility with agile methods.
The reduction of implementation-time errors is a central research topic.
In this work, security awareness was identified to be a crucial factor in the
systematic reduction of security vulnerabilities. A solution suggested by
Adelyar and Norta (2016) is agile agent-oriented modeling, bringing the se-
curity principles a concrete part of the software design and implementation.
Another approach to find a practical way to improve software security is
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aspect-oriented security programming and design, a concept suggested by
De Win et al. (2002) and extended upon by e.g. Boström et al. (2005). In
industry, the reduction of implementation is typically performed by follow-
ing a precompiled list of instructions – a concept described by Tsipenyuk
et al. (2005).
A primary mechanism to provide security assurance is to perform vari-
ous forms of verification and validation. Recent work in the validation and
verification, and the involved methods is extensively summarized by a sys-
tematic literature studby by Such et al. (2016) An analysis of risk-based
testing approaches was performed by Felderer and Schieferdecker (2014).
Current issues and challenges in security testing in software development
have been reported by Cruzes et al. (2017).
Software safety is a closely related field of research: Software security and
software safety share much of the same methodology and rationale. Agile
methods have been used for safety critical work by Fitzgerald et al. (2013);
the effect of safety regulation to DevOps has been considered by Laukkarinen
et al. (2018). The agile development process has been adopted to formally
comply with Capability Maturity Model’s maturity levels by e.g. Marcal
et al. (2007); Jakobsen and Sutherland (2009). Cases where hindrances in
applying agile to security engineering were found, or agile being detrimental
to software security have also been reported by e.g. Türpe and Poller (2017).
This indicates a requirement for further research in agile security engineer-
ing, and that a divergence in the ways to efficiently produce safer software is
required. Research concerning software standards regarding requirement en-
gineering has been extensively mapped by Schneider and Berenbach (2013).
Security engineering and software engineering are cross-disciplinary prac-
tices. System security engineering is defined in the United States Depart-
ment of Defence’s guide for protection of trusted systems and networks
(2017), page 14, as “an element of system engineering that applies scientific
and engineering principles to identify security vulnerabilities and minimize
or contain risks associated with these vulnerabilities”. Information security
research draws methods and theories from e.g. philosophy, history, political
science, sociology, psychology, law, statistics, computer science, physics and
mathematics, as stated by Anderson (2008).
Software security engineering specifically concentrates on the security
issues within software engineering: Security metrics, formal software devel-
opment methods, programming languages, software development method-
ologies, and security techniques and tools. There is a substantial overlap
of methodologies and practices with software security and software quality
improvement, as quality assurance techniques and tools alone do not suffi-
ciently address the security-related requirements. Along with most fields of
computing, software security engineering is also an opportune field for appli-
cations of machine learning and artificial intelligence research. Behavioural
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sciences, such as industrial and organizational psychology, are directly ap-
plicable to the design and development of secure information systems.
In addition to the above fields of research and application, the research
topic includes several directly security-related fields of application. These
include protection of intellectual property, identity management, cryptogra-
phy, communication security, privacy, investigation of computer crime, and
information warfare. Increasing legislative and regulative pressure for pro-
tection of privacy and related immaterial rights promotes the privacy-related
topics, mandating strict privacy policies for the management of sensitive
data. Privacy can not exist without security.
Software security engineering necessarily shares methodologies and char-
acteristics with mainstream software engineering methods (Viega and Mc-
Graw (2002); McGraw (2006); Anderson (2008)). Consequently, following
the software engineering trends, software security engineering is predom-
inantly based on automated tools. Software security is also increasingly
formalized by regulative requirements, mandating not only secure coding
practices, but concrete security features and functionality as a requirement
for software development. The methodologies are presented in a design sci-
ence framework, as presented by Hevner and March (2004).
1.5 Structure of The Thesis
The thesis consists of an introduction part, divided into four further sec-
tions, and the main research contribution given in separate but connected
research articles. The following sections present the field of software security
engineering. Section 2 presents the knowledge base for the security develop-
ment process, by presenting the core international standards and techniques
of software security engineering and their history in an ethnographic frame-
work. The central ISO/IEC software and application security standards
are presented. The standards are complemented by presenting the central
industry- and community-sourced security development and maturity mod-
els.
The security engineering standards and methodologies are used to form
an analytic framework, against which the selected agile software develop-
ment methods are presented. The agile methods most commonly used for
the build process are presented in Section 3. An ethnographic retrospec-
tive of the methods is presented, and a security engineering analysis per-
formed along with the guidelines presented by Hevner and March (2004).
The structural components of each method and the benefits and challenges
experienced in applying them into software security engineering work are
drawn from extant literature. Specifically, the analytic focus is in the use-
fulness and effectiveness of individual software development practices for
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security engineering work.
In Section 4, the individual peer reviewed publications are presented,
and their contribution summarized. Section 5 presents the main findings
and their implications and concludes the thesis by providing directions for
future research in software security engineering.
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Chapter 2
Software Security
In software engineering research, software security is considered an essential
part of the correctness of a computer system or communications, denoted
by the concept of dependability. A definition of dependability states it to
be “a generic concept including a special case such attributes as reliability,
availability, safety, confidentiality, integrity, maintainability, etc.” as defined
by Avizienis et al. (2004). Software security, as a part of the broader field
of information security, is in ISO/IEC Standard 15026-1:2013 (2013) de-
fined as the practice aiming for protection of system items from accidental
or malicious access, use, modification, destruction, or disclosure. This also
effectively comprises the attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability.
Software security engineering activities are specific to the protection of
computer and software data, assets, and processes. The key concepts and at-
tributes of information security are depicted in Figure 2.1 from the software
security perspective.
This classic diagram visualizes the information security elements, ap-
plied to the context of software security. The triangle represents the in-
terdependent core attributes forming the security objectives: confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability. In this depiction, the sides form the system
boundaries, and contain the protected asset, such as a service or data. The
software resides in an operating environment, which may host other con-
nected systems, and connect to other potentially unknown system environ-
ments. Operating environments consist of hardware, networking, software,
and people in various roles. Typically this is run by an organization, and
guided by policies, regulations, and laws (cf. ISO/IEC Sstandard 27034-
1:2011 (2011)).
Organizations achieve security objectives by implicit or explicit security
policies. Policies are enforced by various security mechanisms, implemented
into the operating environment and, during the software development pro-
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Figure 2.1: Software security elements and characteristics
cess, the software itself. These mechanisms include authorization, restricting
access to the protected assets and authentication, verifying the authoriza-
tion. Various cryptography methods are used to verify the authenticity of
the accessing parties, as well as to encrypt the data and the other software-
protected assets. Data may be in various states, such as in storage, being
processed, or being transferred between system entities.
Encryption of the data and the communications is a cornerstone of secu-
rity. It reduces the risk of unauthorized use of data after the other methods
have failed. Encryption does not, however, protect against availability risks:
combined measures taking place in the software and operating environment
are required to ensure availability. Encryption is also an effective means to
reduce the security risk, although an extensive encryption framework may
be costly to implement and maintain (Ponemon Institute (2018, 2017)).
Besides governing software development, the security policy framework
covers the whole software life cycle, extending also to other domains be-
side application security: infrastructure and the organization. This includes
physical security of the computing assets, security controls for the person-
nel processing, accessing and operating the assets. Security policies can
be further divided to corporate, organizational or technical, as specified by
Baskerville and Siponen (2002), an approach quite close to the ISO standard
for application security, ISO/IEC Sstandard 27034-1:2011 (2011).
Security engineering involves a wide range of methods and techniques.
Besides computer science, the disciplines vary from cryptography to sociol-
ogy, law and psychology (Anderson (2008)). The means to breach informa-
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tion security stem from the same source as the means to protect it. The
adversaries typically have the benefit of drastically less limited resources:
most importantly, they have considerably less limiting time constraints, and
the benefit of accumulated post hoc vulnerability information.
In a software lifecycle model, in which the software is first developed
and released, and then potentially gets updated in the maintenance phase,
the long-term focus has traditionally been on operational security. A shift
towards iterative development has introduced various continuous delivery
models. These models enable software developers to implement and deploy
security engineering response in reaction to changing or entirely new security
requirements. In addition, new security threat models put an emphasis on
the security of the software itself, not just the environment.
Figure 2.2 depicts the lifecycle of an advanced security threat: insertion
into an information system, exploiting security vulnerabilities, and achieving
the attacker’s objectives.
Preparations Compromise Post-compromise
Research, 
identificate, 
and select 
target(s)
Choose an 
exploit and an 
attack  vector
Transmit the 
exploit into 
the target
Trigger 
exploit of a 
vulnerability
Establish 
persistence
Establish a 
communication 
channel
Exfiltrate, 
alter or destroy 
data
Figure 2.2: Lifecycle of an advanced software security threat (adapted
from Hutchins et al. (2011))
The diagram helps illustrate the progressive phases during a security ex-
ploit. Although the threat must not go through all the individual phases,
security forensics indicates that exploits and threats may reside within the
operating environment for prolonged periods of time. After the firewalls and
other external protection measures have been bypassed, software vulnera-
bilities are probed for, and possibly exploited, for extended periods. The
total length of a security breach may be several months before an exploit
is utilized. The exploitation continues until it is detected, or the adversary
decides to terminate the activity. In the latter case, the incident may never
be detected (Krutz and Vines (2010)).
Protecting the system boundaries and the operating environment is a
concerted effort, requiring an organization to employ multiple security engi-
neering practices. Security is a combination of security engineering efforts,
and should be prepared to detect and prevent security threats and vulnera-
bilities also in each application system. Software security engineering acts to
improve the security at all the stages of an incident, as presented in Figure
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2.2, by the following mechanisms:
• reducing the attack vectors,
• reducing the number of available exploits, and
• reducing the ability to act on the objectives.
In software development, security objectives are set also by legislation
and regulation. The increased demand for security assurance calls for addi-
tional techniques and processes incorporated into the software development
methodologies. These techniques and security procedures may be costly and
time-consuming to implement. Especially in software development, it can be
very challenging to attain formal security maturity levels in an economically
feasible manner, as reviewed by Silva et al. (2015).
The drive for secure software requires a new combination of cutting edge
software engineering methods. These need to be able to flexibly meet the
various requirements of the system development, and ready to accommodate
the core security processes and practices required to achieve the security ra-
tionale. This combination would not only address the security requirements
but also benefit the whole software development process and software lifecy-
cle, resulting in reduced risk and lowered lifetime cost (Howard and Lipner
(2006)).
2.1 Software Security Standards
Early information security, with central computers in access-controlled loca-
tions, was primarily about physical security and personnel control. Cryptog-
raphy was primarily a means to secure communications, both electronic and
otherwise, with fewer considerations for encryption of stored data. First for-
mal requirements for computer security were made by the US Department of
Defense (DoD) in 1967 “to address computer security safeguards that would
protect classified information in remote-access, resource-sharing computer
systems”. This specification can be found in the history section of one of the
first comprehensive information security standards, the Orange Book (DoD
(1985b)). The book is called such simply by the color of its cover. Together
with a supplementing standard presenting implementation guidance (DoD
(1985a)), presented formal evaluation criteria and simplistic selection ma-
trix for security policies to be enforced, based on the strict classifications of
data and the personnel accessing it.
The late 1960s was a crucial transition period to both software and
security engineering: batch-based computing began to be replaced by time-
sharing of mainframe resources and networking, posing the computer oper-
ators and programmers with unprecedented complexity and a new array of
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concepts. The users gaining remote access to computer’s internal data and
processes through connected terminals created a new set of programming
challenges, and also a requirement for security. Drastic quality improvement
efforts were necessary to prevent the users from crashing the computers and
corrupting data by issuing malformed programs, commands or data. The
era and its problems, known as the “software crisis”, is discussed in more
detail by e.g. Dijkstra (1972). This is also the time when the standard-
ization work in both software and security started, addressing an increased
requirement for secure high-quality software. The root of both can be traced
into the United States’ federal government guidelines, especially those of the
Department of Defense.
Military specifications, such as the Orange Book, are purpose-built for
strict hierarchies and have required a thorough “demilitarization” to be use-
ful in a wider array of organizations. The root source of the current inter-
national computer standards is in these early US and NATO military stan-
dards. For wider applicability, they are combined with a number of issues
by U.S. National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now NIST), and publications
by other national standardization institutes, most importantly British Stan-
dards Institution (BSI) in the United Kingdom, and Deutsches Institut für
Normung (DIN) in Germany. The main body of these is maintained by the
International Standardization Organization (ISO), more specifically the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The committee developing
the information and ICT protection standards (Joint Technical Committee
1, Subcommittee 27) is currently chaired by DIN. The ISO/IEC standard-
ization work is increasingly combined with the work from the US-based
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
The ISO standards form only the general core of the standardization
body, completed with extensive national and industry-specific regulations.
These form complex interdependent frameworks that may be very difficult
to follow and therefore benefit from. An especially complicated example of
such a framework is the current U.S. DoD cybersecurity policy and guidance
matrix: the extensive amount of documentation included in this framework
is shown in Figure 2.3.
The chart itself is here presented merely as an example of a well-matured
and extensive normative framework with a downside of complexity. It con-
tains 195 linked documents in 16 functional categories. The documents
range from national cybersecurity strategies to operational instructions of
the specific technologies. While this may seem complex, the United States
federal system security framework, Ross et al. (2014), contains a numeri-
cally even more impressive effort with 30 processes, 111 activities and 428
defined security engineering tasks. This work, published in November 2016,
provides an example of an elaborate security scheme with heavy emphasis
on security assurance. The regulative pressure on software development is
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Figure 2.3: Example of a complex and extensive organizational norma-
tive framework by the Department of Defence Information Analysis Center
(2018)
propagated by regulating the procurement process, setting guidelines and
assurance requirements. It should also be noted that these frameworks are
likely to contain only unclassified documentation with additional documen-
tation withheld from the public.
In Finland, the government initiative for cybersecurity, VAHTI, provides
instructions for security implementation (VAHTI (2016)). It helps instan-
tiating the guidelines of Finland’s current national cyber security strategy
(Rantala and Kievari (2016)). VAHTI currently consists of 49 standing in-
struction documents. A single one of these instructions, the VAHTI 1/2013
(2013), sets the regulatory requirements for the software development pro-
cesses. This in the form of a three-level maturity model, depending on the
security classification of the protected asset. In wider industry standardiza-
tion use, the term “cybersecurity” is currently used mainly in the context
of industrial automation, regulated by ISO/IEC Standard 62443 series.
To maintain a clarity of the key concepts and the number of standards
manageable, only the central ISO/IEC standards concerning software secu-
rity are under scrutiny. The scope is limited to software security engineering.
The standards are used to provide key terminology and the main concepts of
security engineering used throughout the later sections. Dependencies and
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positions of the most important security standards in the ISO/IEC software
standardization are presented in Figure 2.4
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Figure 2.4: Related ISO/IEC software and security standard structure
The standards presented in Figure 2.4 are organized into four groups:
governance and quality standards; the systems and software engineering
lifecycle management standards within the former; the assessment and cer-
tification standards; and the standards for assessment and implementation
of security. The focus is on the security standards, presented by the colored
items in the center of Figure 2.4. The adjoining standard categories provide
the necessary points of reference and connections for general governance,
quality, and other standards regarding software engineering.
To clarify the concept of software security, three core ISO/IEC security
standards directly involved with software development are examined closer.
The first of these is the Common Criteria ISO/IEC Standard 15408-1:2009
(2014), which provides security guidance for evaluation of security of the
software products and their operating environment. The second one is the
SSE-CMM ISO/IEC Standard 21827:2008 (2008), which provides a semi-
formal process framework for security engineering. The Common Criteria is
used to derive the definitions and requirements for security assurance, and
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concrete criteria for evaluation of security objectives. From the SSE-CMM, a
set of security engineering and risk management processes is presented, and
a basic security engineering framework is extracted. These two main stan-
dards are set into a wider perspective of information security and applica-
tion security management by the standard for application security, ISO/IEC
Sstandard 27034-1:2011 (2011). Much of the terminology and principles in
this research work are derived from these, cross-referenced with related stan-
dards. It should be noted that there are separate standards also for security
assurance (ISO/IEC Standard 15026-1:2013 (2013) and ISO/IEC Standard
15443-1:2012 (2012), and a risk management framework (ISO/IEC Stan-
dard 27005:2018 (2018)). The ISO technical report 22216, currently still
under development, is being created to make it easier to apply the Common
Criteria.
For each method or security framework presented, applying it to agile
development methods is discussed. The bulk of ISO standards predate the
agile methods. Even after recent updates they still maintain to concern
the ISO software life cycle models only, such as the ISO/IEC/IEEE Stan-
dard for Systems and Software Engineering Life Cycle Management (2018).
Adapting these models and methods for agile software development can be
very challenging, and there is much room for improvement. In this adap-
tation process, the main goal is to maintain flexibility to provide a viable
framework for a wide variety of security objectives.
2.1.1 Application Security
The ISO/IEC standard series for application security, the ISO/IEC 27034, is
an exhaustive yet complex work on the aspects of security in software appli-
cations. The scope of these standards is to define the security of software ap-
plications throughout their life cycle, complementing the more development-
oriented Common Criteria and SSE-CMM. The series currently consists of
seven main parts. Instead of techniques, this standard series defines the gov-
ernance of application security at various phases of the life cycle. It contains
definitions, security frameworks, terms and concepts, and clarifies the role
of security engineering in various phases of the software application’s life
cycle. Published over the course of several years, later parts define the ap-
plication security management and application security validation processes,
and application security data controls.
The central concepts in this standard areOrganization Normative Frame-
work (ONF), the Application Security Management Process (ASMP), and
the Application Security Controls (ASC). In this formalization, the ONF for
the ASMP is provided by separate organizational management processes,
resulting in Application Normative Framework (ANF), forming the security
requirements for the application. The approach to security improvement
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is strictly based on risk management, and the aim is to provide means to
evaluate and mitigate the security risks. ONF is specified in 27034-2 and
the ASMP in 27034-3.
The security framework is built on the principle that the organization,
utilizing a risk management process, comes up with a Targeted Level of
Trust for an application; the application’s Actual Level of Trust is then vali-
dated using an elaborate application security scheme framework, specified in
27034-4. The validation of the achieved level of trust is achieved by a com-
bination of security testing and other means to provide security assurance.
Formal security audits are heavily utilized to ensure formal compliance with
the standard.
This standard provides the governance model and principles for appli-
cation security management. Besides a recent extension describing "Case
Studies" (27034-6), the standard does not specify the security engineering
activities themselves, nor does it provide concrete criteria for their evalu-
ation. Instead, it describes the security-related processes involved in the
procurement and operating of software. The actual development-time soft-
ware security engineering activities are presented in the related standards,
presented in the following sections. These basic concepts derived from ISO
27034 series form also the analytic framework on software security engineer-
ing used throughout the following sections.
As stated, the origins of the approach reflected in the Common Criteria
are in the Orange Book, from an old military computer security standard
series. The evaluation framework was defined in the DoD security standard
5200.28-STD or CSC-STD-001-85, “Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria”. A directly related standard, CSC-STD-003-85, set the criteria
for different classes of Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which included the
software running on these platforms. An essential role of this accompanying
standard was to provide a mechanism to evaluate the security requirement
based on the preset security levels of the data and the users accessing the
system.
The original approach suited the limited amount of computers, systems,
and users of the time. This, combined with the context of strictly hier-
archical military organization, enabled the use of a simplistic instructional
guidance matrix to determine the security level for any computer system. In
this guidance, first the security target was defined based on a predetermined
classification of the data contained in the system. Based on this, the stan-
dard dictated the requirement criteria for evaluation, including the security
clearance requirement for the personnel. The security of the systems was
divided into three main classes, from the most lenient to the strictest:
• Class C: Discretionary protection and access controlled systems
• Class B: Mandatory protection with a division into security domains
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• Class A: Verified protection
Of these, Class A extended the requirement for verification of security
to cover also the system’s design and architecture. This classification ap-
proach has since been replaced with more flexible schemes, although the
United States NIST still advocates for a similar approach in its definition of
Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information
Systems NIST (2006).
The Common Criteria epitomizes the normative tradition of software
security engineering. Formalizing the security evaluation criteria provides
a firm base for evaluation of the assurance material: it sets the bar for the
material the security process must produce, in order to achieve a particular
EAL. The practical usefulness of the Common Criteria, however, remains
somewhat dubious: this multi-part publication represents a diffuse tome of
arcane security knowledge, unlikely to be utilized unless a level of compliance
is specifically required by a regulator. For a software development organi-
zation looking to establish or improve their software security engineering
function, the Common Criteria should prove useful reference material.
2.1.2 The Common Criteria
The ISO/IEC Common Criteria (ISO Standard 15408) aims to formalize
software security, security engineering and security assurance, and to make
software security commensurable between applications and organizations.
This standard describes the security targets for software products and pro-
cesses, provides a set of mechanisms to achieve them, and sets the criteria
and methodical framework to evaluate the level of achieved security. The
standard is published in three parts: the first part describes the general
model and the following two specify the functional components and assur-
ance components, respectively. There are two further parts under develop-
ment: a framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities,
and a pre-defined package of security requirements.
The Common Criteria also is a basis of an international certification or-
ganization, the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA), main-
taining a three-part public version of the standard (CCRA (2017a)). The
CCRA’s publication is used by the national certificate authorities to certify a
wide range of information technology and software-intensive products, and
also as the main source of this section. The public and openly available
evaluations, available through their web site, help organizations forming a
trusted computing base for their information systems - combined with their
own security targets and security objectives. In Finland, the Finnish Com-
munications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) is a member of the CCRA,
although as a “consuming member” not authorized to give security evalua-
tions.
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Basic Concepts
The Common Criteria describes a thorough formal framework and qualita-
tive criteria for evaluation of a Target Of Evaluation (TOE), an information
system or a software entity. The framework is based on a risk evaluation
process. The security requirements for the TOE are assessed based on the
risk evaluation process. These criteria themselves do not specify, nor re-
strict, how they should be applied: it is implied that the requirements are
mostly normative. In practice, this requires the existence of an ONF, and a
derived ANF, as specified in the application security standard.
A central practical contribution of the standard is the concept of Pro-
tection Profiles (PP). This concept encapsulates the security objectives and
requirements to be completed, regarding both the TOE and its operational
environment. The PP also contains the security rationale for the security
objectives and requirements. The rationale justifies them by offering a set
of definitive security assurance: the proof why the security objectives ex-
ist, and that a suitable set of security requirements, both for the functional
(SFR) and the assurance (SAR) requirements, have been created to meet
and trace them.
To clarify the security objectives, a set of Security Targets (STs) is de-
fined. An ST may claim conformance with a number of particular PPs.
The ST may also be evaluated to determine sufficient security for the TOE
and operating environment. Certain parts of the system are responsible for
correctly enforcing the SFR. Together, these form the overall TOE Secu-
rity Functionality (TSF). The Common Criteria deals explicitly with the
functional implications of the security requirements.
The TOE has a number of Security Objectives, which are high-level so-
lutions to identified security problems: these are set by security threats,
policies, and assumptions. The Security Objectives are divided into security
objectives for the TOE, and security objectives for the operating environ-
ment. The requirements for the operating environment affect also the soft-
ware development process: they may set restrictions to where, how and by
whom the software is used, and may either further restrict its functionality
or even have additional functionality requirements.
Security Requirements
Security requirements are an essential part of software security engineering.
To determine the security requirements, the SFR and SAR are created based
on the security rationale. SFRs are formally defined and classified: the SFR
classification is presented in Table 2.1. The SFRs are required to completely
address the Security Objectives of the TOE, at a level of abstraction com-
pletely independent from the implementation.
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The SAR then describes how the TOE is to be evaluated. In Common
Criteria, security assurance exists to provide an exact description of how the
evaluation is to be done and to allow comparison between the various STs.
The overall ST can be determined for example by combining the security
requirements with the claimed conformance with the PPs.
Table 2.1: Security Functional Requirement Classes in the ISO/IEC Stan-
dard 15408-1:2009 (2014)
Code Class Name Functional Summary
FAU Security audit Auditing data, events and analysis
FCO Communication Non-repudiation of origin and receipt
FCS Cryptographic support Key management and operations
FDP User data protection Data and communications protection
FIA Identification and User authentication
authentication Failure management
FMT Security Management Security roles, attributes and functions
(normative)
FPR Privacy Anonymity and observability
FPT Protection of the TSF Technical protection
Secure failure and recovery
FRU Resource utilization Fault tolerance, priorities, resources
FTA TOE Access Access session and history management
FTP Trusted path/channels Inter-TSF trusted channels and paths
These 13 SFR classes contain 66 pre-defined security components, spec-
ified by CCRA (2017b). The structure, contents and operations of each of
the components is specified, with descriptions and notes to guide their im-
plementation. The specification goes on to define the structure of the class
formed by its constituent security components. The security components
range from specific security patterns (“FTA_MCS: limitation of multiple
concurrent sessions”) to specific UI functionalities (“FTA_TAH: display to
users [..] a history of unsuccessful attempts to access the account”).
The software architecture and its operating environment determine which
requirement classes are applied. Formally, this happens through the security
rationale, justifying and dictating the security objectives, by which the SFRs
and SARs are selected. The appropriate functional requirement classes are
then derived accordingly.
Security assurance is also extensively covered. The SAR is partly de-
fined by the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) of the TOE. The EALs
contain an increasing number of requirements ranging from the basic EAL1
to the most rigorous EAL7. The EALs are packages of evaluation assur-
ance requirements with accumulating and increasingly rigorous assurance
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requirements. Each EAL has three dimensions: scope, depth and rigour.
The assurance classes start from the development process; the components
of the evaluation are presented in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: The Common Criteria’s Evaluation Assurance Levels for De-
velopment and the Required Security Assurance artifacts as given in ISO
Standard 15408
There are five tracks for Development assurance: 1) Functional Specifi-
cations (FSP), with increasing detail and formality requirements; 2) Security
Architecture Description (ARC), which is one of the first documents to be
produced and is required on EAL2 and up; 3) Technical Design Specification
(TDS), also with increasing detail and formality requirements; 4) Require-
ments for the TOE’s internal structure (INT): in software development, this
would call for code reviews on the lower levels, and on EAL6 and 7, also
code complexity analyses; 5) At EAL6, also formal Security Policy Model
(SPM) for the TOE itself is required.
The detailed descriptions and prerequisites for each assurance item are
given in the Common Criteria specification Part 3 (CCRA (2017c)). EAL7
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does not add new requirements to development assurance, as the added secu-
rity requirements regard security functionality. In addition to Development
assurance, other areas with defined EALs are Guidance Documents, lifecy-
cle support, Security Target evaluation, Tests and Vulnerability assessment.
These all have a similar structure of required assurance documentation.
Applying the Common Criteria
The evaluation itself, when applied to a TOE (i.e., not the operational en-
vironment part of the Security Target), is of particular interest from the
software development point of view. The Common Criteria lists ten specific
techniques, most of which are directly applicable, or integral part of, the
software development lifecycle. Table 2.2 presents these techniques mapped
into the security development life cycle phases.
Table 2.2: Security evaluation techniques in the ISO/IEC Standard 15408-
1:2009 (2014)
Phase Technique
Requirement Definition of SFR and SAR
Design Cross-analysis of TOE designs
Vulnerability analysis and flaw hypothesis
TOE design analysis against the requirements
Implementation Analysis and checking of processes and procedures
Verification Verification of proofs
Independent functional testing
Test case and test result review
Penetration testing
Verification of processes and procedures
Release Analysis of guidance documents
These techniques, provided here without detailed descriptions, reflect
the Common Criteria’s systemic approach to security: after the security
work has been done the proof is evaluated. The strongly assurance-based
approach is reflected by the distribution of the techniques in the security
development life cycle: half of the techniques are applied at the verification
phase. Despite an apparent verification phase bias, the design phase tech-
niques are applicable to the implementation phase as well, especially when
applied to an iterative development process. It should also be noted that
the techniques presented in Table 2.2 are not limited to the evaluation of
the software entity (TOE) itself, but are also applied to the evaluation of
the operating environment.
In order to efficiently improve the security of a software entity being de-
veloped, compatible software engineering techniques are required. These are
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to be applied in concert with the security engineering techniques described
here. Such methodologies and software security frameworks, specifically
aimed for software development, are presented in Section 2.2.
2.1.3 Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity
Model
Capability Maturity Models, such as the ISO/IEC standard 33001:2015
(2015), present an organizational framework for a specific purpose, con-
sisting of processes to achieve it. To measure the process, they also define a
set of formal levels of organizational maturity to be reached, assessed using
given evaluation criteria. The purpose of a maturity model is to standardize
the processes from quality and effectiveness perspective, by making the pro-
cess predictable and thus risk-reducing. The related Capability Maturity
Model (CMM) was developed in the Carnegie Mellon University in 1991
for the United States Department of Defence: the stated purpose of the
model was to asses the quality of and capabilities of the defence software
contractors.
For software security engineering purposes, ISO/IEC maintains the Sys-
tems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), the ISO
Standard 21827 (2018). The standard defines security engineering processes
and practices and claims to represent the current best practices in software
security engineering. As a semi-formal, prescriptive and risk-driven process,
the SSE-CMM lists three security processes:
• Security risk process
• Security engineering process
• Security assurance process
This categorization is represented by the concept of Process Areas (PA),
containing the appropriate Base Practices (BP). The systems security en-
gineering process in SSE-CMM is formed by 11 process areas, consisting of
61 base practices. These practices claim to cover all major areas of security
engineering. The other 11 PAs, addressing the management of projects and
organizations, are directly taken from the SE-CMM (1995). The organiza-
tional practices are not specific to security engineering, and only the risk
management process area is taken into closer examination.
The system security engineering process areas and key work products of
the SSE-CMM security processes are presented in Figure 2.6.
The process areas are detailed in the following section: in Section 2.1.3,
an overview of the SSE model and the security engineering processes is given;
Section 2.1.3 presents the security risk processes, and Section 2.1.3 concerns
the security assurance process.
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Figure 2.6: SSE-CMM security processes, the system security engineering
process areas, and the key work products as presented in ISO Standard
21827 (2018)
In the SSE-CMM, the PAs are structured into five capability levels fol-
lowing the Software Engineering Capability Maturity Model (CMM) and
other ISO standards such as ISO/IEC standard 33001:2015 (2015) series.
Capability levels are defined as follows:
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0: Not Performed.
1: Performed Informally.
2: Planned & Tracked.
3: Well Defined.
4: Qualitatively Controlled.
5: Continuously Improving.
The instructions of achieving these levels are generic management prac-
tices, having little to do with security engineering as such. The SSE-CMM
standard document gives these guidelines in the form of Common Features,
specifying the characteristics of the capability levels. The Common Features
are implemented by Generic Practices (GP), a checklist of things to get done
to achieve the feature.
Based on the descriptions of the levels, the term “capability” itself be-
comes definable. The first level is producing the necessary work products
(Level 1); planning for the production, and tracking the results (Level 2); us-
ing an organization-wide and standardized process for planning and tracking
(Level 3); establishing quality goals and managing the performance through
measurements (Level 4); and, improving the performance by setting perfor-
mance targets, gathering feedback and piloting new ideas and technologies.
Thus, a “capability” is not only doing what you should do be doing in the
first place, but doing it by planned, measured, standardized, and continually
improving organization-wide processes.
The following sections present the contents of the three security processes
of SSE-CMM. The division is not clear-cut: there are 11 system security
engineering Process Areas, that can be considered to cover the Security En-
gineering and Security Assurance processes. Although risk assessment is a
central concept in information security, in SSE-CMM the Security Risk pro-
cess is placed among the organizational management practices, although the
handling the identified security risks is considered to belong in the domain
of the system security engineering. The SSE-CMM risk management base
practices are presented in Section 2.1.3. Only one of the 11 system security
engineering process areas concerns only assurance; these Base Practices are
presented in more detail in Section 2.1.3.
Systems Security Engineering
The SSE-CMM deliberately presents the process areas in alphabetical order
“to discourage the notion that the process areas are ordered by lifecycle
phase or area”. However, for the model to be usable in software development,
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even iterative, it has to be applied in a process typically represented by
a life cycle. The standard does, however, contain mapping to ISO/IEC
Standard 15288 (2015), a standard containing definitions of the software life
cycle processes. The generic life cycle phases can be derived through this
mapping. Together with the process area descriptions, this information was
used to create a mapping of the process areas to a security development life
cycle model, presented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: SSE-CMM Security Engineering Process Areas
Phase Process Area
Requirement PA05 Assess Vulnerability
PA04 Assess Threat
PA02 Assess Impact
PA03 Assess Security Risk
PA10 Specify Security Needs
Design PA09 Provide Security Input
Implementation PA01 Administer Security Controls
PA07 Coordinate Security
Testing PA06 Build Assurance Argument
PA11 Verify and Validate Security
Release PA08 Monitor Security Posture
Some PAs map to multiple phases in the ISO lifecycle model, but here
were placed into a single phase for simplicity. A similar life cycle model is
previously used in the software security engineering research, by e.g. Baca
and Carlsson (2011) and others, and in the software security life cycle models
such as the SDL by (Microsoft (2017)). The simplification is warranted by
making it easier to apply into practice, and by enabling direct comparisons
between the SSE-CMM and other security engineering models.
In the lifecycle model mapping, the release-time phase is used to cover
activities specific to the Operation Environment. Certain activities are con-
sidered to precede a new software development project, which would justify
inserting a pre-requirement phase into the model. In iterative work, and
especially in a continuous deployment organization, the release and pre-
requirement phases will eventually merge after the first release. The base
practices of the security assurance process area, PA06, are detailed in Sec-
tion 2.1.3.
The central process area in security implementation is PA07: Coordinate
Security (see Figure 2.6 for reference). Under the coordinated effort, Risk
Information, produced by the Risk Assessment process (PA03), is used as
the primary input. Risk Assessment process in turn gains its input from the
Threat, Vulnerability and Impact Assessment processes. Risk Information
34
Section 2.1 – Software Security Standards
is used to Specify Security Needs (PA10), to create the security require-
ments and policies; these are in turn used to Provide Security Input (PA09),
consisting of security solutions, guidance, and other context-dependent doc-
umentation. The security implementation is managed by the process area
Administer Security Controls (PA01) and includes communication, security
awareness and training, and managing the maintenance of the controls. The
configuration information, produced by the implementation, and the docu-
mentation created during the implementation process, are used to Monitor
Security Posture (PA08). This information is then merged back to the Se-
curity Risk Information, preferably through re-assessment made according
to the Risk process.
The processes specified by SSE-CMM, while abstractly defined, are to be
addressed in software development to achieve the specified security objec-
tives. The practices defined in the SSE-CMM cover the requirement specifi-
cation and analysis phases quite thoroughly. The design and implementation
phases rely on the vulnerability assessments and coordinating the security
items into the software development processes. Items from security test-
ing (verification and validation), and also from the security assurance and
security risk processes, should similarly be used iteratively as an input in
software development.
Security Risk Process
In the SSE-CMM, the security risk engineering process acquires its input
from assessments made in process areas: assessments of Threats (PA04),
Vulnerabilities (PA05), and Impact (PA02). Risk information is then com-
piled into a risk information document by applying the Security Risk As-
sessment process (PA03). The created risk information is then fed to the or-
ganizational risk management process (PA14), to be used for prioritization,
process design and resource allocation by the other organizational processes.
The Threat and Impact assessment processes (PA04 and PA02) are no-
tably similar, both consisting of identification, and defining the metrics and
monitoring. Impact assessment is essential in determining the criticality of
a system or component: it includes identifying the operational, business,
or mission capabilities leveraged by the system, and the system assets re-
sponsible for these capabilities and the security objectives. Combined with
the impact assessment, this forms the basis of the organizational security
risk management process. In threat assessment, the likelihood of identified
threats is estimated, and the results are fed to the risk management process.
Vulnerability Assessment (PA05) is distinct to security engineering. In
SSE-CMM, a vulnerability “refers to an aspect of a system that can be
exploited for purposes other than those originally intended, weaknesses, se-
curity holes, or implementation flaws within a system that are likely to be
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attacked by a threat”. To be adequately performed, the assessment pro-
cess requires an appropriate level of technical and security expertise, as well
as detailed knowledge of the system assets. The vulnerability assessment
begins with the selection of the methods, techniques and criteria by which
the security vulnerabilities are identified and characterized; the identifica-
tion of the vulnerabilities is then performed. The assessment itself is then
performed, and the identified vulnerabilities added to monitoring.
The resulting vulnerability information is typically a result of paper
studies, which in software development should be supported tools, such as
a threat modeling tool including vulnerability information (see Microsoft
(2017)). In the security risk process, depicted in Figure 2.7, the assessment
information is compiled into risk information by the Risk Assessment process
(PA03).
PA03
Assess Security Risk 
PA04
Assess Threat
PA05
Assess Vulnerability
PA02
Assess Impact
Impact Information
Vulnerability 
Information
Threat Information
Figure 2.7: SSE-CMM security risk process and the related work products
Outside the SSE-CMM system security engineering practices, the or-
ganizational process area PA14 (see Figure 2.6) claims to implement the
ISO/IEC risk management standards 15026-1 and 31000. Derived directly
from the early 1990s, the risk management process defined in the SSE-CMM
is substantially different from the current ISO/IEC Standard 27005:2018
(2018). This newer model is presented and discussed in Section 3.2.2, as
applied to software development.
The SSE-CMM specifies the following organizational risk management
Base Practices (BP), as adapted from the SE-CMM:
• BP.14.01 Develop a plan for risk management activities that is the
basis for identifying, assessing, mitigating, and monitoring risks for
the life of the project.
• BP.14.02 Identify project risks by examining project objectives with
respect to the alternatives and constraints and identifying what can
go wrong.
36
Section 2.1 – Software Security Standards
• BP.14.03 Assess risks and determine the probability of occurrence and
consequence of realization.
• BP.14.04 Obtain formal recognition of the project risk assessment.
• BP.14.05 Implement the risk mitigation activities.
• BP.14.06 Monitor risk mitigation activities to ensure that the desired
results are being obtained.
The security risk process establishes the risk management model and
creates risk information by assessing the known threats, vulnerabilities and
their impact and providing means for risk management. Risk information is
used by the security engineering process to provide means to reduce and con-
tain this risk; in software security engineering, this is typically represented
by a software security development lifecycle, examples of which are presented
in Section 2.2. The security assurance process provides the required degree
of confidence that the security needs are satisfied.
Security Assurance Process
The security assurance base practices gather and create the evidence of how
the security objectives are met, as well as the potential deficiencies, when
compared to the security rationale. The security assurance process is not
standalone work: it is linked to the security engineering processes, with the
purpose of creating and gathering the required evidence of the conduct and
results of these processes. The security assurance process is presented in
Figure 2.8 separated from the other security processes.
PA06
Build Assurance 
Argument
Assurance 
Argument
PA11
Verify and Validate 
Security
Verification and 
Validation Evidence
Security Evidence
Figure 2.8: SSE-CMM security assurance process and the related work
products
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In the security assurance process, the process area of Security Verification
and Validation (PA11) provides a significant amount of security evidence.
In general terms, verification answers the question “are we building the
system right” and validation answers the question “are we building the right
system”. According to the SSE-CMM, this is achieved by first identifying
the solution, e.g., the software being developed; defining the approach and
level of rigor for verification and validation; verifying the implementation
against the security requirements and needs (i.e.: security objectives); and,
communicating the results to other engineering groups.
The SSE-CMM definition of security verification and validation practices
is inexcusably vague, especially considering its importance. The standard
is only able to provide a generic system testing framework, loosely applied
to the context of security. In software development, security assurance en-
gineering consists nearly entirely of various verification and validation tech-
niques; these are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
The security assurance process extends beyond the development-time
practice areas. For validation against the security rationale, the central pro-
cess area is Build the Assurance Argument (PA06). This process uses the
input gathered from other processes and process areas: The actual com-
position of the assurance depends entirely on the ONF and ANF, defined
by the security objectives forming the security rationale. The SSE-CMM
standard specifies the following six base practices for building the assurance
argument:
• BP.06.01 Identify Assurance Objectives: New objectives and modifi-
cations to existing ones are identified and communicated.
• BP.06.02 Define Assurance Strategy: Ensure the correctness of secu-
rity implementation and enforcement.
• BP.06.03 Define Security Measures: Facilitate decision making by col-
lecting, analyzing and reporting relevant performance-related data.
• BP.06.04 Control Assurance Evidence: Maintain the currency and rel-
evancy of the security assurance evidence.
• BP.06.05 Analyze Evidence: Provide confidence that the evidence
meets the security objectives and the security needs are satisfied.
• BP.06.06 Provide Assurance Argument: Demonstrate compliance with
assurance objectives by presenting evidence, which is then reviewed.
Despite its dependence on the other processes, the security assurance
process is equally important as the two others. As part of security man-
agement, it provides key stakeholders, such as customers, managers and
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auditors, their only viable evidence that the security requirements and ob-
jectives have been correctly met.
Security assurance engineering also serves a core technical purpose: for
developers, it produces documentation of the solution and its purpose; for
operations, it provides maintenance instructions and provisions for the se-
curity incidents. Defining the minimum viable assurance, and finding pro-
ductive uses for the assurance material in the development process, would
be an important work management strategy for an agile organization.
Applying the SSE-CMM
Formal conformance with SSE-CMM, even at the basic level, can be an
arduous task for a software development organization aspiring to retain
the agile principles; this is reviewed in multiple implementations by Silva
et al. (2015). The SSE-CMM represents a predominantly deterministic and
process-centred development approach. From security engineering perspec-
tive, the merits of this approach are clear and the goals universal: a measur-
able standardized objective-driven process, which effectively produces high-
quality results through meticulous, careful and repeatable procedures. The
goals are beneficial for security, yet the cost and effects of setting this orga-
nization up may be detrimental. This is especially true, when the speed of
development is a requirement – in such case as presented in the analysis by
Blackburn et al. (1996).
The Common Criteria defines the assurance requirements by giving a
set of evaluation criteria; SSE-CMM defines similar criteria for processes
necessary to achieve those requirements. When the SSE-CMM is applied
in a software development organization, the value-driven approach of agile
methods is necessarily amended with the plan-driven and risk-based ap-
proach inherent to the SSE-CMM. These differing approaches are discussed
by Boehm and Turner (2003a) and further considered in Section 3.
The process of achieving the higher maturity levels for the individual
base practices of the SSE-CMM is a process to be done selectively and in
compliance with the security rationale. Even without the pursuit for formal
certification of some maturity level, the SSE-CMM and the Common Criteria
provide an organization-wide framework for security effort formalization.
The level of abstraction leaves the implementation and its evaluation criteria
open for interpretation. This allows some freedom of implementation for
various organizational contexts (cf. Schweigert et al. (2014)).
2.2 Industry Software Security Models
Building on the tradition formalized in the standards, government and indus-
try organizations have over the decades developed a number of software se-
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curity models. The increased demand in software security has led to certain
formalizations of these models, varying from documented industry practices
in the form of security development life cycle models, to more theoretical
and conceptual maturity models.
The currently prevalent models both in research and industry are pre-
sented in the following sections. Numerous country and industry-specific
models supplement the selection. Together with the standardized models
presented above, these models contain the base practices software devel-
opment organizations perform in the field of software security engineering.
The three models selected here are discussed and analyzed for completeness
and applicability; they each have their flaws, but when combined to the
standardization-derived requirements and methodology definition, should
provide feasible in an software development project or organization.
In addition to the three software security processes defined in the ISO
standardization, Davis (2005) treats the security management of the organi-
zation and projects as an individual fourth process. This separation creates
a point of contention for software development: in software development
organizations, software security development should be an organic part of
software development. In practice, the software security frameworks do not
contain these management elements. Instead, they focus on the other three
processes: security, risk, and assurance. The management practices in con-
temporary software development are discussed in Section 3.
2.2.1 Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), introduced by Howard and
Lipner (2006), offers a set of security practices and tools for the software
development process. SDL is a result of Microsoft’s systematic program to
improve the security of its software products, and the perception that the
regular software development methods were not offering adequate mecha-
nisms to create secure software. Development of the SDL followed the con-
siderable publicity of the security issues in Microsoft products, especially
the Windows XP, released in 2001. To remedy the security flaws, and in an
attempt to regain the lost trust, they established new security policies and
a more security-oriented culture, resulting in the SDL. Microsoft advocated
the internal use of the SDL by making it a process requirement for several
types of applications. The model is to be followed in the development of
all software which (a) handles personally sensitive information; (b) is used
in academia or enterprises; or, (c) is operated in a networked environment.
These categories comprise the majority of current software products. Win-
dows Vista, released in 2007, was the first Windows release to go through
the full SDL cycle (Howard and Lipner (2006); see also Anderson (2008)),
and Microsoft gives credit to the SDL for the drastic drop of security-related
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incidents compared to its direct predecessor, Windows XP.
The activities are distributed into phases in the development accord-
ing to a traditional life cycle sequence. Later, the SDL was adapted for
agile development by Microsoft (2017): in the agile adaptation, activities
are presented not only by the phase but also by their frequency during the
development. The frequency classes are one-time activities performed once
during a project, “bucket” practices performed as seen necessary, and activ-
ities performed in every iteration.
The SDL Process
The SDL model, with augmentations for agile development, is presented in
Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Activities in the Microsoft SDL (Microsoft (2017))
Phase Use in Agile Activity
Training Core Security Training
Requirements One-time Establish Security Requirements
Bucket Create Quality Gates/Bug Bars
One-time Security and Privacy Risk Assessments
Design One-time Establish Design Requirements
One-time Attack Surface Analysis / reduction
Every-sprint Use Threat Modeling
Implementation Every-sprint Use Approved Tools
Every-sprint Deprecate Unsafe Functions
Every-sprint Perform Static Analysis
Testing Bucket Perform Static Analysis
Bucket Fuzz Testing
Bucket Attack Surface Review
Release One-time Create an Incident Response Plan
Every-sprint Final Security Review
Every-sprint Certify Release and Archive
Response Execute Incident Response Plan
SDL activities extend across the development phases, with a focus on the
requirement and design activities. Microsoft also provides a rudimentary set
of security tools, documentation templates and more detailed instructions
for the security work. The accompanying software includes tools for threat
modeling, static code review and attack surface analysis, and an analyzer for
binaries. The tools and their terminology are limited to Microsoft operating
systems, greatly limiting their applicability to general software development
work.
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Threat modeling is a central practice in the SDL. However, creating and
maintaining a sufficiently detailed security model of the TOE and its Op-
erating Environment may provide substantial overhead. To avoid this, a
threat modeling tool is to be used in iterative development from the be-
ginning, and the tools is optimally an integral part of the design process.
When the concept is turned around, the used design tool should also work
as a threat modeling tool.
The main purpose of threat modeling is to make the security risks visible
and therefore manageable. In terms of SSE-CMM processes, threat mod-
eling contains the threat and vulnerability process areas. In the original
text by Howard and Lipner (2006), SDL threat modeling is a document,
or rather, a complex set of documents, consisting of data flow diagrams, a
list of protected assets, and list of threats to the system ranked by the risk
(implying the use of a quantitative risk management framework). While
these documents are considered optional, the most relevant background in-
formation consists of use scenarios, a list of external dependencies, security
assumptions of the security services offered by other components, and ex-
ternal security notes.
Manually maintaining a threat model in the extensive detail described
by Howard and Lipner (2006) is hardly feasible, especially in an iterative
process. SDL does, however, give a metric for evaluation of a threat model.
An acceptable threat model:
• Conforms to the actual design
• Is dated no more than 12 months ago
• Contains a data flow diagram containing assets, users and trust bound-
aries
• Details at least one threat for each software asset
• Provides mitigation for all high-level risks
In addition to these criteria, a good model adds authentication schemes
to the data flow diagrams and provides classification of the threats. An
excellent model utilizes also a suitable security analysis technique to identify
all threats; furthermore, all threats have mitigation, and external security
notes include a plan to create customer-facing instructions.
As an example of a security analysis technique to be used in threat mod-
eling, Howard and Lipner (2006) suggest STRIDE to identify six common
categories of security threats: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Informa-
tion Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privileges. A number of
mitigation techniques are suggested against these, ranging from program-
ming techniques to organizational processes and infrastructure security. For
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a software practitioner, techniques usable for threat or vulnerability identi-
fication are vital. However, the mitigation techniques may be found beyond
software engineering as noted by McGraw (2006).
The list of details and requirements in the original SDL model is stag-
gering. Without clear prioritization, they may not be implementable within
the limitations of a smaller development organization, facing acute person-
nel and time constraints. Fuzz testing is another task difficult to perform in
a time-boxed manner. Fuzz tests require expertise, tools, and an extended
period of time to produce results of practical benefit.
Applying the SDL
The original model by Howard and Lipner (2006) presents the SDL process
as a sequential waterfall-like process, progressing in 12 stages from project
inception to product release, and finally, security response execution. The
individual techniques are of importance, having an extensive focus on pro-
gramming techniques and code quality and the validity of the design. Se-
curity requirements and the risk process revolve around the software and
security design, which itself relies on careful analysis and reduction of at-
tack surface, and creating the design based on threat models. This approach
reflects the primary purpose of software security engineering: creating se-
cure software by preventing and finding software bugs during development.
At Microsoft, the effort could be labeled “security-driven quality improve-
ment”, as security, privacy and reliability were seen, and marketed to the
company management under the umbrella of quality (Howard and Lipner
(2006) pp. 9-10).
The SDL addresses security training as a prerequisite for all security
work. Training is to be complemented and improved as necessary during
the development whenever changes in requirements or design warrant for it.
A noteworthy requirement-phase practice is setting the quality gates called
“bug bars”. Essentially, this is a quality assurance technique involving the
setting of a bug standard, and the triage for placing the found bugs into
three categories based on the risk assessment. The process also involves
setting clear error categories for bugs that would necessitate a fix or further
investigation, especially when a fix is probably needed. These categories
are separately set for both client and server side software and are largely
results of fuzz testing (see Howard and Lipner (2006) pp. 163-164). In the
SDL, security testing techniques also have a focus on the improvement of
code quality, in addition to producing test reports for the security assurance
process.
SDL’s adoption for agile development is a late addition to the model. In
the original form by Howard and Lipner (2006), the SDL is described as a
process, with 12 distinct stages. The instructions for integrating the process
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with agile consists mainly of recapitulating the agile principles and Extreme
Programming quality improvement techniques. In the current model by Mi-
crosoft (2017), the main changes are simplifying the process into six phases,
and adding superficial labeling to the activities according to their perceived
frequency during an iterative project.
If followed literally, restricting some activities’ use frequency to a strict
one-time limit may even be detrimental for security. In iterative work, no
activity can be guaranteed to be limited to simple one-time execution. This
thinking appears to originate from the model’s “waterfall-like” origins: for
example, the model instructs risk assessment to be done only once during
a project. In iterative development, it is essential for the risk assessment
process to be performed after each change in relevant design or requirements.
Finally, Microsoft’s original online documentation for the agile model created
confusion by treating an agile iteration as a synonym for release. This echoes
the early agile ideal of each agile iteration producing a potentially shippable
product release.
Much like the SSE-CMM, the abstraction level of the instructions in SDL
is high. The model captures the essentials of software security engineering
and assurance processes and promotes the use of threat modeling as a way
to manage security risks. The SDL model does not, however, provide a
standalone security solution for security implementation, and in practice
provides a loose framework of practice categories. In addition, the central
concept of a threat model will require either a very competent tool, or a
very dedicated security-minded person to get created and maintained at an
acceptable level.
Howard and Lipner (2006) do describe the rationale, and much of the
practical reasoning and even the process of building up the SDL activities, as
it was done at Microsoft. It is conceivable, however, that many of the condi-
tions and motives are hardly applicable to more modest-sized organizations,
with perhaps more meagre resources. Applying SDL, more detailed mod-
els should be consulted, including the Common Criteria for evaluation and
the SSE-CMM for implementation. Security rationale justifies the security
means.
2.2.2 Building Security In Touchpoints
The Touchpoints by McGraw (2006) also utilizes the lifecycle approach to
software security, similar to the SDL. It essentially consists of the three
security process areas as in the SSE-CMM. The root of this methodology
are the seven key techniques for implementation of secure software, or the
Touchpoints, addressing seven identified problem domains susceptible to ex-
ploitation in software development.
These techniques were first introduced by Howard (2004), the same
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source that presented the Microsoft SDL. Touchpoints conform with other
security and software development lifecycle models and can be seen as an
independent extension and enhancement to the SDL, with many practical
insights how to implement it. The activities included in the Touchpoints are
presented in Table 2.5, divided by the development lifecycle phase. For mu-
tual comparability, artifacts affected by each activity are derived from the
Common Criteria: these may be SFR documentation, SAR documentation,
the TOE itself, or the Operating Environment (see Figure 2.5).
Table 2.5: Touchpoints
Phase Touchpoint Target
Requirements Security requirements SAR and SFR
Design Architectural risk analysis Security arch. description
Abuse cases SFR
Implementation Code review Source code
Verification Risk-based security tests TOE
Penetration testing TOE, Operating Env.
Release Security operations TOE, Operating Env.
Code reviews, the sole activity to be performed in the implementation
phase, is identified as the most important and effective security practice of
the seven Touchpoints. The importance of code reviews is supported by
e.g. Glass (2003), although Glass stresses that there is no single method
to remove coding errors: a combination of methods, tools and techniques
is required. Implementation errors are the traditional center of attention in
software security, categorized into a taxonomy by Tsipenyuk et al. (2005).
Software quality issues introducing exploitable security vulnerabilities, as
well as the difficulty of tracing security bugs through traditional quality
assurance methods, have been a main cause for creating the current security
development models and methodologies.
The Touchpoints places the rest of the practices into order by their ef-
fectiveness, from most to least effective. This order is Architectural risk
analysis; Penetration testing; Risk-based security tests; Abuse cases; Se-
curity requirements; Security operations. When examined in the context
provided by the Common Criteria, as presented in Table 2.5, the practices
affecting the TOE directly are ranked more important, and practices target-
ing the Operating Environment are given less importance. This is consistent
with the idea of building security into the product, not “bolting it on”.
The implementation-specific part, as written in 2006, held the following
areas that require special attention: 1) Input validation and representation;
2) API abuse; 3) Security features; 4) Time and state; 5) Error handling; 6)
Code quality, and; 7) Encapsulation. These conform with the security engi-
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neering base practices in the SSE-CMM presented in Section 2.1.3, although
differently named and formalized as processes.
To effectively address the security threats, security engineering requires
a risk definition and management process. Without domain-specific knowl-
edge the risk analysis cannot produce tangible and usable results. The book
defines five stages for risk management but advises referring to external
sources for more refined risk management processes. The five-phase model
presented by McGraw is presented in Table 2.6. This model is a rudimentary
version of ISO/IEC Standard 27005:2018 (2018). It does, however, capture
the key elements of risk management.
Table 2.6: BSIMM Risk Management Framework by Synopsys Software
Integrity Group (2018)
Level Activity Actions
1 Analysis Understand the business context
2 Identification Identify the business and technical risk
3 Prioritization Synthesize and rank the risks
4 Mitigation Define a risk mitigation strategy
5 Implementation Carry out fixes and validate
and verification
The risk management framework is based on an analysis process, requir-
ing knowledge of security issues combined with knowledge of the business
domain. After composing a list of identified security risks, the risks are
prioritized. The priority scale can be as simple as High, Medium or Low:
use of a context dependent risk prioritization framework may be necessary.
The risk mitigation strategy is the result of the prioritized risk list, which is
analyzed and mitigation methods selected based on the business and tech-
nical risks, the TOE and the Operating Environment; the product of this
analysis is a Risk Analysis Report. In the implementation and validation
phases, the risk mitigation methods are verified and the fixes are carried
out as necessary; here McGraw’s framework is very testing-oriented, and
the verification is generally compared to following a test plan. The frame-
work goes on stressing the importance of metrics and measurability, calling
for quantitative decision support. This can be achieved by setting up for-
mal criteria for measurement by case, or using software-based tools with
predefined measurement criteria.
The methodological framework presented by McGraw, which includes
Touchpoints, is a collection of best practices and tools. It was one of the first
software security engineering methodologies and continues to be relevant to
both industry and research. McGraw also has helped creating the Building
Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) by the Synopsys Software Integrity
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Group (2018). The BSIMM model is updated by annual industry surveys
about security activities and provides central statistics about the industry’s
software security initiatives. The primary contribution of the BSIMM is
highlighting the current issues in software security, and actively reporting
the industry’s best practices on software security.
2.2.3 OWASP Security Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) consists of several
sub-projects ranging from implementation and testing frameworks to secu-
rity verification and metrics. It also contains a large number of open-source
guides and frameworks. Most relevant of these from the software engineering
point of view is the Software Assurance Maturity Model (OWASP SAMM
(2017)). As the name suggests, SAMM has many aspects outside the direct
scope of software security engineering. It does, however, include an SSDLC
model, which it largely inherits from OWASP’s now discontinued Common
Lightweight Application Security Project (CLASP). The structure of the
SAMM is presented in Figure 2.9.
Operations
Issue Management
Environment Hardening
Operational Enablement
Governance
Strategy & Metrics
Policy & Compliance
Education & Guidance
Construction
Threat Assessment
Security Requirements
Security Architecture
Verification
Design Review
Implementation Review
Security Testing
Figure 2.9: SAMM Business Functions and related Security Practices
The structure of the SAMM is highly symmetrical: in SAMM, the four
business functions are each divided into three security practices, each with
three security objectives. Each of the 36 (4 × 3 × 3) security objectives
is achieved by executing two main security activities, resulting in a frame-
work of 72 activities. In the assessment scheme, these activities are scored
based on the scope and frequency of their implementation, resulting in one
of three measurable maturity levels. As the name of the model suggests,
the majority of the practices and activities concern creating and verifying
security assurance. Overall, the SAMM primarily concerns the management
of software security engineering, with many practices extending beyond the
development activities.
The overall abstraction level in SAMM is quite high, and the style is
descriptive. SAMM leaves the details of implementation open and reliant
on other, more technical security instructions. The selected approach ap-
pears feasible and applicable to a wider variety of software development
organizations, although the software security engineering techniques them-
selves are typically not explicitly specified. A precondition for utilizing the
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SAMM model is the existence of security risk and requirement management
frameworks. SAMM, however, does not specify the outlines for these, or
instructions for their construction.
Governance
Governance in SAMM is managing overall software development activities.
The three subcategories of the Governance function are the most important
in setting the security objectives: Strategy and Metrics, Policy and Com-
pliance, and Education and Guidance. The first two are also the primary
practices used in setting the security assurance target. In the ISO standard-
ization, these would represent the application normative framework derived
from the organizational normative framework, and the target assurance level
results from these. The governance objectives concern strategic planning of
security effort by understanding the assets to be protected and their business
value, managing the security processes and expenditures based on the risk
and value, and establishing the compliance requirements from the normative
context.
Education takes the form of security training and personnel certification
schemes. Education includes not only basic security awareness, but also
establishing technical guidelines, introducing the security specific roles and
role-based training, security coaching of the software teams, and creating a
role-based examination and certification program. The education scheme is
especially essential to personnel responsible for security architecture.
The creators of SAMM have for some reason chosen to explicitly mention
the possibility of penalizing staff for making bad business decisions regarding
application security. The penalty is not specified, but enforcing security by
punishment schemes is shown to have an adverse effect on security behavior
by Herath and Rao (2009).
Construction
SAMM’s definition of construction is defining goals and creating software
within development projects. The Construction function is most relevant to
technical security engineering. It consists of Threat Assessment (TA), Secu-
rity Requirements (SR) and Security Architecture (SA). TA in SAMM refers
to project-level risks, which are “accurately identified and characterized po-
tential attacks upon an organization’s software in order to better understand
the risks and facilitate risk management” as specified in OWASP SAMM
(2017). While this conforms fully with the SSE-CMM process model, no
instructions are given on how the threat modeling should be conducted, or
how the risk is to be assessed. The assessment criteria for Threat Assess-
ment is based on the existence of the used practices and the frequency of
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their use; the quality of the assessment is not considered.
According to SAMM, Security Requirements need special attention and
promotion to get implemented. The objectives for SR aim to explicitly
consider security during the software requirement process, derive the secu-
rity requirements from risk analysis and the business requirements, and to
spread these practices to all software projects and third-party dependencies.
Assessment of the SR practices is based on team-level activities, and their
specific usage of best practices and compliance guidance, and the use of
access control matrices where relevant – access control being the only secu-
rity engineering technique explicitly mentioned. SR audits for design and
requirement documentation are recommended for each development itera-
tion before a release is made. SAMM commendably promotes the review
of vendor agreements as an SR-related security activity, suggesting similar
security review and testing policies to be extended into the third party SW
development as well.
Security Architecture objectives in SAMM appear to conform with many
of the generic software architecture principles and objectives. The architec-
tural guidance for software design is quite generic, such as applying security
principles to design or identifying security design patterns from the archi-
tecture. For the more explicit architecture objectives, SAMM suggests the
following activities:
• Maintain a list of recommended software frameworks.
• Identify and promote security services and infrastructure.
• Establish formal reference architectures and platforms.
• Validate the usage of frameworks, patterns, and platforms.
Implementing these activities requires considerable skill in both software
engineering, i.e., programming, and component-level security. For example,
maintaining a list of recommended software frameworks—a first-level ac-
tivity in SAMM—is not a simple feat to accomplish. Identifying a list of
recommended software frameworks would be most useful for the security
services and infrastructure, identified by executing the 2nd-level security
activity. The ambitious 3rd-level activities resulting in formal and validated
reference architectures, patterns, and platforms rely on this framework list
as well. In essence, achieving the first maturity level involves majority of
the work, with the benefits manifesting themselves only at higher maturity
levels.
Software frameworks can be dynamically updated, so extending this ac-
tivity to the code level is not feasible. SAMM promotes standardization and
fixed component-level design guidance, based on careful inspection of each
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component’s incident history and the track record in its response to vul-
nerabilities. Non-security considerations are e.g. assessing the functionality
and the level of complexity of the implementation. From the model, it is
not directly evident at what maturity level these checks should be done.
Verification
Verification in SAMM is defined as checking and testing artifacts produced
throughout software development. Verification subprocesses are divided into
three categories: design review, implementation review and security testing.
Artifacts are defined as design documentation, software configurations, and
the source code.
The concrete design requirements missing from the architectural objec-
tives are placed under the design review objectives instead. The aim is to
allow and enable the project teams to perform self-checks and utilize light-
weight reviews for the design. In SAMM’s three-level maturity scale, the
security team is conducting design reviews only at the strictest level. Con-
crete security engineering activities consist of identifying the attack surface,
analyzing the design against security requirements, and developing data-flow
diagrams for sensitive resources. Data flow diagrams can be considered part
of either software design or a threat model, leading in an apparent inconsis-
tency between SAMM requirements: while the form of threat modeling was
not clearly specified, requiring data flow diagrams at design review appears
peculiar.
On the security management side, the suggested verification activities
are organization-heavy, and call for deploying a design review service for the
software projects and establishing release gates for design review. Both of
these practices can be seen to lead to organizational bottlenecks in software
production, causing development and deployment delays. Agile development
and management may still be effective in micro-managing these changes
to mitigate the adverse effects on productivity (Karlstrom and Runeson
(2005)).
Implementation reviews include code reviews and analyses, based on re-
view checklists, recognition of security critical code and use of automated
tools. SAMM does not reflect the current state of the art in the sense that
the basis of implementation review is seen to be manual, augmented with
tools. In an agile organization, continuous integration and unit testing is
the key of keeping the code base clean of bugs and unspecified functional-
ity; integrating an automated source code review tool would be a logical
enhancement to the CI and testing tools. As a quality control issue, SAMM
suggests the use of release gates for implementation review. It also suggests
applying a straightforward passing criteria for the reviews, with only one
or two vulnerability types. However, in order for the review not to just
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be a formality, the criteria should actually represent the security risks the
application is facing. From the technical point of view, it would be more
advisable to deviate from SAMM a bit, and (a) use automated tools from
the start and (b) utilize the tools to make the review as thorough as possible.
Several reviews may also be performed with focus on specific vulnerability
types if the development resources allow for it.
The third verification practice in SAMM is security testing. Of security
testing methodologies, only penetration testing is specifically mentioned.
Penetration testing is instructed to be used before each release. The test
cases themselves are to be derived from the security requirements. The use
of automated tools is also promoted in security testing, a practice naturally
suitable for agile software development. SAMM does, however, also suggest
another security-related release gate for security testing. Again, automation
and agile practices could mitigate the productivity reduction resulting from
these measures.
Operations
In SAMM, operations stands for the management of the created software re-
leases. SAMM specification conforms to the traditional release-based think-
ing, as opposed to agile continuous delivery models such as DevOps. This
approach is also visible in lack of utilization of automated security tools.
SAMM’s operations security practices are issue management, environment
hardening and operational enablement.
Issue management consists of management practices, such as establishing
security response teams and issue escalation points, and creating response
processes and incident disclosure processes. Technical practices, consisting
of root cause analyses and collection of per-incident metrics are built on
the incident management; these practices are very closely linked, and often
managed by interconnected tools.
Environment hardening practices are routine procedures to conduct in
any operational environment maintenance: documentation of the used com-
ponents, security patching, and monitoring the environment configuration
status. Hardening practices, according to SAMM, also include deploying
relevant operations protection tools, such as firewalls, anti-tampering mea-
sures, integrity verification tools, and secure logging solutions for security
forensics. The operating environment should also be audited, targeting up-
to-date environment specifications, monitoring tools, configuration manage-
ment, and the use of protection tools listed above.
Of the operations practices in SAMM, operational enablement appears
to be closest to continuous development models. The objectives are in the
improvement of communication between development and operations teams,
and improvement of the operational maintenance practices. The communi-
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cation is improved by increasing the development-time documentation and
making it available for the operations team. The additional documents in-
clude identification of software errors and alerts, and recovery procedures
for critical error situations. The operations team should maintain an op-
erational security guide, done in cooperation with software development
teams to avoid deviation of security practices. For further security assur-
ance on SAMM level 3, the environment should be audited before each
release, adding yet another security gate into the deployment process. A
final gate is the code signing process, performed only for the relevant parts
of the software. This process is also to be performed during each release.
2.3 Summary
The security engineering methods and models presented in the above sec-
tions represent the current state of the art in generic software security
methodologies and standards, also forming the core topics of software secu-
rity engineering research. The selected models and standards are presented
in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Software security engineering models and standards included.
Type Name Source
Standard Application Security ISO 27034
Standard The Common Criteria ISO 15408
Standard SSE-CMM ISO 15443
SSDLC SDL Microsoft
SSDLC Touchpoints Synopsis/Cigital
Maturity Model SAMM OWASP Foundation
The table presents the standards, software security development life cy-
cles and maturity models currently most relevant to generic software devel-
opment. A systemic literature review of the methodologies used in software
security engineering is pending; one of the most comprehensive method stud-
ies was performed by Win et al. (2009). In many respects, this study is in
need of an update, indicating a research gap.
Several branches of business and technology have their own security regu-
lation supplementing the generic practices presented here. The most promi-
nent examples are the health care, and financial sectors, and the defence
industry along with many other governmental, societal, and economical ar-
eas. This regulation, however, has its roots in the ISO software security
standard framework presented here. The same principles are also used in
the creation of the mechanisms to protect personal privacy in electronic
systems.
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The main purpose of security standards is to gain commensurable se-
curity and security assurance by setting objective evaluation criteria and
providing explicit security processes and assurance requirements. In prac-
tice, none of the standards alone is capable of providing this. Only when
thoroughly examined and combined, the three presented ISO standards pro-
vide the framework and the criteria for just that: Application security pro-
vides the framework for security rationale, objectives and requirements, and
the security management. SSE-CMM describes the processes to build the
required security and assurance; the Common Criteria sets the evaluation
criteria for the product through the Protection Profiles.
The examined industry models provide lightweight frameworks for man-
aging and measuring the security work. However, the main framework,
against which the work is to be analyzed, is set by the security standards.
Section 3 sets the security frameworks into the context of agile software de-
velopment. This section also provides more insight into the current state of
the art in both industry and research. For each of the examined areas, gaps
in both the practical implementation and scientific knowledge are pointed
out.
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Agile Security Development
– Methods and Solutions
In this section, the key methodologies used in agile software development
are presented, and their applicability to security engineering is analyzed.
The knowledge base and the analytic framework is drawn from the field of
software security engineering presented in the previous section. The selected
agile methodologies and their core techniques are presented in Section 3.1.
Based on the analysis, an agile software security engineering framework is
presented in Section 3.2.
Combining the SSDLC and maturity models with agile software devel-
opment requires combining the business and security objectives to set the
objectives for development. This requires a rigorous approach to risk man-
agement, and is the topic of various system engineering theories, ultimately
being rooted in mathematics on the technical side. Elicitation of the se-
curity requirements, including the management of security risks, has to be
conducted in a way that contributes towards achieving the security objec-
tive without unnecessarily causing hindrance to the business objectives. This
section presents ways to ‘enhance’ the software development process with
software security engineering activities.
3.1 Agile methods
The paradigm change that began in the 1980s and 1990s was summarized
and even aggravated in the Agile Manifesto by Beck et al. (2001). Since the
manifesto, the agile methods and principles have received a near-universal
adaptation in software engineering, as verified by studies by Rodríguez et al.
(2012) and Holvitie et al. (2017), and industry surveys by VersionOne (2018).
The development of methodologies, leading to agile development models, has
its roots in the age before computers. Outside the field of software engineer-
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of currently prevalent agile methods improved on
Abrahamsson et al. (2003)
ing the lightweight, iterative and incremental management and development
models have a much longer tradition and many predecessors, such as the use
of Kanban with the Toyota Production System, as described by Sugimori
et al. (1977). Iterative models have been prevalent especially in the method-
ologies aiming to improve quality control.
The evolution of these methods was recounted and illustrated by Abra-
hamsson et al. (2003). Building upon that work, Figure 3.1 presents the
development from the 1980s onward in a cleaned and modified form, up-
dated to include the recent developments in the methodologies and their
origins.
The diagram, while necessarily simplified, contains the historically sig-
nificant techniques and methodologies that are either still in use, or have
had a marked influence on the currently used agile methods. The diagram is
expanded to include the developments in lean and hybrid methods, scaled ag-
ile methodologies and the inclusion of new hybrid methodologies. Also, the
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development branch originating from the Rational Unified Process (RUP)
published by Kruchten (2000) leading to Disciplined Agile Delivery (DAD)
by Ambler and Lines (2012a) is included; the latter is an exercise in enforcing
pre-planned activities into iterative and incremental development processes
– as such, a prime candidate for security projects, although notably break-
ing away from the agile principles and values. The Test-Driven Development
model, a direct precursor to the XP method by Beck (2000), was also absent
in the original source and was thus added.
In Figure 3.1, the shaded boxes represent the agile methods with reported
use of at least 1% in the survey by VersionOne (2018). The trend indicates
increase use of hybrid methods, developed to provide scalability and enable
synchronization of the work of parallel development teams. The non-boxed
elements in the figure represent past methodologies or techniques preceding
the “true” agile methods. The Agile Manifesto, marked with an ellipse, is
included to provide a timeline for the methodologies and their influences.
The elements that have a dashed border, represent methodologies or tools
that have acted as an influence, but no longer have significant reported use.
The vast majority of current software engineering organizations is using
software development methods that can be labeled agile. Adaption of ag-
ile development processes, methodologies and models into software security
engineering has been researched relatively poorly. Most of the work concen-
trates on combining specific agile methodologies with e.g. requirements of
the Common Criteria, or the SSDLC methods, both described in Section 2.
The following sections present the basics of the most used agile method-
ologies and the key concepts in agile methods. The agile methodologies
selected for review are Scrum, Extreme Programming, Kanban, and the
scaled methods. Key agile concepts are presented as provided in the Scrum
method in the next section. These concepts include iterations (sprints),
the main artifacts (backlogs), and the definition of done. This important
concept, the definition of done, marks the completion of a process starting
from requirements gathering, continuing with design and implementation,
and finally, fulfilling the verification criteria and achieving acceptance.
3.1.1 Scrum
Scrum is one of the earliest and currently still the most used agile methodol-
ogy. Scrum was defined in its current form by Schwaber (1995), and revised
by Schwaber and Beedle (2002). The term ‘scrum’ itself originates from “The
new product development game” by Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986), as does
much of the game-themed terminology used in earliest agile methodologies.
The Scrum processes are divided into two iterative stages, presenting the
“pre-game” planning and architecture stages on the left, and compressing
the “game” and “post-game” stages onto the right, consisting of production
57
Chapter 3 – Agile Security Development – Methods and
Solutions
Iterate
Product backlog 
planning Risk assessment
Initial security assurance
Risk list4Security policies and 
regulation
2
Sprint
Training 
Certificates
1
Production‐time security assurance
Sprint backlog 
planning Risk assessment
Security 
reviews
6 Test 
reports
7Security 
documentation
5 Audit 
reports
8
Implementation Verification Deployment
Operational 
documentation
9
B
Security 
Architecture
3
B A
A
Figure 3.2: Software security engineering processes executed in Scrum
framework by Schwaber and Beedle (2002): roles, events, and documenta-
tion artifacts
and delivery. The iterative Scrum process, as related to various security
assurance artifacts, is presented in Figure 3.2.
Numbered items refer to the security assurance artifacts created or uti-
lized during a Scrum iteration, linked to the processes and events. Of these,
(1) training and (2) security policies typically exist prior to the start of
the development process; organizations may also have a security risk assess-
ment baseline to perform initial risk analysis. Training requirements may
also emerge and be addressed during implementation.
Security architecture (3) is one of the most common security assurance
requirements, essentially a part of the general software architecture with
security requirements included. Item (4) is the security risk management
documentation: risks are related to the protected business value, and the
risk mitigation techniques are to be translated into concrete backlog items.
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The prioritization of these items can also be based on the risk assessment.
The rationale for the security work is based on the security objectives, which
are derived from the initial security assurance documentation.
Items from (5) to (9) are produced or updated during the development
process through documentation (5), code and software reviews (6), and var-
ious forms of security testing (7). In some cases, also security audits, per-
formed by a certification body or other third party, may be required and an
audit report is produced (8). Before release to production, instructions for
maintenance and operations are produced (9). These are sometimes supple-
mented by a plan, or roadmap, for updates. This, in turn, is based on the
architecture and the technical documentation. To provide some context, in
the Common Criteria item (5) would represent the assurance documentation
stack ADV_FSP.x (see Figure 2.5).
Scrum introduces a flexible framework, rather than a strict methodol-
ogy, within which the techniques and processes most suitable for the task
at hand can be employed. In Scrum, work is completed in short iterations,
called sprints. In its basic form, Scrum introduces a simple framework of
three roles (scrum master, developer and the product owner), three core arti-
facts (product backlog, sprint backlog, product increment), and four events
(sprint planning, daily meetings, sprint review, and sprint retrospective).
When scaling up the team size or the number of parallel teams, a sprint
burndown chart is a practical necessity to track and coordinate progress of
the work.
The Scrum workflow captures the essence of agile software development
work. In Figure 3.2 security specific work stages and security assurance
have been added to a rudimentary Scrum process. The security engineering
processes, presented in Section 2, practically introduce security and qual-
ity gates into all the stages: product backlog planning involves architecture
reviews; risk assessment itself resembles a quality gate. Sprint backlog plan-
ning implies design and test case reviews; in the implementation phase, there
are reviews for the code, tools, and programming practices and processes;
the verification stage introduces further security testing and possible third-
party audits. The release, done after a final risk assessment, introduces
security documentation creation and consequent reviews, and the possible
certification of the code.
Requirements are elicited by customer collaboration (i.e., the product
owner), and are communicated in the form of stories. The main differ-
ence between a story and a requirement is the level of formality and detail:
the user expresses what feature is wanted or which objective needs to be
achieved, and these are formalized into requirements and further into devel-
opment task in backlog planning events. Items in the product backlog are
prioritized together with the product owner, and the actual commitment to
implementation is done by the developers in sprint backlog planning. Com-
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mon ownership of the items is promoted, meaning that the team commits
to implement each task they select for the backlog of the upcoming sprint.
Each backlog item is assigned a formal definition of done criterion, verified
through a continuous (automated) testing effort.
In practice, Scrum is a set of rules tying the above elements together
and governing their use throughout the project, adapting to the changes
occurring during the process. The incessant drive for ‘value’ is inherent to
not only to Scrum, but nearly all modern software engineering. This ap-
proach has the potential downside of causing functionally complete software
to be released for production use despite inadequate, or completely missing
security engineering and validation.
3.1.2 Extreme Programming
Predating Scrum, the eXtreme Programming (XP) by Beck (2000), has been
influential in the definition of later agile methodologies and, most impor-
tantly, the agile manifesto itself. XP has a more holistic view of the soft-
ware lifecycle, not concentrating only on the development phase. In XP, the
development lifecycle is divided into five phases, from exploration through
planning, iterations to release, ‘productionizing’ and maintenance to ‘death’.
Despite the unconventional naming, the phases constitute a common lifecy-
cle model with XP activities defined for each.
Extreme Programming aims at increased code quality while improving
productivity, and suggests achieving those goals through four activities: cod-
ing, testing, listening and designing. Coding is the act of implementation and
production of the software; the software will be subjected to rigorous testing
both on unit and integration levels as part of quality assurance. Current
practices of continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) reflect
this thinking.
In Extreme Programming, listening is a generic term for requirement elic-
itation done in cooperation with the software’s customer, and implemented
by a process called the planning game. The planning game is a mechanism
similar to Scrum’s backlog planning and is divided into release planning and
iteration planning. This mechanism of requirement elicitation translates the
user requirements, recorded in story form, first into concrete requirements
in cooperation with the customer, and then into implementable and testable
functionality (tasks) within the development team. The planning game pro-
cess is divided into three phases: exploration, commitment and steering. In
release planning, exploration deals with stories, which get estimated and, if
necessary, split into smaller entities; commitment phase involves sorting of
the stories. Sorting is based on value and risk: in this context, the risk is
not taken to mean a security risk, but rather level of uncertainty dealing
with the completeness of the story: this means the likelihood of the story to
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change (volatility) and the complexity of the story’s implementation.
From the viewpoint of software security, security-related stories create
both explicit and implicit business value, which the team should have the
ability and expertise to estimate. After estimation, the team assesses the
velocity with which they can perform, and choose the scope of the items
that will be included in the next release. In iteration planning, the items
in the scope of release are translated into tasks and assigned to individual
developers using a similarly staged process. An industry survey by Licorish
et al. (2016) indicates that the planning game is one of the least utilized
agile activities with 27.7% adoption rate.
XP also introduces other important techniques, such as pair program-
ming. This is to be applied using value-based guidelines, such as sustainable
development pace enforced by a 40-hour upper limit to the work week. Ad-
ditionally, the implementation effort should be test-driven, emphasizing the
testability of all planning items. However, for security requirements, ex-
pressing requirements as test acceptance criteria may not be a suitable ap-
proach. XP also discards many of the planning phase practices, promoting
an emerging design and architecture to reduce the re-design work.
The concept of emerging design is also a source of criticism targeted to all
agile methods – not only XP (see e.g. Bellomo et al. (2014)). The criticism
is on the other hand supported by reported 74.5% adoption rate of “Simple
Design” as surveyed by Licorish et al. (2016). This approach, combined with
the low adaptation of planning activities, provides ground for hypotheses
against the use of agile methods in security critical work. In contradiction
to the anti-agile hypotheses, in a case study by Adelyar and Norta (2016)
the use of XP and other agile methods was found directly beneficial in the
mitigation of security vulnerabilities. Early software security engineering
focused on XP due to its prevalence in software development in the early
2000s. Security engineering in the XP method has been a central topic in
research by e.g. Wäyrynen et al. (2004) and Karlstrom and Runeson (2005);
requirement engineering in XP has been researched by Boström et al. (2006).
Security assurance in XP was discussed by Beznosov and Kruchten (2004),
and a study about security processes in XP was conducted by Ge et al.
(2007). A common theme in the findings in these research reports is the
practical adaptability of agile methods – in this case, XP – to virtually
all types of security engineering processes. This can be generalized to other
agile methodologies as well, indicating that the current research gap is in the
security techniques and tools, and the management of security engineering
work in the agile projects.
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3.1.3 Lean methods and Kanban
The Kanban method combines agile principles with a lean approach. The
lean approach, introduced to software engineering by Poppendieck and Pop-
pendieck (2003) among first adopters, has its roots in the manufacturing in-
dustry. Lean thinking has been widely adapted to software engineering (see
e.g. a systematic literature review by Ahmad et al. (2013)), and Kanban is
among the most used management methodologies (VersionOne (2018)). In
software engineering, lean methods promote high-quality work, knowledge
creation, and deferring commitment and decisions until they are absolutely
necessary.
The Lean Software Development deals extensively with the concept of
‘waste’. In the broad definition, anything that does not produce value for the
customer is considered waste. Lean development extends the agile frame-
work by adding seven key principles. These principles, with their support
tools, are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Lean Software Development principles and support tools as
given by Poth et al. (2018)
Key Principle Support Tools
1. Eliminate Waste Seeing waste
Value stream mapping
2. Amplify learning Feedback
Iterations
Synchronization
Set-based development
3. Decide as late as possible Options thinking
The last responsible moment
Making decisions
4. Deliver as fast as possible Pull systems
Queuing theory
Cost of delay
5. Empower the team Self-determination
Motivation
Leadership
Expertise
6. Build integrity in Perceived integrity
Conceptual integrity
Refactoring
Testing
7. See the whole Measurements
Contracts
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Much like in Scrum and XP, the relationship to quality improvement
methods, and the drive for better quality is evident. In general, the agile
and lean methodologies stem from the principle of continuous improvement
(cf. Anderson et al. (1994); Brunet (2000)). Lean principles call for situation
awareness; intrinsic understanding of the processes being performed, and
the ability to alter them quickly to gain benefits faster. The principles
represent a collection of “common management wisdom”, and the aim is to
reduce waste. In lean methodologies, this concept is central: waste consists
of partially completed work, extra processes, extra features, task switching,
and defects. In Kanban, waste is addressed with a set of high-level work
management principles: visualization of the workflow, limiting the work in
progress, measuring and managing the flow, making process policies explicit,
and collaborative improvement.
Kanban techniques emphasize a technique of visualizing the workflow.
This is achieved simply by using a signboard, or similar: The board has
columns representing the work process, such as “To-Do”, “In Progress”, and
“Done”. Definition of done of a security-related task typically would in-
clude passing relevant tests and verification steps. Work items are moved
sequentially through the columns, with the “in progress” column item lim-
ited to a fixed number of concurrent items. Lean methods were developed
to address resource optimization and throughput maximization in mass pro-
duction. Kanban addresses this mode of production as ‘push’ mode, whereas
software is typically produced in ‘pull’ mode. In lean software process man-
agement, the waste is not limited to the limitation of tangible production
items, such as items on the sprint backlog when using a Scrum-Kanban hy-
brid: It involves anything that is not directly producing value in the next
release, according to Anderson et al. (2012).
Kanban and agile methods in general regard managing and leading the
people as an even more important task than managing the work. The work is
often highly complex, requiring a great amount of skill to be completed. To
ensure continuous performance, Extreme programming explicitly lists sus-
tainability practices, such as 40-hour week; Kanban abstracts this into “re-
specting the people”. From the management perspective, these approaches
are essential to keep the team performance level constant and predictable.
This is also the basis for self-organization, letting the teams choose their
tasks and give their own expert estimates on their complexity and the re-
sources required. The respect for people also affects the quality control,
as all raised concerns are to be taken seriously and the necessary changes
applied quickly.
The individual improvements introduced by Kanban can be subtle. The
principle is to introduce one-day changes: small incremental improvements
to the work process that can be implemented in one work day. The focus
is on quality improvement. Ideally, when a problem is found, the work
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is stopped immediately to solve it: This serves the purpose of getting the
quality right from the start, as defects are waste. This is an important aspect
in software security engineering and would be reflected in for example the
test-driven development practice of writing a test case for each found bug
(Howard and Lipner (2006); Beck (2000)).
Besides a proof of concept created by Dorca et al. (2016) there is little
extant literature about reported cases, or other examples of lean methods
being used for software security engineering management. This can be hy-
pothesized to represent a publication bias (i.e., preference not to submit
scientific articles), rather than a lack of practical use.
3.1.4 Scaled Agile Methods
Scaled methods, such as Large Scale Scrum (LeSS)1, Nexus2 and SAFe3 pri-
marily enable larger organizations and enterprises to apply agile methods
in their development work on the team level. They also affect the devel-
opment process by adding their own inter-team communication practices
and processes into the workflow of the agile practitioners. These methods
provide the means to divide the product backlog to different teams and syn-
chronize their work and output; more importantly, they promote the agile
and lean processes through the whole management structure, not only the
development teams.
These methods also provide a way to ease the larger enterprises into
the iterative workflows without forcing them to drastically restructure their
internal organizations. Much of the old management staff can retain their
positions, allowing the bulk of the multi-level business organization to re-
main, and change only the interface towards agile development processes.
In the simplest case, scaled methods such as Nexus allow large development
projects to be split into small-size teams to successfully apply the agile de-
velopment methodologies.
Scaling agile methods up involves managing distributed teams and con-
trolling the organization overhead and a flexible workflow according to agile
principles. There are some inevitable compromises to these principles, how-
ever: for example, the Disciplined Agile Delivery model by Ambler and Lines
(2012b) approaches the management of agile production from the viewpoint
of architectural control. It also divides the development process into spe-
cific management phases. This model may be suitable for certain delivery
models, but when results – such as security fixes – are needed quickly, much
of the “waterfall legacy” needs to be overcome if this logic is applied. On
contrast, achieving the higher maturity levels in SSE-CMM or SAMM may
1https://less.works/
2https://www.scrum.org/resources/scaling-scrum
3http://www.scaledagileframework.com/
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be inherently easier when using a planned work management and centrally
managed organization.
A somewhat different approach to management of distributed teams and
shared resources has been presented by Kniberg and Ivarsson (2012), by in-
troducing a method commonly called the Spotify model. Besides the techni-
cal management of the “squads” (development teams with up to 8 members)
work items, organizational and personal issues are brought into the focus by
maintaining a measurement chart of the teams’ performance and trends.
This enables the management to take action based on the squads’ direct
feedback, and even predict future performance issues. Squads are divided
into “tribes”, which in the original concept were seen as mini start-ups.
Tribes optimally consist of a maximum of 100 people, and exist to promote
the social relationships within the tribe. Tribe can also be formed by the
squads in one geographic location or building. In the Spotify model, squads
retain the freedom to organize their own work and choose their preferred
work management techniques, such as Scrum or Kanban.
In the Spotify model, technical work is managed by System Owners and
chief architects. Information sharing between squads and tribes is enabled
by introducing “chapters” and “guilds”. Chapters are local to a tribe and
connect the people sharing similar roles or technical task areas in differ-
ent squads. Chapters have a technical lead, who controls the work profiles
and information sharing within the technical area. Guilds are larger and
looser entities, which may extend between the tribes and throughout the
organization. Guilds enable people from various chapters to share common
interests, goals, and methods, beyond their individual squads or tribes. A
security guild, for example, could consist of interested programmers, testers,
product owners, and managers.
The final examined scaled model is the Scaled Agile Framework (SAFe)
by Knaster and Leffingwell (2018). From the viewpoint of software devel-
opment, SAFe consists of production units, such as Scrum teams, working
in iterations and creating products incrementally. The scaled framework is
built upon a layered concept. Above the team layer, there are introduced
the program layer, the large solution layer, and the portfolio layer. The
development teams’ work is divided into program increments, which pro-
vide workflow limits on the program level; in SAFe the continuous delivery
pipeline is managed by these program increments, creating “agile release
trains”, scheduled work packages that contain several iterations’ worth of
planned work towards a release taking place when the release criteria is met.
The upper layers in SAFe provide mechanisms to combine several trains, and
add e.g. budgeting, and other necessary corporate management elements.
Through this elaborate framework, SAFe also provides the necessary frame-
work for security management, especially in conveying the contents of the
organizational normative framework into the security requirements and the
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release criteria.
The scaled models have quickly risen in popularity and use recently. In
the State of Agile annual reports, SAFe has been the most popular scaled
model since 2016; the Disciplined Agile model has also seen a considerable
rise, from breaching the 1% threshold in 2016, to 5% in 2018. As the scaled
models mostly address management issues outside the direct workflow of the
security engineering processes, very little software security research on the
topic of scaled agile models exists. An early work by Fitzgerald et al. (2013)
describes an in-house scaling method, developed to extend the software team
to accommodate the domain experts as well as the experts responsible for
software safety and security. While this is essential for the security work,
this type of scaling does not address the inter-team scaling issues. So far, the
scaling models described in this section have not received much attention in
software security research.
3.2 Security Engineering in Software Develop-
ment
Security implementation in a software project is dependent on the normative,
organizational and technological contexts, as defined by the ISO standard
for Application Security, ISO/IEC Sstandard 27034-1:2011 (2011). Under-
standing these contexts is necessary to recognize the security rationale, and
from them, the security objectives. The objectives state the security re-
quirements. Changes to any of the contexts during software development
is a source of security risk. This introduces the following challenges to the
development of software security:
• Correctness, consistency, and completeness of security requirements
• Correctness, consistency, and completeness of security risk process
• Correctness, consistency, and completeness of implementation and ver-
ification of the security features and functionality
Defining the security requirements and identifying security risks is inde-
pendent of the development methodology; implementation and verification
of the security features and functionality is all about it. Achieving correct-
ness in any of these fields conceivably benefits from applying an iterative and
incremental approach, albeit the focus in this section is univocally on the
security implementation and verification activities in the software develop-
ment, analyzed against the three security contexts. The normative context,
i.e., security regulation such as standards, guidelines, laws and directives,
is the groundwork for security requirements. The normative context may
66
Section 3.2 – Security Engineering in Software Development
set requirements for both the development process and the software prod-
uct, accompanied by requirements for security assurance. This also affects
the choice of requirements engineering techniques, as shown by Elahi et al.
(2011).
Security requirement engineering in an agile context may be performed
through misuse cases first presented by Sindre and Opdahl (2005), applying
SEI’s SQUARE, or using mechanisms presented by the SSDLCs, evaluated
by e.g. Tøndel et al. (2008). In an agile implementation of requirements,
the typical mechanism is to first create user stories, or rather abuser sto-
ries which are then translated into items on the product backlog. At this
point, a recommended approach is to apply formal quality criteria before
accepting the items. Examples of such criteria are INVEST and SMART by
Wake (2003): a backlog item must be Independent, Negotiable, Valuable,
Estimable, Small, and Testable. When taken under implementation, a task
should be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-boxed.
After implementation, agreed and discrete Definition of Done criteria are
to be applied, based on the requirement elicitation technique. The greatest
difference between adaptive and prescriptive methods lies here: agile de-
velopment consists of piecemeal definitions of the requirements, rather than
doing everything in advance and at once. This allows not only more accurate
work load estimation but also much greater technical precision, improving
security.
3.2.1 Security Requirements Engineering in Software De-
velopment
An agile security development process, when following the agile principles,
should be utilized to define and implement only the necessary security and
security assurance. To reach this goal, the correct setting of security ratio-
nale is of critical importance; this cannot be achieved without the bottom-up
risk management process, identifying the protected assets and risks. Nor-
mative frameworks set the rest of the objectives.
In an agile mindset, the security rationale is based on a dynamic evalua-
tion. Extending upon the agile principles and terminology, the result of this
evaluation can be called finding the Minimum Viable Security (MVS). The
principles to achieve MVS can be directly derived from the main challenges
to software security:
• Security objectives are correctly, completely and consistently defined;
• security objectives are correctly, completely and consistently met; and,
• sufficient security assurance is provided.
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Agile development methods provide an adaptive framework for the build
process. Formally this is realized by the attitude towards changes in the
requirements set for the development. In the agile framework, as the itera-
tive work progresses, any number of incorrectly set requirements may have
to be redefined, while “new”, i.e., latent, requirements are discovered along
with the development work, as knowledge is accumulated. By minimizing
the assumptions and defining the requirements as they appear, the resulting
set should result in a minimal set of requirements to achieve the security
objectives.
The standards guiding software requirement engineering have been re-
viewed by Schneider and Berenbach (2013), providing guidance and criticism
also applicable for security requirement elicitation. A comprehensive survey
by Tøndel et al. (2008) lists several approaches and techniques to perform
security requirements engineering: The analyzed techniques typically com-
bine risk engineering with threat modeling, or security design. To put this
into a formal framework, these methods represent the knowledge base for
the evaluation process. The evaluation process sets concrete metrics and
formal criteria for the systems’ build process, as well as their results.
Security requirement management is largely based on the security risks
identified during the development. Risk identification, and consequently the
requirement definition, demand considerable security knowledge and aware-
ness of the security issues from the developers. In modern software develop-
ment this knowledge is much supplemented by the use of automated tools:
when applied in the technological context, they enable the software and se-
curity engineers to concentrate on the correctness of the security process
and the assurance produced, rather than the technical details.
The compliance of the development process should always be secondary
to the compliance of the software product under development, unless the
work is performed under specific compliance requirements. The require-
ments for the process should be selected case by case, implemented and
applied to meet the actual security objectives and to provide true security.
The security objectives and the security criticality of the software under
development may also influence the software development processes; most
typically in literature, a security expert role is added to the development
team, taking responsibility for the security work and coordinating the secu-
rity objectives (see Howard and Lipner (2006)).
The foremost shortcoming of the SSDLCs presented in the previous sec-
tion is the inadequate definition of requirement engineering. Formal require-
ment engineering methods such as Security QUAlity Requirements Engineer-
ing (SQUARE), by Mead and Stehney (2005), amended by Mead (2015), aim
to provide measurability and rigour to this process. These methods provide
means to both defining the security requirements, and identifying security
risks. SQUARE suffers from the same general shortcoming as the SSE-
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CMM, and other prescriptive management-heavy methods: While thorough
and comprehensive, they scale poorly for smaller organizations. Addition-
ally, they impose severe resource and schedule strains on the software devel-
opment process, causing implementation difficulties in also larger organiza-
tions. As such, these methods are primarily useful in providing guidelines
for the processes. The implemented engineering process will most likely be
a subset of the suggested processes, always adapted to the organization and
the current objectives.
3.2.2 Security Risk Engineering in Software Development
ISO/IEC has defined a standardized risk management framework for infor-
mation security in ISO/IEC Standard 27005:2018 (2018). The ISO standard
differs somewhat from e.g. the Touchpoints risk model, or even the SSE-
CMM model, in both terminology and the level of details. In an adaptation
of the risk management process for government work by Patiño et al. (2018),
the risk management process is performed in four distinct stages. After
the risk management context has been established, the process progresses
bottom-up: each component subject to the process is evaluated individually,
and the combined risk is then evaluated.
Process stage 1, Context establishment, contains three activities:
• Scope establishment. Define the environment and critical services.
• Selection of critical processes. Includes involving the people and man-
aging the required resources.
• Description of Evaluation Criteria. Qualitative risk estimation.
An example result of this phase could be a risk matrix, used as a template
into which each critical process is placed. The matrix has two dimensions:
Frequency and Impact. The total risk is the product of these two. The
frequency varies from highly improbable (1) to highly probable (5), and the
impact from very low (1) to very high (5).
Stage 2, Risk identification, contains five activities:
• Identification of assets – in software development, an architectural
description or security-related use case list can be utilized.
• Appraisal of critical assets. Estimate the impact of each asset included
in the process. Calculate the average to gain an overall asset impact
value for the process.
• Identification of threats. This activity is based on security expertise
and knowledge of the threats.
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• Identification of controls. Create a checklist of controls to mitigate the
threats, update the list as necessary.
• Identification of vulnerabilities. These may vary from natural to social
and technical and must be monitored.
The work products of this stage are a list of critical assets, a list of
threats, a list of controls and a list of vulnerabilities. When the impact of the
risk to assets is appraised, Patiño et al. (2018) suggest that processes with
an average above 3.00 are considered critical. In this stage, the significance
of security awareness is heightened. Identification of threats, controls, and
vulnerabilities are highly context-specific and require an adequate level of
security expertise.
Stage 3, Risk Estimation, consists of two activities; these are performed
for each item on the lists created at stage 2.
• Valuation of probability. A numeric value from 1 to 5.
• Valuation of impact. A numeric value from 1 to 5.
Assigning the numeric values requires expertise on both the business do-
main, and the security vulnerabilities and their impact. The standard does
not give any advice as to how to perform this critical phase: It is important
to know that all the related risk components are correctly identified and
that the appraisal of the risk and its impact is accurate. To make things
worse, the environment and thus the probability and impact of the risk may
be in a constant state of change. To manage the ongoing risk assessment
process, an owner should be designated for each risk. The owner may not
be responsible for the mitigation or even remediation of the risk but can
be held explicitly accountable for the management of their particular risk
items. Risk can be expressed the direct product of the probability and im-
pact: (Risk = Probability × Impact), properly adjusted to the asset value.
Security controls are implemented to reduce this value.
An example risk analyzing technique, called after its mnemonic DREAD,
combines this stage with the next one, Risk Evaluation. The mnemonic
comes fromDamage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users,
and the exploit’s Discoverability. This model adds further dimensions to the
risk estimation process, and makes the impact assessment more thorough by
taking e.g. the amount of affected users into consideration. DREAD has
been integrated also to tools, as described e.g. by Ingalsbe et al. (2008); as
Chapple et al. (2018) notes, these inspection points should be accompanied
by risk estimation aspects customized to the current context.
Stage 4, Risk Evaluation, concludes the risk process and consists of three
activities.
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• Risk valuation. Calculate the product of each impact and frequency.
To be repeated once in e.g. 6 months.
• Identification of critical risks. Focus on mitigation of risks that are
ranked high or very high.
• Selection of control measures. Treatment options are: mitigate, ac-
cept, avoid and transfer to a third party.
This stage sets the requirements for the practical security engineering
work. In a software development company, the risks that are to be mitigated
or avoided require policies and guidelines. These policies and guidelines form
a major part of the organizational normative framework. Through applica-
tion normative frameworks derived from them, they get incorporated into
the software development processes, environments. They are also imple-
mented into the software products. The risk management framework pays
specific attention to an organization’s internal threats. Internal threats, also
known as malicious insiders, were also a major concern of the early security
standards: the military did not trust their civilian contractors.
To avoid excess security overhead the security risk process should be a
part of organizations generic software risk process, such as one described
by Boehm (1991). The process described by Boehm is not specific to soft-
ware security, but security items can be easily added to the to it. This
process consists of six steps: (1) Risk-identification checklists, with a top 10
risk sources (more, when security is included) and a quantification model
for this; (2) Risk analysis and (3) risk prioritization are to be adjusted to
the security items relevant to the current context; (4) Risk-management
planning, involves mitigation for the risk items is integrated; (5) Risk reso-
lution and, finally (6) risk monitoring, involve implementing the plan and by
keeping the implementation on track by a closed-loop process and applying
corrective action whenever necessary.
Risk management sets the foundation for all the security work in the
organization, by practically defining the organizational security rationale.
Combined with the security regulations and other external factors, it forms
the complete Organizational Normative Framework, from which each Appli-
cation Normative Framework is derived. An example of such external regula-
tion is a governmental requirement for use of a risk management framework
or a security maturity model, such as NIST RMF (NIST 800-37) in the
United States, or the VAHTI framework in Finland. The caveats of quan-
tification of risk probability are obvious: Such calculations should be used
with caution, especially when used to manage security-related investments
and security work.
An essential characteristic of the risk management process is that it
cannot be done by the developers alone: input from the user domain is
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essential for the completeness of the assessment. Perhaps due to this, and
the amount of work involved in the risk process, the reported experience of
risk management in software security research is scarce. This indicates a
research gap and a clear demand for improved risk management processes.
One such model could be a combination of iterative risk process keeping
track of the top 10 (or any number found suitable) of the software security
risks in the development project, and managing the security engineering and
assurance work utilizing this list.
3.2.3 Security Assurance Engineering
Security assurance has many definitions, and its scope and composition has
significantly grown since the introduction of the concept. The assurance el-
ements described in the first DoD standards still form the basis of software
assurance in software-intensive systems. In the early definitions, assurance
consists of system design and security documentation, together with descrip-
tions of security policies (cf. DoD (1985b)).
Assurance in the security context is commonly specified as grounds for
confidence that a deliverable meets its security objectives. In ISO/IEC Stan-
dard 15026-2:2011 (2011), a definition of assurance is given as a set of ev-
idence consisting of the sets of known facts, data, objects, claims and as-
surance cases. Of these, a claim is further specified as a proposition to be
assured about the system of concern, chosen based on a set of justifications
for the objectives. Software (security) assurance is defined as “level of confi-
dence that software is free from vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed
into the software or accidentally inserted at anytime during its lifecycle and
that the software functions in the intended manner”.
Hamidovic (2012) combines security assurance engineering with require-
ments engineering in his practical dissection of security assurance selection
and implementation. This approach to security assurance reflects the three
main areas of software security engineering:
1. Security of the deliverable software through verification and testing.
2. Security of the development processes.
3. Security of the operating environment.
Security assurance exists to create confidence in all three. In an anal-
ysis of information assurance techniques by Such et al. (2016), four main
components of assurance are identified: (1) Assurance scheme, consisting of
standards (e.g., ISO 27001) and qualifications; (2) Assurance target, which
are further classified as either security controls or security competence re-
quired for assessment; (3) Assurance technique, the method of assessing the
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Figure 3.3: Assurance techniques as given by Such et al. (2016)
target: either security control, such as penetration testing, or controls for
the qualifications of the personnel; (4) auditing and assessment evidence of
the three other components. All four of these are directly applicable to se-
curity context as well. The assurance techniques identified in this study are
presented in Figure 3.3.
Not all of the assurance techniques are directly used by the observed
software security assurance frameworks, but they may be introduced to the
assurance process by e.g. regulation. The level, scope and qualities of se-
curity assurance are ultimately dependent on the applied security policies.
Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) group security assurance into requirement
assurance, design assurance and implementation assurance.
Implementation assurance is gained by security reviews and various forms
of security testing. In a cross-case analysis, Cruzes et al. (2017) identify the
following risk-based security testing types in various software development
life cycle phases:
• Design: Model-based Security Testing.
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• Implementation: Code-based Testing and Static Analysis
• Verification: Penetration Testing and Dynamic Analysis
• Maintenance: Security Regression Testing.
To set the target of the validation’s outcome, the assurance argument
must be clarified. In defining the minimum viable security assurance, the
NASA definition of minimum security assurance as listed by Davis (2005)
could prove helpful:
1. Security risk evaluation process has been performed.
2. Security requirements have been established for the software and data.
3. All software reviews and audits include evaluation of security require-
ments.
4. Configuration, change and incident management processes contain se-
curity reviews to prevent security violations.
5. Physical security for the software and the data is adequate
In addition to the proof of secure system architecture and design, the
security assurance requirement includes verification and validation of appro-
priate security controls. This assurance is created to provide an acceptable
amount of information about the security policies being enforced. In prac-
tice is created by logging the system and application events. The core of
security policies is to set the rules for how the access is granted to the data
contained in the system. The access control in based on the authentication
scheme: the security classification of information and its users.
3.2.4 Security in Continuous Delivery
Depending on the organization and the software product, the iterative and
incremental software development have extended the practice of continuous
integration into continuous delivery. The merger of development and oper-
ations is called by the portmanteau DevOps. In continuous delivery models
with a special emphasis on software security, the model is sometimes called
DevSecOps, or some of its variants (cf. Mohan and Othmane (2016)).
Organizations apply the continuous delivery models and processes to
speed up the software deployment, by creating a production pipeline with
a high degree of automatization. This level of streamlining calls for good
quality code and extensive and highly automatized testing processes, as
described by Kim et al. (2016). For software security, this poses both new
challenges and opportunities: when a service-type software is published in
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the open Internet in a matter of hours, or minutes, the security testing and
monitoring tools need to be constantly up to date and able to respond to
changes. The changes may occur in the software or its configuration, or
in the operating environment in the form of new security threats or even
infrastructure changes (Mohan and Othmane (2016)).
The change does not happen only by introducing tools and automati-
zation: it requires also change in the organization, bringing the developers
and operations closer to each other, often over the subject of testing (Kim
et al. (2016)). Also in regulated environments, such as security-critical ones
reported by Mohan and Othmane (2016), or safety-critical by Laukkarinen
et al. (2018), this results in an increase in effectiveness and flexibility and a
decrease in response times. This fully fits the definition of the word “agile”,
whether used as an adjective or noun.
Continuous delivery impacts security in the form of requirements for
scanning tools, security monitoring, and security logging. The work man-
agement tools will also need to be able to accommodate and appropriately
prioritize the security-related tasks created from the operations and inserted
into the development backlogs as discussed by Mohan and Othmane (2016).
For example, Kanban-style work management should allow such flexibility,
whereas a scaled agile model, such as SAFe with release plans, may face
greater challenges in pushing these changes into production. Moyon et al.
(2018) provide a direct example of how to modify SAFe to achieve compli-
ance with ISO/IEC security standards. Proper prioritization of the security
items is one of the most pressing issues in software security research and
practice.
The security assurance engineering is also facing changes in a continuous
delivery model. Security assurance may take new forms, such as archiv-
ing entire virtualized environments and using them as security evidence
(cf. Laukkarinen et al. (2018)). After an incident, they can be used as a
source of security forensics. Ideally, technical security assurance consists of
elements usable not only in security engineering but also by the software’s
developers and operators.
Security Management in Software Development
In a standard-regulated security scheme, the security objectives are norma-
tive and formalized. Objectives are translated into requirements and poli-
cies, which in turn are implemented by security functionality and verified
by security assurance.
Boehm and Turner (2003a) proposed the choice of software development
method to take place on an axis between Agile and Plan-driven methods. He
proceeds in presenting five dimensions for this selection. Presented roughly
from the most quantifiable to the most qualitative, the dimensions are:
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1. Size, the number of personnel;
2. Dynamism, or number of requirement changes per month;
3. Criticality, or amount and severity of loss due to impact of defects;
4. Skill of the personnel, as defined by Cockburn (2002) and further de-
veloped by Boehm and Turner (2003a);
5. Culture, ranging from “chaos-thriving” to “order-thriving”.
The agile methods evolved to meet the shortcomings of the prescriptive
methods, in conformance with the best practices and management values
in software engineering. After two decades, the simplest and most flexible
methodologies appear to have thrived: Scrum, XP and their hybrid forms
still have a strong representation in the industry. A notable trend has been
the emergence of various scaled agile frameworks, such as Large Scale Scrum
(LeSS), Nexus and the Scaled Agile Framework (SAFe), providing manage-
ment models and practices for several coordinated development teams, thus
enabling the agile methods to be used in larger organizations.
The developments in agile methodologies have amended the juxtaposi-
tions between agile and non-agile methods, described by Boehm and Turner
(2003a): scaled methods relax the team size limits, and there are methods
introducing a level of pre-planning into the iterative and incremental de-
velopment process, while still claiming to retain agile principles. Examples
of such methodologies would be Disciplined Agile Development (DAD) by
Ambler and Lines (2012a), or the slightly older Crystal family by Cock-
burn (2000). Neither of these has acquired significant reported use in the
industry, but contain elements useful for producing more secure software
through their focus on architecture and requirements management. Boehm
and Turner (2003a) also presented the concept of “home grounds” for ag-
ile methods, another concept that has been outdated by the methodological
developments and at least partially later predicted by Boehm (2006) himself.
At enterprises the use of scaled methods appears to be dominated by
various “methodology providers”: a true competition of agile or lean man-
agement ecosystems, complete with extensive training models and certifica-
tion programs. In this competitive landscape, Scrum has fared best, despite
being divided into factions of scrum.org4 and Scrum alliance5. As shown in
Figure 3.1, among the most popular agile methods are only a few established
methodologies. The methods are being morphed into various hybrid models
and scaled up into more elaborate product management models.
4http://www.scrum.org
5https://www.scrumalliance.org/
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Figure 3.4: Decision-making in risk-driven development method selection
(adapted from Boehm and Turner (2004))
Despite the near-absolute current dominance of the agile methods, not all
projects may warrant using them. While agile methods dominate, there may
still be organizations or situations where use of “non-agile” patterns may
be justified to achieve the optimal target; markedly, these include projects
with fixed schedules and budgets. In a critique to agile methods, Boehm
and Turner (2003b) discussed the dimensions the selection process is based
on. Boehm and Turner (2004) formalize this approach into a simple decision
process, illustrated in Figure 3.4 and set into the context of risk management.
In the figure, the risk evaluation process is used to give the necessary
insight to the validity of the security objectives, and to help determine the
appropriate security assurance. The decisions should also be based on the
resources at disposal: skill, tools, workforce and time. Especially the amount
of skill is a critical factor in security work; requirement elicitation, risk iden-
tification and the mitigation techniques all require extensive knowledge in
the security field. The significance of the individual is markedly emphasized
in agile software development, coiling back to the significance of skill. A
framework for formalizing skill levels in software development has been pre-
sented in Cockburn (2006); from the software security perspective, the skill
requirement stresses the importance of relevant security training.
In addition to the security processes, also the agility of a process may
be a subject of evaluation. Schweigert et al. (2014) identified about 40
models claiming to be agile maturity models. They pointed out significant
difficulties in defining the agile processes and metrics in a way that would
be commensurable between the agile maturity models. The agile models
deal with general organizational processes and are directly applicable to
security engineering. To separate fads and buzzwords from solid engineering
principles, Séguin et al. (2012) performed an analysis of agile principles. The
bulk of them was found to be valid software engineering principles. These
findings from both practical engineering and research traditions support the
use of agile methods and principles for purposes beyond managing singular
projects.
Security objectives are drawn from the environment and the protection
target; security objectives are met by setting security policies; these form the
concrete security requirements, elicited by a risk-driven process; the security
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requirements are further developed into verifiable features and functionality.
Security assurance largely ‘emerges’ from this process, but may also require
formal reviews, security audits and few pieces of security documentation,
most importantly a security architecture. The depth of security assurance
depends on the objective, but should always exist to serve the purpose of
increasing security and facilitating security management.
Lean methods can be used as a Software Process Improvement method
far more flexible and effective than traditional maturity models, as shown
by Poth et al. (2018). Heavily biased towards solving the technical and
practical, rather than the managerial issues, it can also be an effective way
to manage the realization of the security rationale, and production of the
appropriate security assurance. According to lean principles, this involves
abolishing hierarchical organization, directly managing the people and team
dynamics, addressing the faced challenges immediately and focusing on qual-
ity. Combined with diligent management of the process and project, based
on direct feedback from developers and customers, the lean principles claim
to enable the organization to always work on the most valuable item (see
Poth et al. (2018) and Poppendieck and Poppendieck (2003)).
3.3 Summary
In software development, security is a collective term, and a means for
achieving software reliability, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and com-
pliance. Security engineering has direct convergence with those software
engineering practices that traditionally have been used to improve software
quality. The agile methods aim to the reduction of unessential work, and
the improvement of quality. Security engineering, in addition to being a
requirement in an increasing number of cases, heavily contributes to the
latter. The main mutual contribution of combining the security engineering
techniques with effective software development practices is specifically the
increased rigor in requirement and risk engineering, and enhancements in
the quality assurance techniques.
Excess security compliance requirements may entitle allocating resources
towards administrative security. In software development, this is realized in
the form of additional security assurance requirements. In an agile or lean
process, additional verification-based requirements create potential bottle-
necks that need to be addressed. In these cases, instead of being the driving
force for e.g. better testing coverage, or more thorough code quality checks
during security reviews, security processes may become a hindrance to pro-
ductivity. Proper inclusion of security processes into all development stages
removes these bottlenecks. Conversely, agile methods help in the valida-
tion of security, as the iterative process with tight requirement management
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practices has been designed to “build the right product” from the start,
including security requirements.
Management of security engineering work in an agile software develop-
ment project is a combination of various techniques. These are to be fitted
into the iterative and incremental framework and rigorously applied accord-
ing to the lean or agile principles. Arguably, any software project would
benefit from applying even a light-weight security requirement elicitation
process, identifying e.g. 10 security risks and implementing a management
plan for those risks; practical programming guides, such as OWASP Top 10
security flaws should also be put to good use in the implementation phase.
Also, one of the project’s aims should be the production of appropriate se-
curity assurance: Optimally, assurance-producing mechanisms also double
as forensic evidence after the occurrence of a security incident. To system-
atize the approach to software security, a maturity model, such as SAMM
or a light-weight version of the SSE-CMM, could be modified to fit to the
organizations’ purposes, providing an ample target for future research.
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Research Description
The research objective was to find practical solutions and challenges in pro-
duction of secure software. For relevance, the chosen methodologies and
the research results reflect the current best practices and state of the art.
The steps to ensure both scientific and technical relevance were taken in
the form of literature surveys, case study and an industry survey, following
the frameworks described by Wohlin et al. (2012). Conceptual models and
analytic frameworks were utilized to gain an understanding of the topic and
to provide guidance in the empirical studies.
In this chapter, the research structure is presented by describing the
individual research articles included in the research. The research methods,
key contributions as well as possible limitations and openings for future
research are presented for each article.
4.1 Research Structure
The research consists of six publications, utilizing a variety of research meth-
ods to achieve the research objectives, and were selected to provide a thor-
ough view of the research field and research topics. The publications, and
the primary research methods used, are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Publications and the primary research methods
Publication Chapter Research Method
P1 4.2 Literature Review
P2 4.3 Constructive Research
P3 4.4 Constructive Research
P4 4.5 Literature Review
P5 4.6 Case Study
P6 4.7 Survey Research
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The field of research was charted by reviewing the relevant literature;
constructive research was used to delve deeper into key aspects, further
clarified by additional literature review. The findings were validated by a
case study and survey research.
Publication P1 provides a review of literature in the subject of agile
security engineering, gathering further empirical evidence of how security
mechanisms are applied to agile software development methods. The ma-
terial for the study was gathered from five online libraries, from which 11
peer-reviewed articles were selected for analysis. The selected articles con-
tained empirical cases of applied agile security engineering. The security
mechanisms in each article were identified, and a security activity matrix
was compiled based on the findings. It contributes towards finding answers
for RQ1, defining the security objectives and rationale.
Publication P2 presents a framework of mechanisms to set and meet the
security requirements and objectives in agile software development. The
framework is based on secure software development life cycle models and
their application to the agile software development process based on ex-
tant literature and security standards. The development techniques involve
security objective setting, requirement elicitation, and the design, imple-
mentation and verification of security features and functionality in the agile
software development process. In addition to the contribution for RQ1, in
this publication, the currently prevalent agile software development prac-
tices and software security engineering are thoroughly surveyed, solidifying
the practices to combine them. This knowledge is used to answer RQ2,
defining the concrete software security engineering methods.
Publication P3 further develops on the research topic of meeting secu-
rity assurance requirements with an agile software development process: in
this article the most widely used software development method, Scrum, is
enhanced to meet the security assurance requirements of the VAHTI instruc-
tions for the software development processes. The resulting VAHTI-Scrum
method is a software development method capable of meeting the VAHTI se-
curity requirements and producing the required security assurance artifacts.
This article provides a contextual solution to RQ2.
Publication P4 is a comparison of key industry surveys in the field of
software security engineering. BSIMM, a main software survey apparatus
in the field of software security, is an annual international industrial survey
conducted among companies with an established software security function.
The results of this survey are then utilized in the BSIMM to construct a
descriptive maturity model, with 12 core practices “everybody does”. The
results are directly compared to an industry survey conducted in Finland,
pointing out considerable differences in the core practices, and revealing a
severe lack of security training offered by software employers in Finland. The
information is used to answer RQ2, and to map the research field and the
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head topics of RQ3, the challenges and impact in practical software security
engineering.
Publication P5 describes an industry case of applying the Scrum method
to produce a VAHTI regulated software-intensive product, in this case, an
identity management platform for high-security service infrastructure. The
article provided supporting evidence for Research Questions 1 and 2, but its
primary goal is to answer RQ3.
Publication P6 is an industry survey extending the empirical research.
The survey was conducted by selecting security engineering practices from
prevalent security development life cycle models, and combining that with
extant industry surveys about agile software engineering. The aim of the
survey was to attain knowledge of the current use of security engineering
practices in the context of agile software development, and their perceived
impact on security. The survey gives a detailed view on current SSE usage
in the Finnish software industry and its perceived impact. The results are
a direct contribution to RQ3.
4.2 P1: Busting a Myth: Review of Agile Secu-
rity Engineering Methods
In this study, the history of security engineering processes and activities
integration with agile software development methods was researched by a
literature survey. The inception of iterative and incremental software devel-
opment methods raised suspicions of an inherent incompatibility between
the traditional non-agile security processes and the new agile methods. This
suspicion is deemed to still affect the attitude towards the suitability of ag-
ile methods to provide security. To examine and explore this claim, this
study presents a literature review of a selected set of agile secure software
development methods.
The results show a wide and well-documented adaptation of security
activities in agile software development, with the observed activities covering
the whole security development lifecycle. During the research process, a
repetitive theme was noted in the reviewed articles: it was noted that agile
methods are considered unsuitable for security engineering work, not to
mention to achieve regulatory compliance or conformance with a capability
maturity model. However, the evidence to the contrary is excessive, and the
reviewed articles provide many concrete examples of empirical cases where
security engineering has been applied at all phases of the software security
development life cycle in the context of agile development.
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Table 4.2: Literature searches and result set size (truncated from P1)
Library Result set size
ACM Digital Library 59
IEEE Explore 120
Springer Link 101
Wiley 32
ScienceDirect 64
Total 376
4.2.1 Method
A systematic literature review, following the principles set by Kitchenham
et al. (2009), was used to find the definitive set of secure agile software de-
velopment methods, of which a core set of 11 papers was selected for anal-
ysis, and the security activities documented in the methods were extracted.
The research was conducted in several phases: first, a systematic literature
method was applied by performing searches in five online computer science
libraries, using a systematic and documented process. The resulting set of
388 articles was then manually screened for most suitable examples of the
adaptation of agile methods to security work, with a preference for case
studies and using the incorporation of security engineering activities as a
selection requirement. A simple metric, citation count, was considered an
indication of the impact of the research. Due to inconsistencies in citation
count reporting between online libraries, a high number of citations was not
an essential requirement, but merely a contributing factor towards inclusion.
In Table 4.2 is shown the amount of the agile software security engi-
neering articles at the time of the article’s writing, in the selected online
libraries.
Each library search was conducted with the term (agile AND software
AND (security AND engineering)), with slight library-dependent varia-
tion in syntax. This body of articles was used to select a representative set
of software security engineering research, covering the whole life cycle. The
selected articles were then reviewed and analyzed, and the security activities
described in the articles were identified. These activities were evaluated us-
ing the principles of Common Criteria, which is the ISO standard to “permit
comparability between the results of independent security evaluations”. It
does so by providing a common set of requirements for the security func-
tions of IT products and systems and for assurance measures applied to
them during a security evaluation.
Finally, each method was screened for any empirical evidence provided,
as were any references to security, quality or safety standards. The results
were categorized and evaluated using the defined analytic lenses.
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4.2.2 Contribution and future work
Based on the findings of this study, the practice of security engineering ap-
pears well adapted to, and widely used with, the agile software development
methods. Some of the activities have been modified to better suit an iter-
ative development model and, based on the literature, much attention has
been paid to retain the agile nature of the development process despite of the
added security activities. The often-repeated myth of agile methods’ incom-
patibility or inherent unsuitability for security tasks and achieving security
objectives is still being perpetuated.
Selected result articles represent the various phases in the SSDLC models
thoroughly. Notably, a minority (4 of 11) were empirical. The impact of
these articles was not reliably available, so the direct number of references
was used as reported by the library itself; this was acknowledged not to
be the actual number of references. The results show the history of the
agile software security engineering research, as well as its overall typology:
conceptual papers are dominant, with empirical evidence provided mostly
in the form of case studies. The methodological development of the agile
software development processes is a central theme, complimented with the
research of security skills and management.
The field of secure agile software development is still fragmented and
organization specific, largely due to the highly adaptable nature of the agile
methods. A wide industry survey concentrating on agile security activi-
ties would help to identify the key agile security practices and confirm the
findings outlined in this study. This was performed in P6.
Also using other than peer-reviewed academic sources would provide an
interesting ground for hypotheses, to be verified with a scientific method.
Finally, distinct similarity between security and safety activities implies an
increase in the general quality of the software products created with security-
augmented processes. The impact of security activities on the measurable
quality of software, and software project management should also prove to
be an interesting research subject.
4.3 P2: Aligning Security Objectives with Ag-
ile Software Development
The research objective of this article was to provide a mapping between
security engineering and software engineering practices, and to clarify the
transformation of security objectives into verifiable security functionality
and security assurance, utilizing a measurably agile software development
process. The work is based on security practices from several software se-
curity engineering frameworks and derives the agile practices from industry
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surveys. Development-time security practices were derived from the Mi-
crosoft SDL, the ISO Common Criteria, and OWASP SAMM. The resulting
framework is inclusive to various types and levels of security requirements,
and can be used to guide the selection of both software development and
software security engineering practices in a software development project.
4.3.1 Method
The research framework was a literature-based constructive model built on
the software security development life cycle models. The security engineering
practices in each phase of the chosen models were listed, and agile practices
supporting the activity were found. A mapping between these practices was
performed, resulting in a framework comprising of both agile and security
engineering practices.
The relevance of the framework was increased by selecting the agile prac-
tices from industry surveys, and the security practices from industry life cy-
cle models, maturity models and ISO security standards. The model to map
the software security engineering practices into agile software development
was derived from extant literature documenting the use of security engineer-
ing in software development. The resulting was created as a combination of
empirical and conceptual work.
4.3.2 Contribution and future work
The resulting framework provides useful guidance in the selection of a suit-
able agile framework for security engineering work, or for improvement of
software security in an existing software process by introducing compatible
engineering practices. The framework should also improve the efficiency in
achieving the security objectives by integrating the security processes into
the software development processes, instead of running them separately and
therefore needlessly using resources. The key results are improvements both
in the security of software, and the efficiency of the processes used to produce
them. The resulting mapping is presented below in Figure 4.1.
Modeling an agile process is necessarily always an approximation, as the
implementation of the process may significantly deviate from the model.
The mapping does, however, show the primary execution points of the agile
practices in the SSDLC. The framework prompts for empirical research. As
such, the framework can act as a guideline for future work, not a strict selec-
tion criteria for industry use. Agile organizations and software development
processes are flexible, so the usefulness of a singular unified model can be
very limited. Instead, flexible and extensible frameworks can fit several or-
ganizations and objectives, proving the most utilizable end results. Another
beneficial research approach would be to reverse the angle and enhance the
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Figure 4.1: Agile activities mapped into the security development life cycle
(from P2)
identified agile practices by software security engineering practices. The re-
sulting framework, an enhanced practice set, could then be applied to any
methodology the organization decides to use, to best achieve the current
objectives.
4.4 P3: Securing Scrum for VAHTI
This article provides an insight into the combination of methods, techniques,
and tools used to promote data confidentiality, integrity, usability, availabil-
ity and privacy. Specifically, this is presented in the context of conducting
an agile software development project that needs to comply with VAHTI
security requirements. In order to achieve concrete and measurable levels
of software security, several international, national and industry-level regu-
lations have been established. The Finnish governmental security standard
collection, VAHTI, is one of the most extensive examples of these standards.
The article presents a selection of methods, tools, techniques, and mod-
ifications to the Scrum software development method to achieve the levels
of security compliant with VAHTI instructions for software development.
These comprise of security-specific modifications and additions to Scrum
roles, modifications to sprints, and inclusion of special hardening sprints
and spikes to implement the security items in the product backlog. Security
requirements are transformed into security stories, abuse cases and other
security-related tasks. The security activities were divided into three classes
based on VAHTI security levels. The security assurance artifacts were iden-
tified, as were the tasks to create them. The definition of done in software
security is established to provide compliance with the VAHTI requirements,
and the steps to achieve it are presented.
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4.4.1 Method
A conceptual-analytic research approach was used, combined with a con-
structive research strategy (see Järvinen (2004)). As a practical research
activity, this translated into an analysis of the integral elements of the
Scrum framework and VAHTI security regulations: based on the concep-
tual analysis, the article proposes modifications to Scrum that it will fulfill
the requirements set by VAHTI.
This study presents the result of conceptual analysis and modifies the
Scrum process and framework to adapt to the security requirement. The
presented model was based on a conceptual and analytic approach and it
has not been empirically verified. While the two concepts were carefully
examined, and the new model created based on the results of this examina-
tion.
4.4.2 Contribution and future work
The target of analysis is a modern security maturity model, VAHTI 1/2013,
designed directly for software development. The maturity model also acts as
a security standard, as it states clear security requirements for the process
and its outcomes, without specifying the implementation itself. The security
assurance requirements of VAHTI were enumerated and evaluated against an
agile framework, which was then adapted to comply with the requirements
and produce the regulative security assurance. This study rather pragmati-
cally concentrated on the security assurance as the definition of done when
aiming to compliance with a security regulation. To provide future software
development projects with direct instructions to achieve compliance, a de-
tailed diagram containing all the required security assurance artifacts was
created. This diagram is presented in Figure 4.2.
The map presents the various levels of the maturity model (Basic, In-
creased, and High) and the type of the assurance artifact. Initial documen-
tation should presumably exist before the development process starts, and
development-time documentation is produced during the agile development
in iterations and may be incrementally updated. External documentation
is either a product of independent verification and validation processes or
specific development-time documentation produced for the maintenance or-
ganization, historically separate from the development organization. In a
continuous development model, the separation of duties does not necessarily
exist, or at least it is not that strict; in this organization type, maintenance
documentation is part of development-time assurance.
To continue on the paths opened by this research, the benefits and draw-
backs introduced to security and safety development by agile methods should
be further studied. The most important question is, how the items used to
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Figure 4.2: VAHTI documentation artifacts (from P3)
provide security assurance actually advance and compare with the actual
security of the software product. Based on a conceptual study, it is difficult
to perceive the actual degree of complexity and depth of security actions;
the exacting of the security measures is performed by the development team,
security experts, and finally verified by security auditors. Without an in-
stantiated process and a case study, complete with external security audits,
any in-depth evaluation cannot be possible.
4.5 P4: Surveying Secure Software Develop-
ment Practices in Finland
In this article, the current state of security engineering surveys and results
from an industrial survey in Finland are presented and compared. The main
comparison is performed towards BSIMM version 8 and the similarities and
distinct differences are discussed. The research objective was to compare
the findings of the BSIMM to the data gathered in a Finnish survey, and to
perform an analysis of the BSIMM survey using an evaluation criteria for
industrial surveys used and presented by Stavru (2014).
An analysis of the composition of security development life cycle models
is presented, suggesting regulation to be the driving force behind security
engineering in the software industry. It was also observed that there is a
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non-correlation between the frequency of usage and the observed impact of
the software security engineering practices. Among the findings was also the
observed lack of security training provided by the Finnish software compa-
nies: only 16% of the respondents reported having received security training
from their current employer. In comparison, BSIMM’s reported figure is
nearly 70%. This can also indicate a security bias in BSIMM, as this study
can be taken to represent security-oriented software development compa-
nies, while the Finnish survey was performed among the general population
of software engineering practitioners. Taking into account that the answers
were received mere weeks before the European Union’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) was to be enforced, the figure may be considered
outright alarming.
4.5.1 Method
The research was conducted by a statistical analysis of certain aspects of
the results of an industry survey, described and reported in P6. The sur-
vey asked software practitioners about their development practices regard-
ing both software engineering and security engineering, and was performed
among the SW professionals working in Finnish software companies. The
objective was to utilize the gathered data to provide a comparison to an
established annual BSIMM software security survey, and to a survey about
agile practices in the context of technical debt management. The results of
these surveys are compared. The details and the conduct of the BSIMM
survey were evaluated using analytic evaluation criteria set by Séguin et al.
(2012).
The BSIMM framework, the main source of empirical software security
engineering data, is analyzed against a literature-based evaluation frame-
work, and certain shortcomings are pointed out. The frequencies reported
in BSIMM and the Finnish industry survey are directly compared, and sim-
ilarities and differences are pointed out. The differences were measured by
a statistical evaluation; while the BSIMM does not disclose its survey nor
the key techniques of its methods, certain approximations were made. The
five-point Likert scale used in the Finnish study was noted to produce strik-
ingly similar results with key indicators, so the observed differences can be
considered valid and reliable.
4.5.2 Contribution and future work
The general principles of the BSIMM survey and the resulting maturity
model are generally found to concur with the Finnish survey. The methods
in the BSIMM’s data gathering and the construction of the BSIMMmaturity
model are subject to criticism. The surveyed impact of the selected security
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Figure 4.3: Breakdown on the Use of Selected Security Engineering Ac-
tivities (from P4)
engineering activities is utilized to estimate the benefits received from the
12 core practices. The use and impact of ten of these activities are presented
in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
Respondents were exclusively utilizing agile methodologies in their soft-
ware development. The results reveal a few characteristics of security engi-
neering in agile software development: first of all, the ‘waterfall-like’ practice
of setting quality gates is rarely used, although found effective. External se-
curity testers – penetration testers or the Software Security Group (SSG)
– are considered very effective. The external testers may include also QA
team in certain organizations. Infrastructure (host and network) security
is still considered the most important security practice, although still not
considered at all in a significant portion of SW engineering projects.
Based on the comparison it was concluded that certain aspects of the
BSIMM do not appear to reflect generic practices in the software industry.
It appears evident that the BSIMM has a bias towards a more heavily reg-
ulated set of companies, resulting in an atypical set of security assurance
requirements and resulting practices, as compared to the software industry
in general. An increase in information and software security regulation is
an ongoing trend, mandating future empirical research about the ways to
efficiently fulfill the regulative security requirements.
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4.6 P5: Case Study of Agile Security Engineer-
ing: Building Identity Management for a
Government Agency
In this study, the need for a practical case example of an agile security
project was addressed by an industry project in which Scrum was used to
produce a security standard compliant end product. The article describes a
case of a large ICT service provider building a secure identity management
system for a sizable government agency. The project was subjected to strict
regulatory compliance requirements due to the end product’s critical role,
with an extensive set of specific security requirements.
The target project was a multi-team, multi-site, standard-regulated secu-
rity engineering and development work executed following the Scrum frame-
work. The study reports the difficulties in combining security engineering
with agile development, provides propositions to enhance Scrum for security
engineering activities. Also, an evaluation of the effects of the security work
on project cost is presented.
4.6.1 Method
This study follows a case study design method by Yin (2003) and a qualita-
tive research approach by Creswell (2003). For the study, we were looking
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for a development project that was both using agile methods and fulfilling
VAHTI regulations. The case was selected as a representative candidate,
able to produce rich information about the phenomenon under study. A
case study was conducted along the guidelines set by Wohlin et al. (2012) as
a semi-structured interview of the key personnel, and post-hoc observations.
For this study, a post-implementation group interview was held for the
key personnel of the selected project. We used a semi-structured inter-
view approach where time was given to the interviewees to elaborate their
thoughts about the phenomenon under study. The general questions con-
cerned the scope and size of the project, amount of the personnel involved,
and the daily routines of the team. More specifically, the cost of security
actions, in work hours, and the proportion of security-related tasks in the
sprints were inquired from the project manager responsible for the finances.
4.6.2 Contribution and future work
This study presented a case of building an infrastructure and setting up
an identity management software platform for a governmental customer.
The customer agency had its own set of security regulations and require-
ments, the VAHTI instructions. In addition to the government requirements,
the ICT service company contracted to build the system was committed
to several international ISO/IEC standards, as well as their own manage-
ment frameworks and sometimes complex financial reporting rules. Both
the agency and the service provider’s project management offices required
employing the Scrum methodology as the project management framework.
The research was conducted in a post-project semi-structural interview, and
the information was gathered based on their experiences and notes of the
project. The parties involved are anonymized, and only publicly available
information about the project and the regulations involved was to be dis-
closed.
Scrum was initially applied in its standard form, with no formal security
extensions. Security engineering activities were integrated into the prod-
uct backlog, and performed within sprints whenever possible. During the
project, the team adapted to the security work by creating a de facto security
developer role, and many of the security engineering tasks ended up to be
performed outside of the regular sprint structure: typically, security assur-
ance is based on evidence gained through security testing, which also, in this
case, had an adverse effect on the team’s ability to schedule and time-box
the items that were subject to these tests; these were performed as spikes
instead, in which the security personnel performed their tasks individually
or in small teams.
The same technique of using spikes was also applied to documentation.
Documents were produced outside the main sprints. Security audits and
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reviews were also run as separately scheduled one-time tasks. The results
of these spikes were nevertheless presented in sprint demos among the other
deliverables. The reported issues at product deployment in the production
environment prompt for developing and applying a delivery model that pro-
vides the required security assurance without the interruption to iterative
development. The Scrum process with extensions and outputs required in a
security-oriented project is shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Security-oriented Scrum framework and roles (adapted from
P5)
The diagram contains the processes and outputs for security assurance
(numbered items), as well as the security engineering processes and roles.
The observed team viewed the use of Scrum as a positive factor to project
cost and quality, although arguably Scrum was not utilized to the maximum
extent: important parts of the work were done in spikes outside of the main
sprint flow, without attempts to utilize the experience gained from them to
time-box the future tasks. This was seen to benefit the project, although an
iterative and more exploratory approach to those tasks might have proved
more benefits in the long term, and it is still a possibility that the experience
gained in this project can be utilized in similar future projects. The project
team still regarded the security engineering activities and providing the re-
quired security assurance to compose a significant amount of extra work:
at final stages, the workload effectively doubled. The initial approach in
this project was more or less an unmodified textbook example of the Scrum
method, but the team adopted and applied certain security extensions dur-
ing the project. Additionally, conducting weekly product backlog refinement
sessions was deemed essential for the project’s success.
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The project can be considered to be a model case of two large entities
that have decided to fit their traditionally ‘non-agile’ organizations to work
according to an agile framework. The nature of work itself has not changed,
although the introduction of a growing amount of security engineering and
increasing regulation put an additional strain on the project’s requirement
management process. Agile methods have an inherent preference to produce
working solutions instead of spending time documenting them; in contradic-
tion to this goal, the documentation of the solutions is a key deliverable in
the field of security. Scrum will continue to be used by both organizations,
and as the team’s experience grows, we expect also the cost of the secure
systems development to drop, while their quality and security get better.
Based on the experiences gained in this case, Scrum has shown the po-
tential to be suitable for security-oriented development work. With certain
additions and modifications, it can be used to provide the security assur-
ance required by the regulators in the ICT and software industry. Especially
when applied by an organization capable to adjust itself to fully utilize the
flexibility of incremental agile frameworks, instead of partially reverting back
to the sequential mode of operations. We are yet to observe a pure agile
project where security standards are in a central role: truly integrating se-
curity engineering processes and security assurance activities without losing
the agile values and benefits gained by the use of those methods is still work
in progress.
4.7 P6: Security in Agile Software Develop-
ment: a Practitioner Survey
To gather further empirical evidence about security in agile software de-
velopment, an industry survey was conducted among the Finnish software
practitioners. The aim of the questionnaire was to answer the three re-
search questions: (1) how is security engineering implemented in software
development; (2) what is the perceived impact of software security activities
with respect to their level of systematic use; and, (3) do the usage of agile
practices and security engineering activities correlate?
Invitations to the survey were sent to over 300 software company CEOs
and CIOs, and nearly 1500 security and software practitioners in early 2018.
From this group, 62 complete and valid answers were received, 40% of which
came directly from developers. The survey revealed that the use of agile
software development has an effect on the selection of security engineering
practices. The perceived impact of the security practices was lower than
the rate of usage would imply, suggesting a selection bias caused by either
peculiarities in the security engineering practices, or difficulties in applying
the security engineering practices into the iterative software development
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workflow.
The conclusion was that security engineering in software development
mostly conforms, or is possible to fit in with agile practices. Usage of agile
practices correlates with the usage of security engineering: when the use
of activities categorized as security engineering practices increases, the use
of agile practices is also more systematic. The use of security engineering
is concentrated in the implementation phase. Results show a discrepancy
between the usage and perceived security impact of the activities, indicating
a need for better integration of security engineering methods and tools into
the processes and toolchains in software development.
4.7.1 Method
The objective of the study was to empirically verify the usage and impact of
software security engineering and accompanying agile software development
practices, currently utilized in industry software development projects. This
was done by designing an online survey following principles by Pfleeger and
Kitchenham (2001), and Kitchenham and Pfleeger (2002).
The survey (N=62) was performed among software and security engineer-
ing practitioners, regarding their usage of 40 common security engineering
practices in accordance with agile software development activities, processes
and artifacts. The survey was conducted following the criteria set by Séguin
et al. (2012). The perceived security impact of the used security practices
was also surveyed. The results were reported using an analytical framework
drawn from extant literature, and research suggestions are provided. An-
swers were provided on 5-point Likert scale, measuring both the usage of the
activities (5=used systematically, 1=not used) and, similarly, the perceived
effect of the used activities.
4.7.2 Contribution and future work
This empirical study charted the current use of security activities in agile
software development. It also measured the impact and extent of security
standards to agile software development processes. The survey revealed two
important aspects in software security: about half of the security work done
by the software security practitioners is regulation-driven; standards, guide-
lines and formal requirements drive the software security work. A significant
portion of the companies had composed their own security frameworks based
on the best practices; only a minority reported that no security regulation
was in place.
The study surveyed two aspects in software engineering: first, the use of
agile practices, in the form of activities, processes, and artifacts; second, the
use of software security engineering activities, practices, and techniques in
96
Section 4.7 – P6: Security in Agile Software Development: a
Practitioner Survey
conjunction with the software development. Figure 4.6 shows a composition
of the agile usage as degree of agility.
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Figure 4.6: Degree of agility (from P6)
This observation of high agile usage, combined with the fact that 0 re-
spondents selected the option “Agile methodologies were not used” when
asked for their work method, indicates a broad emerging practice of agile
software security engineering in the industry. Agility was further analyzed
by examining the correlation between the use of agile practices and individ-
ual security activities. This correlation is given in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Correlations between the degrees of agility and use of security
engineering activities
The diagram shows the security engineering practices, most used in con-
junction with agile activities, occur on the later stages in the SSDLC: imple-
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mentation, verification and release. In contrast, requirement planning and
software security design are much less frequent. This may be taken that the
architectural and design activities are considered less effective. Research in
these fields of software security might reveal possible shortcomings and pro-
vide improvement. Figure 4.8 gives a statistical analysis of the observation
made already in P5: the correlation between use and the perceived impact
of security engineering activities.
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A negative correlation indicates a practice that is either underused, or
ineffective. In each case, the cause must be individually derived: for exam-
ple, extra workload and the resulting scheduling pressures are considered
likely to inhibit the use of hardening sprints and fuzz testing. On the upper
scale, infrastructure security (host and network) was both the most fre-
quently used and considered to be effective. The most used design activity
was a generic criticality definition: this activity is naturally the basis of all
security work and provides the rationale for security engineering.
The main conclusion is two-fold: first, software development organiza-
tions should be more proactive in updating their processes; second, the
research community working on software security development models and
certificates should pay high attention to their adaptability. Further, a trend
in the application of specific security activities to software development can
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be observed from the results presented. It was also observed, that security
activities executable as part of normal software development activities are
more systematically used. Agile practices were found to be extensively used
among the respondents. The use of security practices appears to correlate
with the increased use of agile practices. However, the extant software se-
curity development life cycle models do not appear to guide the security
engineering work: practices appear to be selected in conjunction with the
software development practices instead. This calls for further research in
software security engineering methodologies and techniques.
To facilitate the results, further empirical data needs to be gathered.
This includes both quantitative development efficiency data, and static se-
curity breach analysis data, as well as qualitative data on the stakeholder’s
argumentation, relating to how security is defined and attained in their soft-
ware projects. Direct interviews with the security practitioners, combined
with a series of industry surveys targeted to specific groups, will provide an
overview of the best practices in the target areas, and the specific needs for
further development. The studies should also be conducted in an interna-
tional scope, to allow comparison.
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The research presented in this thesis focuses on integrating and combining
agile software development and security engineering. This involves mixing
and matching iterative, incremental and lightweight software development
practices with security processes and activities. The security processes and
frameworks as well as the software development methodologies are derived
from international security standards and industry best practices. The work
is based on a combination of peer-reviewed scientific literature, observed in-
dustry best practices, and extant professional literature for security experts.
The resulting combination of system engineering, security engineering, and
software engineering, provides an extensive overview of software security
engineering. The provided overview of methodologies enables software de-
velopment organizations to adopt practices that help producing more secure
software and achieving compliance with a wide range of software security
standards and regulations.
Security regulation, protecting the data and intellectual property of com-
panies and private citizens, sets the baseline requirements for software secu-
rity. As a result, software development has additional quality requirements,
but security cannot be implemented using traditional quality and safety en-
gineering methods only. Software security engineering provides these meth-
ods to both implement the security functionality, and produce the security
assurance to prove compliance with the regulation. This research was con-
ducted to examine the security requirements and the means to meet them
in a way most suitable for the software developers to adapt their existing
development practices and methodologies to security work.
Security engineering, as specified in the security standards, predomi-
nantly relies on formalized processes and outcomes. In contrast, since the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the focus of the management of software devel-
opment has shifted into customized and purpose-built processes. Specific
focus is in the details of the process, elimination of the overhead, and metic-
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ulous management of the work processes. Too generic security requirements
for the software products have the effect of creating impediments to the
processes without direct security benefits. These formalities are often in-
herently alien to the new type of software development work, and to the
software engineering specialists performing it. Security requirements, in-
creasingly normative and emphasizing assurance, require resources not all
organizations possess, thus detrimental to the effectiveness of the software
development process. Inappropriate or irrelevant security objectives do not
necessarily increase the actual software security, as they may act as a di-
version, consuming resources otherwise utilizable for the purpose of meeting
more relevant security objectives.
As a result of these observations, the research idea was to apply the agile
principles into the software security engineering work: create ways to define
minimum viable security, starting from an essential set of requirements,
and incrementally adding to it as the implementation progresses. Another
important characteristic of current software engineering, largely unacknowl-
edged by the security engineering specifications, is the pervasive use of au-
tomated tools. As the research progressed, it became increasingly clear that
the original intention of security assurance was to create it automatically,
by implementing logging and monitoring systems. While development-time
documentation is an important component in both validation of the security
implementation and verifying it, development-time verification produced by
automated security tools is not a part of any observed security assurance
requirements.
The research objective, how to produce secure software, was examined
from both theoretical and empirical aspects. Software security standards
were used to determine the security objectives and to provide definitions
and scope for security assurance. Security standards represent the software
industry’s best practices in setting security objectives. However, develop-
ments in software engineering methodologies and techniques have signif-
icantly reduced significance and direct applicability of standardization in
the development processes. Principles and paradigms may remain largely
immutable, but the implementation processes, techniques, and tools have
considerably evolved.
The objective was approached through three research questions:
RQ1: How are software security objectives and practices aligned with agile
software development?
RQ2: How can software security be integrated into agile software develop-
ment methodologies?
RQ3: How is security engineering affecting the agile development process
and the security of the software?
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Within the research, the individual security objectives and the software
security engineering methods, were derived from the regulation and stan-
dards. The basic concepts of software security were established. These
include security management, security engineering, security assurance en-
gineering, and security risk engineering. Security risk engineering is used
to identify the protected assets, and the security threats and vulnerabilities
along with their projected impact. Security management involves defining
a security rationale through setting security objectives, and enabling the
organization to achieve them. Security engineering provides the methods,
processes and techniques to achieve the objectives and verify them. Security
assurance engineering provides the organization with definite proof of secu-
rity, resulting from verification and validation of the security engineering
work and its end products.
5.1 Results
Selecting the most suitable combination of methodologies is not merely mix-
ing up a variety of security techniques: it involves combining the essential
objectives, processes and even philosophies guiding them. Building an ef-
ficient process to build secure software is a task of combining the state of
the art methods from both software engineering and security engineering
traditions. Security assurance for this process is essential.
The standardized security engineering frameworks, as well as the indus-
try maturity models, aim to increase security by defining a broad set of
predefined and organization-wide security processes and practices: Security
is always accompanied by assurance, and the compliance of the output is
proved by formality and repeatability of documented processes. This ap-
proach also doubles as a risk management technique: in addition to manag-
ing the risks by mitigating or avoiding them, they are partially transferred to
the certifying party: Security incidents may still happen, but the certificate
acts as evidence of the security effort.
A certified process alone does not guarantee secure products: this is
achieved by the thoroughness of risk assessment, correctness of the imple-
mentation, and appropriate level of verification and validation. Even in
the case of formal compliance requirements, process efficiency is of utmost
importance. Maturity models claim to improve efficiency by promoting re-
peatability; however, they also burden the organization with processes that
may not fit dynamic software development work. The key to effectiveness
is not only an efficient process, but an adaptive one that can be adjusted to
the changing software requirements. The following sections show what kind
of issues and possible solutions were found in this research by answering the
research question.
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5.1.1 RQ1: Security Objective Alignment to Agile Soft-
ware Development
Security objectives form the security rationale of the organization and the
software product it is creating. The approach to find out how the software
security objectives and practices are aligned with agile software development
was two-pronged: First, the frameworks and best practices for security engi-
neering were established. The basic set of software security life cycle models
and maturity models was established by literature reviews. Second, the se-
curity engineering processes, as well as practical examples of using them in
agile software development were found from literature descriptions of em-
pirical cases (P1 and P2). This was verified in the empirical part of this
research, in publications P5 and P6.
The security objectives were found to be defined and achieved by apply-
ing security engineering processes: Context is set by the security regulation,
organizational policies, and the utilized technologies. Risk management pro-
cess is used to explicitly identify and asses the security scope. Security en-
gineering practices are utilized in a security engineering process to create
the security controls to mitigate the risk. Appropriate security assurance is
produced by the process of verifying and validating the achievement of the
security objectives. These were the main subjects of the publications P1
and P2, which directly contribute to this Research Question.
Agile methods are an effective tool in achieving security objectives. While
the processes in the security maturity models, such as SSE-CMM and SAMM,
are not specifically designed for agile software development, literature-based
examples of achieving maturity levels using agile methods prove this pos-
sible. In cases where regulatory compliance is a key requirement, the core
practices defined in BSIMM may provide an appropriate security engineer-
ing framework. However, when the objective is to improve the security of
software produced using agile software development methods, the software
security development life cycle models provide a set of security practices
adjustable and adaptable to suit the organization’s needs.
The SSDLC models – Microsoft SDL, and the life cycle models found
within the maturity models (SAMM, VAHTI and BSIMM’s Touchpoints) –
contain the current best practices in software security engineering and secu-
rity assurance engineering. The risk engineering process was in most models
left undefined, despite its importance. Maturity models give a certain level
of freedom for implementation, and the actual compliance requirements for
achieving higher SSE-CMM maturity levels remain strictly implementation
specific and dependent on the evaluation process. No direct contradiction
between the security models and agile methods were found; the agile values
and principles, however, discourage mechanistic process approaches. Em-
pirical evidence strongly suggests increased security and efficiency achieved
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by applying agile principles to the security engineering processes.
5.1.2 RQ2: Integrating Security Engineering into Agile
Software Development
The first research question established the methods and context. The major-
ity of the work concentrated on finding out how software security engineering
processes can be integrated into agile software development methodologies.
This question considers the technical details of the security engineering and
software engineering practices concretely applied to the agile software de-
velopment process. The theme of this question is the efficiency of software
security engineering: this approach was selected principally to find out and
provide means to integrate the practices, and to ensure the security of the
software product: achieving the security objectives. The means are provided
from industry practices and extant literature, and justified by the security
rationale in the software development context.
The established prevalence of SSDLCs and the key maturity models pro-
vide the main source of security engineering practices. The agile software
engineering practices were established in a similar process used to answer
RQ1: a conceptual work based on the Scrum model (P2, P3), and a compar-
ison of practical survey results (P4). The SSDLC models were used to divide
the security engineering practices into life cycle phases. This categorization
is more or less artificial when applied to the practical agile software engi-
neering process, but helps to establish their intended purpose. The wideness
of the research and the multitude of applied research methods alleviates this
by approaching the subject from several different aspects.
Direct counterparts for security engineering practices can be found from
the most prevalently used agile practices. The agile practices aim for effi-
cient high-quality products, and were found to provide ample opportunities
for introduction of security engineering techniques and practices. The un-
derlying issues primarily concern the mechanisms to prioritize the security
objectives and the skills, processes, and tools to achieve them.
5.1.3 RQ3: Challenges and Benefits in Applying Security
Engineering to Agile Software Development
This part of the research provided empirical evidence of the challenges and
benefits in applying security engineering to agile development. A significant
part of the original research motivation was the observed overhead intro-
duced by security requirements to an efficient and working agile process:
This was observed in a case study (P5). The security objectives were not
necessarily clear or well-communicated, and the security engineering work
was performed in isolation by security experts, as an external process sepa-
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rate from the actual iterative development cycle. The effect of agile software
development methods to software security is considered by analyzing the
corresponding techniques and activities.
To find effective industry practices, and to establish the current state of
the art in agile security engineering, an industry survey was conducted (P6).
In this survey, the software engineering practitioners were explicitly asked
about their use of both agile and security engineering practices in concert.
The survey was also designed to provide important information about the
impact of the used security engineering activities. This provides direct input
useful in implementing a software security engineering process.
Modern software development is predominantly characterized by the use
of agile methods, but security engineering is still mainly driven by com-
pliance requirements. Based on this research, main challenges are lack of
security skills among the software engineers, and security engineering’s lack
of compatibility with agile processes. Key agile principles, such as a fo-
cus on high quality and knowledge sharing, directly benefit the security
engineering process, and help to achieve the security objectives. While the
impact of security engineering practices was generally positive, the impact
did not always correlate with the frequency of use. Performing a specific
security engineering activity may be detrimental to achieving a technical
security objective: Diverting resources to achieve compliance may lead to
some security controls, crucial to software security, left unimplemented or
inadequately validated and verified.
5.1.4 Summary of results
The standardized security frameworks do contain the essence of security en-
gineering work: to work in software development, security engineering pro-
cesses must fit in the software engineering ones, not the other way around.
Security frameworks define the security objectives, forming the rationale
that provides the justification for security engineering work; in software se-
curity, the proper term for this would be minimum viable security. Viable
in this context does not mean only compliance or assurance, but concretely
achieving the security objectives by accurate and correct software security
engineering processes. This concept is considered to be the minimum set
of viable security objectives, forming a justifiable security rationale. Imple-
mentation is verified and sufficient security assurance is produced.
To achieve the security objectives, a concrete definition of done needs to
be set. Organizational security processes may be in place, but only to be
engaged when necessary; some security engineering tasks may still be ex-
ecuted by security professionals, but security is everybody’s responsibility;
security-related tasks and requirements are diligently implemented and ver-
ified. This is achieved by executing security management and security risk
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processes, increasing the level of security awareness by training, and utiliz-
ing the achieved security skill in security engineering and security assurance
production. By combining the efficient agile and lean software development
method processes with the forma approach of security engineering, the best
of both worlds can be achieved: provably secure software produced efficiently
and sustainably.
Using agile methods for security engineering may require technical and
organizational adjustments. In the case observed (P5), work tasks consist-
ing of purely security engineering activities were conducted outside the agile
framework and were not time-boxed within the regular iterations. This mode
of work may have been beneficial in that particular case, but it worked also
as an indicator of the benefits lost when the agile method was not used.
The predictability was non-existent, the participants were not communicat-
ing effectively with the other members of the team nor the customer, and
thus the experience gained from the work largely remained unshared. Agile
methods are a particularly powerful tool for organizational development in
work demanding highly specialized skills and dynamic decision making.
Findings of the industry survey (P6) indicate a highly polarized group
of software security engineers. The respondents were clustered in the high
end of both experience and education spectrum. On the other hand, when
the software security engineering processes were executed by the same pro-
fessionals, software security was carefully considered and diligently imple-
mented. Regulation appears to be a main driving force in software security.
As an argument against formal security assurance frameworks, not all the
security engineering techniques primarily used for security assurance were
among the most effective. These include the methods typically introduced
by compliance requirements. Also, the amount of security education offered
by the employers for the software professionals in Finland was found to be
significantly lower compared to security-intensive organizations abroad.
A connection between the use of agile practices and increased utilization
of security engineering was found: increased use of agile processes correlates
with increased use of software security engineering. From the traditionalist
security engineering point of view this may be seen as surprising: from the
agile proponent’s point of view, it is a natural consequence of meticulous
process and quality improvement with an added interest towards individ-
ual skill and effective tooling. It was also found, that security engineering
practices directly attachable to software development received the most use.
This prompts further development and experimentation work among both
software and security development methods and tools.
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5.2 Limitations
In this research, focusing on the adaptability of security engineering practices
into agile software engineering methodologies, the system security engineer-
ing approach is necessarily limited. Specifically this concerns the security
engineering practices of the software operating environment at the mainte-
nance and disposal phases of the software lifecycle; also, security manage-
ment and the principles in defining the security objectives are not covered.
The research focus was on the methodological level of software security en-
gineering, and in the mutual implications of introducing security elements
into software engineering processes. Developing this combination further is
a topic of further research of the required tools and techniques.
On the software engineering side, the same limitations apply: software
design and architectures are software engineering research areas directly
concerned with security. Developing implementation and verification tech-
niques supporting the development of secure software are of critical interest.
The individual techniques were investigated and assessed in publication P2,
and their impact was among the variables measured in the industry survey
(publication P6); they were not at any point thoroughly analyzed for fur-
ther development or critique. Education and awareness of security issues
among the software developers form the very basis of the software security
work. The forms of education, such as security certification or even manda-
tory training, and the effect of security training, were not included in the
research.
The limitations noted in the publications note the restricted availability
of peer-reviewed source literature, justifying the inclusion of technical papers
as direct sources, and prompting an increase in empirical industry reports.
Software engineering research could benefit from combining the research ef-
fort in software security, safety, and quality due to extensive similarities in
the principles and execution of these fields of engineering. On the security
side, the effectiveness of security regulation and security assurance remains
largely unresearched: quantitative and qualitative data from actual effec-
tiveness and efficacy of the regulated elements is sporadic and not publicly
available.
The security techniques were covered by a literary review of agile software
security engineering cases (P1), a case study of a Scrum project executed
in compliance with security regulations (P5), and an industry survey (P6)
about the use and impact of security engineering practices in agile software
engineering. Reporting accuracy regarding the actual implementation on
these was necessarily limited due to the methodological scope of the source
material in P1 and the requirement to comply with the security limitations
in P5. The conducted industry survey (P6) also hinted at a limited scope
of software security work in the software industry: the respondent profile
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was strongly biased towards the most experienced and educated, and conse-
quently most capable people in the industry. Empirical profiling of security
work and the effects of security education is required. Similarly, the causal-
ity of the relationship between security and agile practices cannot be reliably
established without further research.
5.3 Future work
Combining software engineering and security engineering on a methodolog-
ical level opens several avenues for research, many of them covered in the
section describing the limitations. Each development phase in the security
development lifecycle provides room for improvement over current software
and system engineering practices. This involves iterative and incremental
risk management and design practices, as well as security implementation,
and verification and validation practices. Continuous delivery models tie
the security incident management to the development life cycle and calls for
specialized tools with a security aspect, as well as efficient work management
and organizing methods. Security assurance should similarly be automated
and kept up to date with the actual security controls and structures currently
utilized; security assurance can be useful in three roles: security evidence,
security guidance, and security forensics – preferably all three at once. Defin-
ing security rationale and setting the security objectives is a combination of
understanding the security threats and the value of the information assets
to be protected. In software security engineering these are to be combined
with the resources at disposal as effectively as possible: efficient and sys-
tematic security management is a foundation of an organization’s software
security. Security education creates awareness which guides and motivates
the security work.
Much of software engineering work and publications are purely techni-
cal and not published on academic forums. Convergence of industry and
academia is beneficial for both. Theoretical work and practical innovations
follow and enable each other. Merging practices and shared information is
beneficial for all: this should include the principles guiding information se-
curity and especially security regulation. In software security, quantitative
and qualitative data should be the driver for the development of both reg-
ulative and technical frameworks. Efficiency and security are tangible, yet
elusive goals: effectiveness and competitiveness can be maintained only by
constant, ongoing change.
A major part of the future work is practical and empirical research. The
main topics in these areas are security architectures, security techniques,
and security tools. Metrics, as a component of security improvement, and
security verification and security management, provide further interesting
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research topics. The security maturity models suggest the security effort be
measured, with quite fragmentary practical suggestions to what should be
measured, and how. To measure the effectiveness and efficacy of security,
metrics, and monitoring are to be developed. Engineering of security re-
quirements and objectives is directly connected to system engineering, and
the iterative and incremental models are yet to be applied into this field.
Guiding the software development work by security rationale as the mini-
mum viable security could benefit from aspect-oriented and agent-oriented
design and implementation techniques. These are all bound together by the
use of a development methodology and security activities, which were the
focus area of this research.
Developing secure software is a result of skill and resources combined
into a managed process. The strategic goal is improved software security
using pre-emptive means: risk mitigation where it can be done most effec-
tively. The strategic goal is achieved by education and awareness, and by
methodological and technological innovation. The research presented in this
thesis provides a framework for implementing this security strategy: Tech-
niques to assess and analyze security risk, to form a security rationale, and
to produce provably secure software efficiently.
Software security is in an ongoing competition with constantly evolv-
ing security threats. The theory of natural selection by Charles Darwin
(1859) appears directly applicable to information security in organizations
and software projects: The ones that succeed are the ones most adaptable to
change. The evolution of methodologies has defined new prerequisites, into
which software security engineering and security regulation will now have to
adapt.
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ABSTRACT
Engineering methods are essential in soware development, and
form a crucial element in the design and implementation of so-
ware security. Security engineering processes and activities have
a long and well-standardized history of integration with soware
development methods. e inception of iterative and incremental
soware development methods raised suspicions of an inherent in-
compatibility between the traditional non-agile security processes
and the new agile methods. is suspicion still aects the aitude
towards agile security. To examine and explore this myth, this
study presents a literature review of a selected set of agile secure
soware development methods. A systematic literature method
was used to nd the denitive set of secure agile soware devel-
opment methods, of which a core set of 11 papers was selected for
analysis, and the security activities documented in the methods
were extracted. e results show a wide and well-documented adap-
tation of security activities in agile soware development, with the
observed activities covering the whole security development life
cycle. Based on the analysis, the inherent insecurity of the agile
soware development methods can be declared to be a mere myth.
KEYWORDS
Agile Soware Development, Mythology, Security Engineering,
Soware Development Methods, Review
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1 INTRODUCTION
Importance of soware security has been dramatically aggravated
by the rise of the public awareness in the current post-Snowden era.
New, fresh soware development methodologies continue to be
presented, with the aim of guaranteeing a credible and acceptable
level of security. While the level and complexity of the requirements
is increased, the development process is expected to be faster and
more reactive in order to guarantee market success [21]. To cope
with these somewhat contradicting conditions, a series of soware
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development methods that combine practices from agile soware
development and secure development have been presented.
e objective of this paper is to organize and map the existing
agile soware development methods that contain pronounced se-
curity engineering activities. Several such methods exist; however,
new methods have been continuously presented, based on the argu-
ment that agile does not suit well for secure soware development.
is study contributes to the eld of secure soware engineering
by mapping existing secure agile methods, showing the empirical
evidence supporting the methods, and collecting and pointing out
the agile security activities in each of them.
e work is structured as follow: Section 2 presents the central
concept for this work in area of agile soware development. Sec-
tion 3 summarizes the used research process and it is followed by
descriptions of secure agile soware development methods, the em-
piric cases and the security activities used (Section 4). Summarized
results of the analysis are presented in Section 5, and the results
and ndings are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the study and proposes avenues for further research.
2 BACKGROUND
A new wave of lightweight soware development methods, dubbed
‘agile’, started to gain popularity in the end of the 1990’s. A remark-
able milestone in the eld was in 2001 when the Agile Manifesto
with its twelve principles was published [1]. Since then, the agile
methods and practices have gained tremendous popularity both
as research subjects in the academia [8] as well as practices in the
industry [12].
In contrast to the process-oriented methodologies, agile methods
emphasize e.g., short-term planning and adaption to changes over
planning ahead and following strict processes. A series of agile
methods has been presented [cf. 1] since the Agile Manifesto, with
Scrum and its derivatives being currently the most widely adapted
[22]. Scrum is a simple process model where the soware is pro-
duced in short iterations lasting just a few weeks, and consisting of
well-dened ceremonies, roles and artifacts [1].
Extreme programming (XP) is one of the earliest agile methods,
and still the second most used [22]. In contrast to Scrum, it resem-
bles more a collection of tools and practices rather than a strict
process model. e method does not, for example, dene roles for
the participants, as Scrum does. XP promotes for example prac-
tises of simple design, pair programming, continuous integration,
test-driven development and collective code ownership [1].
e studies surveyed in this article also reference widely to Mi-
croso Security Development Lifecycle, OWASP CLASP, Cigital
Touchpoints and ISO Common Criteria. ese security processes
and models provide the basic security tools and activities, ready
to be adapted and integrated into the soware development meth-
ods. e models have roots in security engineering practices that
ARES ’17, August 29-September 01, 2017, Reggio Calabria, Italy K. Rindell et al.
Table 1: Searches
Library Search term Result set size
ACM Digital Library agile AND soware AND security AND engineering 59
IEEE Explore agile AND soware AND security AND engineering 120
Springer Link agile AND soware AND ”security engineering” 101
Wiley agile AND soware AND ”security engineering” 32
ScienceDirect agile AND soware AND ”security engineering” 64
Total 376
predate the agile boom, leading to initial diculties with adaption
to agile methods. A starting hypothesis for several works, cf. for
example [19], is that an agile method in itself is somehow perceived
to be incompatible with secure soware development. Despite
the diculties, several examples of agile soware development
with integrated security engineering activities and processes have
been presented [e.g. 3, 19, 24]. However, the number of empirical
studies assessing and describing industrial cases is low. For exam-
ple, Rindell et al. [17] studied a case where Scrum was applied in
the development of a security-critical system. While they found
shortages in converting the security engineering processes into a
truly agile process, the project itself was deemed a success: the end
product was delivered on budget and on time, while meeting the
requirements of the security regulations that applied to the case.
Regulations represent, in agile terms, customer requirements
for security. ey also help dening the level of ‘good enough’
or ‘minimum viable’ security. For these reasons, considerations
regarding compatibility with a security standard were taken as
one of the aspects for analysis when assessing the material. Also,
evidence of practical empiric application of security activities in
agile soware engineering was noted.
3 RESEARCH PROCESS
e purpose and motivation of this study was to search the extant
literature for examples of agile soware development with security
engineering activities.
e search was performed in ve online computer science li-
braries: ACM Digital Library1, IEEE Explore2, SpringerLink digital
library3, Wiley Online Library4 and ScienceDirect5. e search
was conducted using following general term, limiting the results to
the eld of agile methods, related to elds of soware and security
engineering:
agile AND software AND (security AND engineering)
e library specic searches and the size of each result set are
presented in Table 1. ACM Digital Library search produced 59 re-
sults, IEEE Explore search 120, and SpringerLink 101 articles. Wiley
search was conducted in all elds available for search, and pro-
duced 32 results, and ScienceDirect produced 64 results. Inclusion
of terms ‘security’ AND ‘engineering’, adjusted for each search
engine, was crucial in obtaining a manageable result set. Aer the
initial search, the result sets were scanned and articles which did
1hp://dl.acm.org
2hp://ieeexplore.ieee.org
3hp://link.springer.com/
4hp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
5hp://www.sciencedirect.com/
not explicitly concern an agile soware development method with
security engineering activities were dropped. SpringerLink and
IEEE result sets required a careful manual screening, while ACM
produced a readily more homogeneous result set. Five out of the
11 selected methods were selected from the ACM Digital Library.
ree methods were selected from the Springer Link result set, two
from the IEEE Explore and one from ScienceDirect. None were
selected from Wiley.
Aer the library search, a manual screening and selection process
was performed, to ensure the validity of the rst search round:
(1) Article describes use of an agile method, or use of an ex-
tension to an existing agile practice
(2) Article describes use of security engineering activities in
the agile seing
e articles selected by this two-stage process were then re-
viewed and analysed, and the security activities described in the
articles were identied. ese activities were evaluated using the
principles of Common Criteria, which is the ISO standard to “permit
comparability between the results of independent security evalu-
ations”. It does so by providing a common set of requirements
for the security functions of IT products and systems and for as-
surance measures applied to them during a security evaluation”
[10]. Furthermore, each method was screened for any empirical
evidence provided, as were references to any security, quality or
safety standard.
Citation count was hypothesized to project industry or scientic
signicance. However, the citation count of individual articles
outside their respective research groups and direct aliates was
found to be very low with the notable exception of [7]. One of the
papers [20], without any citations and certain noted shortcomings,
got selected for its merit in summarizing CLASP security process
from an agile point of view. e selection of 11 studies is presented
and summarized in Table 2.
Based on the search result set it was observed that the use of ASD,
Crystal, DSDM, EVO, FDD and RUP appear to have been decreasing
rapidly: no examples of these methods got selected into this study.
XP is still a mainstay of the agile soware methodologies, although
Scrum-based methods have since gained more popularity. Kanban,
despite its popularity in the industry, appears to be less used for
security specic purposes. ese observations echo the results from
surveyed industry agile practises, such as [22] and [12].
e activities found in each study were placed into a life cycle
model, consisting of six distinct phases: Pre-requirement, Require-
ment, Design, Implementation, Testing and Release. is generic
life cycle phase division is used by two of the selected articles [see
2, 4] and resembles closely the 7-stage life cycle model of the SDL:
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Table 2: Studies selected for review
Topic summary Standards Empirical Cited Source
Security Engineering and XP Yes No 3 Wa¨yrynen et al. 2004 [24]
Towards Agile Security in Web Applications No No 5 Kongsli et al. 2006 [11]
XP Practices and Security Requirements Engineering No Yes 10 Bostro¨m et al. 2006 [5]
Agile Security Using an Incremental Security Architecture No No 4 Chivers et al. 2005 [6]
XP Security Practices No No 3 Ge et al. 2007 [9]
CLASP, SDL and Touchpoints compared No No 40 De Win et al. 2009 [7]
FISA-XP: Integration of security activities with XP No No 0 Sonia et al. 2014 [20]
Agile security management No No 6 Baca et al. 2011 [4]
Security Activities in Agile Projects Yes Yes 1 Ayalew et al. 2013 [2]
Extending agile methods with security No Yes 8 Othmane et al. 2014 [3]
Soware Security Skills, Usage and Training Needs in Agile Yes Yes 1 Oyetoyan et al. 2016 [16]
the SDL model has an added maintenance phase aer the rst
six. In [7] the phase division is a even more elaborate, with nine
stages. e model presented in that study is a combination of sev-
eral security processes: in addition to an added support stage, the
pre-requirement and design stages are each divided in two. How-
ever, the six-stage life cycle was deemed to resemble agile soware
development process with sucient accuracy and clarity, and was
therefore selected.
4 REVIEWS
e found methods, listed also in Table 2, are presented in forth-
coming subsections. For each method, we shortly summarize how it
enhances the existing methods and is there any empirical evidence
or support for the method. e methods are organized primarily
by publication year, but by grouping articles from the same group
of authors together.
We review the key contributions of each study primarily from
the security activity point of view. Security activities were extracted
and placed into an activity matrix, summary of which is presented
in Table 3. In the few cases where the activities were found dicult
to categorize, the categorization process is disclosed and discussed.
4.1 Security Engineering and eXtreme
Programming: An Impossible
Marriage? [24]
e rst and oldest of the selected articles by Wa¨yrynen, Bode´n, and
Bostro¨m [24] concentrates on extreme programming. It provides
an analysis of the XP method from the viewpoint of two central ISO
standards for soware security: Systems Security Engineering –
Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM, ISO 21817) and the Common
Criteria (CC, ISO 15408). e article provides a solid analysis of the
agile security: it discusses the topic of insecurity of agile methods,
reviews the literature and earlier work aiming to integrate security
activities into agile methods and transform them into agile activities,
and then provides an analysis standing on two cornerstones of the
traditional security engineering standards.
e issues presented in this article, wrien in 2004, are echoed
and reiterated in several of the later works: the agile methods’
perceived unsuitability of security work, the contradicting require-
ments for fast and continuous delivery and meticulous design and
planning, and the fundamental contradiction between security en-
gineering (i.e. sequential development, formal processes, nonnego-
tiable requirements) and agile methods (i.e. incremental devel-
opment, free-form work ow and low overhead, uid goals and
requirements). e authors set aside much of the prejudice, and
concentrate in reviewing XP from a standardized security engineer-
ing perspective. XP is analysed from the viewpoint of SSE-CMM’s
requirement to specify security needs and Common Criteria’s re-
quirement to provide assurance that the said requirement is met.
e discussion of the topic is more on the philosophical rather
than practical side, as there is no empiric evidence to test the hy-
potheses; the authors do, however, succeed in arguing their case
that XP is no less well suited for security engineering activities than
any other soware development method. As a maer of fact, many
of the XP’s inherent properties are seen as benecial to security
engineering, such as simplicity of the design, pair programming,
collective ownership of the code, test-driven development, refactor-
ing and coding standards. Certain security activities are noted to
be, if not incompatible with XP, at least missing from it: need for
security engineer(s), static code review, security policies, formal
security reviews and security documentation are mentioned. e
suggested solution is as simple as one would assume: integrate the
security engineering activities into the agile method.
e authors acknowledge the need for empiric validation missing
from this article. ey present a claim that their approach is limited
to particular elds of soware engineering, specically excluding
real-time soware and safety critical applications. e paper is
the earliest one of the selected studies, pointing out that certain
agile practises are also benecial security activities. e identied
activities were security education, misuse cases, simplicity of (secu-
rity) design, pair programming, and security testing. e security
activities the authors acknowledged to be missing from XP were
excluded from the results.
4.2 Extending XP Practices to Support Security
Requirements Engineering [5]
e paper by Bostro¨m, Wa¨yrynen, Bode´n, Beznosov, and Kruchten
[5] enhances XP by introducing two security specic mechanisms:
abuser stories as threat scenarios, and security-related user stories
as security functionalities. e authors suggest that incorporat-
ing the security engineering activities into XP as agile processes,
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using XP terminology and mechanisms, yields the intended ben-
ets without sacricing the agile method’s claimed benets. e
security-augmented XP process is explained starting from require-
ments planning, and introducing a way to integrate the abuser
stories and security-related user stories into XP’s planning game.
Since stories are the essential way of communicating requirements
and features in XP, the two new story types aect the whole devel-
opment process.
e method is applied in a student project, which is described
from the security point of view: specically, the implications of the
added features on the XP process are discussed. For the project,
they have also introduced the role of a security engineer, which is
typically an explicit requirement in various security standards. e
Common Criteria is mentioned several times, and its requirements
discussed, yet the method or the described student project do not
claim compliance with any security standard, nor specically pro-
vide the security assurance that would satisfy the CC requirements.
e proposed security activities consist of two key design phase
processes: use of misuse cases (abuser stories, security-related user
stories), which were considered to have eect when applying secu-
rity principles to design.
4.3 Towards Agile Security in Web
Applications [11]
e study by Kongsli [11] is one of the earlier eorts to integrate se-
curity engineering activities with agile soware engineering meth-
ods. e paper reiterates the then-current strongly negative aitude
towards the agile methods’ ability to support security activities,
assumed to result in less secure soware products. e reasons for
this are still basically unchanged, aer a decade of eort: security
methodologies are sequential and require ’big design up front’. e
paper does not elaborate further mismatches, and from there on,
concentrates on the security activities to be incorporated in agile
methods. Use of XP is implied, yet not specically stated; also
Scrum is mentioned.
e article lists several agile security activities, collected from
earlier literature: misuse stories (also called abuse stories) to supple-
ment user stories; automated security tests throughout the devel-
opment, parallel to unit and acceptance tests to verify the defence
against misuse stories; security review meetings, comparable to
iteration planning meetings, to provide the team with an overview
of the security-related issues; and, nally, securing the deployment
earlier than in sequential development, where system hardenings,
security tests and security risk mitigation is done aer the soware
functionality and features are completed. Authors then discuss the
shortcomings, incompleteness of the misuse cases and tests, largely
specic to the used testing tool, Selenium. ey also discuss the
role of security expert in soware development, which transforms
in agile process from owner of the security issues into a coach, who
guides the team which collectively owns the misuse cases (stories)
and the security in general.
e paper does not provide direct empiric validation for their
method, yet implies that the method has been used in a customer
project. ere is no mention about a need to follow security reg-
ulations regarding the soware or the development process. e
amount of security activities mentioned in this study was quite low,
but these can be considered key components in building secure so-
ware: misuse cases and security testing. Security review meeting
was considered to be a form of verifying the security aributes of
resources.
4.4 Agile Security Using an Incremental
Security Architecture [6]
e article by Chivers, Paige, and Ge [6], as many of the other
early works in the eld of agile security engineering, starts by
acknowledging the contrast between agile development, namely
XP, and traditional security engineering approaches. e approach
concentrates on the iterative nature of the agile methods, and also
the inherent cost of refactoring, contrasted to maintaining a suf-
cient level of security. e authors propose an iterative security
architecture which maintains ’good enough security’ throughout
the development iterations. e agile approach to architecture is
described in Kent Beck’s words as the simplest thing that could pos-
sibly work, and on the other hand admit that an architecture acts
as a useful artifact for maintaining and communicating the overall
vision of the system under development. is approach is used to
dene also the security architecture presented in this article. Good
security architecture is stated to partition a system and identify its
security-sensitive parts (and in what way), show how the security
components combine for useful system level security, and commu-
nicate the structural security logic in an aempt to ensure that
the development team does not build functionality that bypasses
security.
Security architecture is partly approached from the refactoring
point of view: architecture is wrien as the code is produced, and
re-wrien during following iterations, to reect the security view of
the current system. e authors claim that the architecture should
be just that: not a plan for future, but as clear and and simple rep-
resentation of the current state as possible. is is logical from the
agile point of view, which promotes avoiding top-down planning as
the goals may change before they are reached. e case is presented
as a ’paper exercise’ where an iterative soware project’s architec-
ture evolves during each iteration along with added functionality.
e security context in the example project is user authentication
scheme, with alternative architectures: presented alternatives are
a heavy top-down design, which at certain stage will have to be
abandoned and changed to another, the scenario where there is no
architecture and the developers select the easiest way which soon
becomes unmanageable; and, nally, there is the ’just right’ archi-
tecture that also may have to be abandoned (of course, not in the
scenario presented), but is much less expensive as it corresponds
to the current need, not an anticipated one.
e article does not present empiric evidence, nor claim standard
support. It does, however, provide a way to provide security assur-
ance in the form of security architecture in a way that conforms
with agile values. e security activities covered by an iterative
security architecture are not explicitly stated in the description,
yet the provided example conveys the idea that the author has
had in mind. ese were expanded to cover most of the require-
ment phase activities, and due to its iterative nature, also contain
the most common design phase activities: documentation of as-
sumptions, detailing misuse cases, applying security principles to
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design (in response to changing architecture-level requirements),
and performing a security analysis of the system design.
4.5 Extreme Programming Security
Practices [9]
Ge, Paige, Polack, and Brooke [9] propose security training and
fundamental security architecture for XP as means to establish a
security criteria. Security training would eect the team’s way
of conducting the XP’s planning game: team’s awareness of secu-
rity issues would bring security issues into the center of the stage.
Specically, they would write security stories, understand secu-
rity threats and vulnerabilities, be able to write beer code and
avoid common mistakes, and be able to perform security testing.
Fundamental security architecture, in contrast to an iterative secu-
rity architecture, is dened before the iterations commence, and
outlines the available security mechanisms, system platforms and
provides basis for risk and vulnerability assessments. An exam-
ple representation of a fundamental security architecture would
be a collection of engineering paerns. e architecture could be
created based on architectural risk analyses, security and program-
ming best practises, and from both tacit and documented soware
project experience and knowledge.
e article does not provide empiric evidence, nor provide much
more than the outlines of the proposed security activities. Both
security training and and a system-level security architecture are,
however, a common requirement in soware security standards,
and the authors show their validity for agile methods in the context
of extreme programming (XP). Security training is a direct and
straightforward security activity. Fundamental security architec-
ture, as proposed in this article, does not specify the content of the
architecture model itself. It was interpreted to cover most of the
general pre-requirement and requirement phase activities specied
in the then-current CLASP security process.
4.6 On the secure soware development
process: CLASP, SDL and Touchpoints
compared [7]
De Win, Scandariato, Buyens, GrA˜©goire, and Joosen [7] have con-
ducted an extensive and exhaustive review of three then-current
industry standard security processes, OWASP CLASP, Microso
SDL and Cigital Touchpoints. e security activities in these pro-
cesses are extracted, categorized and placed into an activity matrix,
with a total of 153 distinct entries. Each security process is discussed
and characterized, and their similarities and common properties
pointed out. An theoretical case is presented, applying all three
processes into an example development project.
e suitability of the processes with agile methods is not dis-
cussed, although the authors acknowledge the prevalence of the
XP method, and note a knowledge gap in applying CLASP to ag-
ile methods, where SDL and Touchpoints are noted to be more
extensive in this maer.
Although not directly discussed in the article, the security pro-
cesses analyzed and compared are designed for basic compliance
with ISO security standards (SSE-CMM and Common Criteria). e
study presents an example case into which the security processes
are applied, but not direct empirical evidence.
It should be noted that as this study aims to chart out all the
security activities in several security processes, they are not listed
as occurrences in the resultant table of security activities in this
study.
4.7 Agile Development with Security
Engineering Activities [4]
Baca and Carlsson [4] start by stating the existence of classic suspi-
cion against the security of agile methods, naming the fast pace of
development and perceived lack of documentation as the greatest
discrepancy between the agile and secure engineering values.
e selected approach is to introduce and review Microso Secu-
rity Development Lifecycle (SDL), Cigital Touchpoints and the Com-
mon Criteria. e activities specied in these processes are then
used to evaluate an industry agile soware development method,
enhanced with proposed security activities. Scrum and XP are used
as reference methods for the iterative and incremental development
process. e evaluation criteria for the security activities was to
give the developers chance to rate the cost and benet of each
security activity.
e company where the study was conducted was tradition-
ally not using iterative methods, which is represented by the roles
present in the development process: the development team con-
sisted not only of developers but also of testers, architects and re-
quirement engineers. e feedback received from the development
team, product owners and the unit manager contributed to selec-
tion of the most preferred and benecial security activities. Product
owners preferred security requirements from CC and role matrix
from SDL. e development team preferred at design phase to use
assumption documentation from Touchpoints, abuse cases from
SDL, and requirements inspection from CC, added with counter-
measure graphs. For implementation phase, the static code analyses
and coding standards were seen most benecial. Testers preferred
dynamic analyses and, of course, testing.
e security activities ranking by the developers themselves pro-
duced interesting results, and, according to authors, selecting the
activities based on feedback produced a exible security engineer-
ing process that also conforms with agile principles. e developer
opinion may well be biased, resulting compromised security: this
is apparent in the project team’s aitude towards fuzz testing: this
was seen as costly and therefore non-benecial, so it was not im-
plemented at all. is very poorly reects e.g. the Microso SDL’s
view on fuzz testing: in SDL, fuzz testing is seen as an important
and easily automated part of security testing of various soware
interfaces. e article summarizes neatly the security activities
suggested by existing security frameworks, giving a good overview
of activities valid for standard compliance – which the method
does not claim. e method and the security activities were not
integrated into a real production project, they were merely tested
and discussed in the existing sequential soware project context.
Article presents a solid set of 11 security activities. Of these, the
release-phase activity of repository improvement was not found
on any of the other studies. is is done in retrospect, and may
be considered to further promote continuous security between
iterations.
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4.8 Identication and Evaluation of Security
Activities in Agile Projects [2]
Ayalew, Kidane, and Carlsson [2] have selected several security
engineering activities from industry security frameworks: CLASP,
SDL, Cigital Touchpoints and the Common Criteria, and performed
a survey-based cost-benet analysis of these security activities. e
approach extends the previous work by producing a list of ‘agile
compatible and benecial security activities’. is resulting list of
16 activities appears to cover all phases of the secure soware devel-
opment life cycle. Countermeasure graphs, introduced by Baca and
Carlsson in [4] are present also in this study, which, coupled with
the same the life cycle phase model, is another concrete evidence of
the connection between these studies. e similarity between this
and the previous studies is noted and discussed, and the extended
results and marked dierences of this paper are pointed out.
Inclusion of CLASP marks a concrete improvement in resul-
tant set of agile security activities, especially in the release phase.
Assigning a value for agility is not self-explanatory, as each orga-
nization may estimate the agility of an activity dierently. Also,
selecting security activities solely based on their agile value does
not guarantee acceptable security. Combined with the other studies,
the activities selected by this process provides a valuable addition to
the set of agile security activities. is article lists several security
activities extracted from SDL, CLASP and CC, and selects the most
agile ones out of them. e resulting set of 16 security activities was
further reduced for the purposes of this study: SDL’s security tools
and countermeasure graphs were removed, resulting in 14 key agile
security activities, covering all phases of the security development.
4.9 FISA-XP: An Agile-based Integration of
Security Activities with Extreme
Programming [20]
is article by Sonia, Singhal, and Banati [20] represents the prac-
tise of assigning security activities an agile value, in this approach
complemented by an online tool where the security activities can
be chosen based on a user-assignable Acceptable Agility Reduction
Factor. e security activities are derived from OWASP CLASP
(Open Web Application Security Project, Comprehensive Light-
weight Application Security Process). Microso’s SDL is dismissed
on account of an earlier study [7] branding it more ’heavyweight
and rigorous’ than CLASP, and therefore not suitable. Develop-
ment of CLASP has since seen discontinued and largely replaced
by OWASP SAMM [15], while SDL has evolved towards a more
agile-friendly adaptation [see 13, 14].
For the purposes of this study, this article works mostly as a
summary of the [7] from an agile point of view, also lling the
‘knowledge gap’ applying CLASP to agile, identied in that study.
An important contribution is mapping of XP’s agile activities into
the 30 listed security activities, although restricted to CLASP pro-
cess activities. is mapping provides further evidence towards
the conclusion that a fundamental mismatch between security en-
gineering and agile methods does not exist: the authors provide
an integration matrix (Table 2 in [20]), in which every single secu-
rity activity is found basically compatible with at least one agile
activity. A clear fault of this integration matrix is the mapping of
several security activities into the agile activity of pair program-
ming: for example, operational security guide is not a result of
pair programming, and does not necessarily even take place at
the implementation phase. is does not imply incompatibility
between the activities, just a misconception and misplacement in
the matrix. Despite these concerns, and aer careful consideration,
it was decided that this article will be included in this review.
Pre-assigning an agility value to security activities can prove
useful in selection of security activities for an agile project, with
specic needs to satisfy a security requirement and to provide
security assurance. A requirement for compliance with a security
standard would be a perfect example of such a selection criteria.
Standard compliance is not discussed in this article. e article
does not provide direct empiric evidence to support its agile value
assignment technique. As with [7], the security activities listed in
this article are not presented in the result matrix, Table 3.
4.10 Extending the Agile Development Process
to Develop Acceptably Secure Soware [3]
e article by b. Othmane, Angin, Weers, and Bhargava [3] starts
with a comparison of iterative and sequential activities and pro-
cesses. e challenges of ing these together are derived from
literature sources, and listed as “lack of complete view of the sys-
tem, absence of security engineering activities in the development
process, lack of detailed documentation, lack of security aware-
ness of the customers, and conict of interests between security
professionals and developers”. e authors also refer to certain
earlier aempts to integrate security activities into agile methods,
and criticize their lack of continuous security, calling for an agile
development method, that produces acceptably secure soware in
each iteration.
e article presents several approaches to agile methods with
security activities: OWASP and Microso security frameworks, and
risk-driven and security assurance-driven soware development
methodologies. e authors proceed to proposing their own ap-
proach, which aims to continuous security and security assurance
by adapting security activities and a specic security reassurance
process into each increment and release. e security activities are
listed per life cycle phase:
• Inception: threat modeling, risk estimation, and identica-
tion of security goals.
• Construction: dening security claims, writing security
stories, and dening the security assurance. All of these
are done for each iteration.
• Transition: performing the security assurance tasks, for
example producing the documentation artifacts, running
(automated) security tests, or conducting an external re-
view (security audit).
e article presents a methodology which not merely integrates
security activities into an agile method, but also oers a method
to provide continuous security assurance. Although somewhat
limited and without concrete empiric evidence, each incremental
release candidate produced by applying the proposed is secure and
ready for acceptance. Although complying with security standards
is not specically mentioned in the text, this approach includes all
the necessary components for standard compliance. A real world
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approach might not aim for continuous security assurance, i.e.,
transition phase tasks done during each iteration, which could
improve the approach by reducing the workload and therefore
the cost of security tasks. On the other hand, continuous security
assurance makes the proposed method directly eligible for DevOps
and other continuous delivery and continuous integration models,
characterized by frequent delivery of new soware increments into
production environment.
4.11 An Empirical Study on the Relationship
between Soware Security Skills, Usage
and Training Needs in Agile Settings [16]
In this case study by Oyetoyan, Cruzes, and Jaatun [16], the security
activities of two organizations using agile soware development
methods are inspected and compared. e study was conducted by
combining 26 security activities from CLASP, SDL, Touchpoints and
the Common Criteria, and asking the development teams which of
the activities does their organization employ. e focus was in the
skill, training and experience of the development teams in each of
these activities. Both surveyed organizations used Scrum as their
agile soware development method. e researchers had selected
four common agile activities as ’frequently used activities’: use of a
code review tool, static code analysis, use of a static code analysis
tool, and pair programming. Promoting pair programming into a
core activity used by both of the surveyed organizations is some-
what atypical, as a wider industry study nds pair programming
among one of the least utilized practises [12]. Also, unlike in XP,
pair programming is not a key technique in Scrum. Additionally the
security activities were categorized into two groups: core activities
and activities that can be leveraged to deliver security.
e key ndings from security activity perspective are dicult
to generalize. It does appear, however, that largely regardless of
the selected key activities in an organization, awareness of security
issues and security training promotes their use – which was exactly
what was hypothesized. Also, the security awareness in the form of
training should be administered to all participants in the soware
development process: architects, developers and testers, to yield the
best results. e ultimate drivers for a more frequent and thorough
use of security activities cannot be deducted from the results, but
the presence of an organizational security expert group in one of
the organizations is listed as a potential source of promotion of
security activities. e presented security activities are selected
from industry-proven security processes.
e study is empirical and surveys existing organizational prac-
tises. Of security standards, the Payment Card Industry Data Se-
curity Standard (PCI-DSS) is specically mentioned, and others
hinted at. e presence of a security expert team and the listed
security activities – secure design and coding, threat modeling and
risk management, security testing, and security considerations at
requirement and release phases – are all among to common security
activities performed when meeting standard requirements [see e.g.
18].
5 RESULTS
e purpose of this study was to outline and identify the security
activities used in agile soware development. e papers selected
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Figure 1: Distribution of the activities by life cycle phase
for this study represent the whole development life cycle, from the
project inception to the release. Secure DevOps delivery model
was not in the central focus of the study, but was still found to be
directly supported by at least one of the proposed methods. Our
key nding can be summarized in the secure agile development
life cycle: every phase of a soware development project has been
eectively covered by at least one agile security activity, including
iterative architectures along the multitude of activities used in the
development and release phases.
An adjusted total of 38 individual security activities were identi-
ed in these studies, of which 34 were present in more than one
case. Even the least used activities have their uses: for example,
while nominating a security ocer or using a separate ‘red team’
for security testing can not be considered agile at all, they represent
established industry processes and provide intrinsic value for the
security process. Some distinctively non-agile activities may addi-
tionally be required by security regulation and therefore accepted
as a form of customer requirement.
e security activities presented in each study were extracted and
placed in the rudimentary life cycle model presented in [4] and [2],
which in turn closely represents the phases used in Microso SDL.
Some of the activities were grouped into main activities, and some
more generic activities, such as the iterative security architecture
in [6] were considered to contribute into several activities in the
requirement and design phases. e resulting set of activities and
the coverage of the agile security development life cycle is presented
in Figure 1.
An overview of the gathered security activities is presented in
Table 3. Certain activities, such as fuzz testing and red team testing,
were combined under other activities, in these cases under ‘Perform
SW security fault injection testing’ and the generic ‘Identify and
implement security tests’, respectively.
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Table 3: Security activities in life cycle phases
Phase Activity Occurrences Source(s)
Pre-requirement
Specify operational environment 1 [9]
Identify global security policy 1 [9]
Institute security awareness program 3 [9], [24], [2]
Monitor security practises 1 [9]
Research and assess security solutions 1 [9]
Build information labeling scheme 1 [9]
Project security ocer 1 [16]
Pre-Requirement phase adaptations total 9
Requirement
Identify user roles and requirements 5 [4], [6], [9], [16], [2]
Perform security analysis of requirements 5 [4], [6], [9], [16], [2]
Specify resource-based security properties 2 [6], [16]
Requirement inspection 1 [4]
Requirement phase adaptations total 13
Design
Risk estimation 3 [3], [16], [2]
reat modeling 2 [3], [16]
Document security design assumptions 5 [4], [6], [3], [16], [2]
Detail misuse cases 7 [11], [4], [5], [6], [24], [3], [16]
Apply security principles to design 4 [5], [6], [24], [2]
Specify DB security conguration 0
Perform security analysis of system design 3 [4], [6], [2]
Design UI for security functionality 0
Annotate class designs with security properties 1 [16]
ality gates 1 [2]
Design phase adaptations total 26
Implementation
Coding standards 3 [4], [16], [2]
Pair programming 2 [24], [16]
Integrate security analysis into build process 1 [2]
Implement and elaborate resource policies 0
Implement interface contracts 0
Address reported security issues 1 [16]
Implementation phase adaptations total 7
Testing
Identify and implement security tests 6 [11], [4], [24], [3], [2]
Perform security function usability testing 1 [4]
Perform SW security fault injection testing 1 [2]
Testing phase adaptations total 8
Release
Manage system security authorization agreement 1 [3]
Perform source level security reviews 3 [4], [3], [16]
Verify security aributes of resources 1 [3]
Manage certication process 1 [3]
Perform code signing 2 [3], [2]
Build operational security guide 2 [3], [2]
Manage security issue disclosure process 3 [11], [3], [16]
Repository improvement 1 [4]
Release phase adaptations total 14
Adjusted total number of security activities 38
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A majority of the actions, 30 of the 38 in total, were selected from
CLASP as presented and adapted to agile in [20]. Corresponding
SDL, Common Criteria and Touchpoints activities are combined
under the denition provided in CLASP. Selection of the security
activities should always based on the task at hand rather than a
popularity contest, yet the number of their uses was recorded. A
low number of occurrences, 0 or 1, suggests a more uncommon
adaptation of the activity, and a higher number can be interpreted
as an indication of wider adoption. e top activity list of security
actions looks as follows; in case of a tie, all the most used activities
are listed.
• Pre-requirement: Institute security awareness program
(security training)
• Requirement: Identify user roles and requirements (role
matrix), Perform security analysis of requirements
• Design: Detail misuse cases (abuser and security stories)
• Implementation: Coding standards
• Testing: Identify and implement security tests
• Release: Perform source level security reviews (static code
reviews)
Security activities in the design phase appear especially widely
adapted to agile development, with a total of 26 documented imple-
mentations. e placement of abuser and/or misuse stories were
present majority of the (in 8 of 11). Although some sources bucketed
all stories into the implementation phase, they were considered to
belong to the design or planning phase of each iteration or sprint.
Pre-requirement phase had 9 implementations, while there were
16 found in the requirement phase. Implementation and testing
phases are more tool oriented, but had still 11 and 13 implemented
activities across the analyzed studies. Release phase, with static
code reviews and strong emphasis on security assurance tasks, had
21 total security activity implementations. In total, the whole cycle
of soware development process appears well covered.
6 DISCUSSION
e ndings implicate that while adoption of agile soware de-
velopment methods has been perhaps slower in the security eld,
but nevertheless it has largely already happened. e perceived
discrepancy between agile values and security requirements has
largely been solved, and both security activities and agile methods
– and the experts utilizing them – have adapted to their integrated
use. e original intention was not to inspect the agile security
‘myth’, yet the theme occurred in so many papers, especially in
the earlier ones, that we decided the time has come to ocially
declare the death of of the incompatibility myth. One probable and
much-cited origin or at least a propagator of the unsuitability myth
is the of Viega and McGraw’s book published in 2002 [23], in which
a thorough and meticulous pre-planning is emphasized, and agile
methods found to be lacking in this aspect. In the light of current
studies, however, the conict appears to be more theoretical than
practical or technical.
Certain limitations are acknowledged in the selected approach:
the articles were selected from the result set in common digital
libraries, and the source material is far from complete. Addition
of non-academic sources might have produced rather interesting
results and potentially well-documented cases, yet the search of this
study was limited to peer-reviewed articles. It is to be noted that an
unexplored body of work with further – or contrary – evidence may
not have been included in the result set, excluded from the source
material. e invariably positive view of agile secure activities in all
of the surveyed articles can also be a reection of publication bias:
cases in which the agile methods are found not to be suitable for the
task at hand are perceived to be failures and do not get published.
Also, access to restricted environments and projects may be limited,
and publication of the results withheld. Furthermore, certain types
of the soware products and organizations may provide easier
access to empiric evidence.
From strictly agile security engineering point of view, the evi-
dence gathered by this study appears bipartite: theoretical models
support the use of security engineering activities in agile soware
development, whereas empirical evidence is sporadic and largely
incomplete. Also, concrete security or quality metrics collected
from the use of these activities appears to be absent. No examples
of properly documented cases of agile security engineering in a
security standard regulated seing, either from internal or exter-
nal point of view, were included in the result set. While alarming,
this can also aest to either a publication bias, incompleteness of
the source material included in the selected digital libraries – or, a
research gap.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In the light of this study, the practise of security engineering appears
well adapted to and widely used with agile soware development
methods. Some of the activities have been modied to beer suit
iterative development model, and, based on the literature, much at-
tention has been paid to retain the agile nature of the development
process despite of the added security activities. e oen-repeated
myth of agile methods’ incompatibility or inherent unsuitability for
security tasks has been eectively been broken already in the rst
observed study, published in 2004 [24] - yet the myth is perpetuated
for years aer this well up until mid-2010’s. e eld of secure
agile soware development is still fragmented and organization
specic, largely due to highly adaptable nature of the agile methods.
A wide industry survey concentrating on agile security activities
would help identifying the key agile security practises and conrm
the ndings outlined in this study. Also using other than peer-
reviewed academic sources would provide an interesting ground
for hypotheses, to be veried with a scientic method. Finally, a
distinctive similarity between security and safety activities implies
an increase in the general quality of the soware products created
with security-augmented processes. e impact of security activ-
ities on the measurable quality of soware and soware projects
should also prove to be an interesting research subject.
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ABSTRACT
Success of a software development process is determined by its
ability to transform its objectives into requirements, and the re-
quirements features and functionality. In addition to business objec-
tives, software development also has security objectives, requiring
security engineering activities. Software security engineering is
characterized by sequential life cycle models, in sharp contrast to
the iterative and incremental software development processes. This
leads to a situation, where security and business objectives are
to be met through conflicting approaches. In this study, security
engineering activities from Microsoft SDL, the ISO Common Crite-
ria and OWASP SAMM security development lifecycle models are
mapped into common agile processes, practises and artifacts, with
the intention of decreasing the incompatibility gap between the ap-
proaches. The organizational and technical aspects of the mapping
are considered primarily from the point of view of achieving the
security objectives: setting security requirements for design, imple-
mentation and verification, and releasing secure software through
efficient software security development processes.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software development organizations are hard pressed tomeet the in-
creasing demand for secure software [12, 19, 38]. Value-driven soft-
ware development processes are seen lacking in ability to produce
secure software, essentially a risk-based process. Responsibility for
software security is placed on elements external to the development
teams [8], deepening the separation of business objectives and se-
curity objectives in software development. In agile development,
the lessened emphasis to preliminary planning, and the absence of
fixed milestones causes difficulties incorporating external security
processes into the iterative development processes: organizations
effectively end up running a non-agile security development life
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cycle along the agile software development processes. Aligning the
business and security objectives, and aligning and integrating the
activities is necessary to avoid sacrificing neither efficiency of the
agile processes, nor the long-term security objectives.
Agile software development processes call for agile organiza-
tion, infrastructure and business models [5]. Self-organizing teams
and non-deterministic implementation processes result in task im-
plementation patterns remarkably different from those produced
by sequential and pre-planned counterparts of these models. In
addition to the organizational dissimilarities, security engineer-
ing processes are ultimately driven by risk rather than business
value; unlike the agile development processes, they also rely on
planned activities executed in a sequence [22, 43]. Deterministic
sequences aim to reduce the security risk by executing pre-planned
tasks at fixed points in the development life cycle. Lightweight,
iterative, and incremental processes utilize a profoundly differently
structured implementation and verification cycle; thus, security
mechanisms fully integrated into agile development processes are
required. There exists no inherent obstacle to utilizing agile pro-
cesses to achieve the security objectives: implement the required
security functionality and security assurance, and verify the ab-
sence of known security vulnerabilities [cf. 35].
The agile methods improve productivity by narrowing the scope
of implementation into specific featureswithin a fixed time frame [e.g.
1]. Focused development allows for meticulous concentration on
the quality and functionality selected into the iteration backlog. By
selection of the tasks, the team and the customer can be reasonably
assured that the work is done in order to achieve the objectives
currently considered most important for the software product un-
der development. The differences between the methodologies have
been categorized : the methods are determined to be either risk-
driven or value-driven [11]; hybrid models, such as Disciplined
Agile Delivery [2], set out to reintroduce a set of planned activities
(a sequential element) into the iterative work flow. To find out the
reasons for the difficulties experienced by the software and security
engineers, software security processes must first be defined, and
the activities analysed. These differences between the approaches,
values and even the paradigms of software engineering and system
engineering methodologies lead to the primary research question:
RQ: How can the agile practises be combined with software se-
curity engineering activities?
This question is considered primarily from the viewpoint of ag-
ile software engineering in the following chapters. In Chapter 2,
the issues in software security and the current adaptation of agile
software security engineering activities, practises and artifacts are
examined. In Chapter 3, an exhaustive list of common software
security activities are mapped into agile practises, processes and
artifacts found common in the software development industry[25];
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the security engineering activities defined in the Microsoft SDL
security development lifecycle model, the ISO/IEC Common Cri-
teria, and OWASP SAMM are used. In Chapter 4, the process and
the related issues are discussed in the perspective of achieving
both the security objectives and the business objectives of software
development process; Chapter 5 concludes the article.
2 BACKGROUND
Software Security Engineering (SSE) introduces several system en-
gineering practises and activities into the software development
process. In academia, software engineering as a subdiscipline of
computer science tends to systematically exclude unquantifiable
variables as ‘user’ and ‘operating environment’ from its core [see
16]. However, in practice it is clear that in order to meet the soft-
ware engineering’s objectives of delivering working software in
sustainable manner, software engineering and system engineering
will have to meet [9]. Mainstream software development methods
are extremely value-focused, and as such perform poorly when
facing non-functional requirements [32]. Functional requirements
describe what the system should do, whereas non-functional or
qualitative requirements are typically worded as how the system
should perform, or concern the architecture, operating environment,
scalability etc. Treating security as a non-functional requirement
has provided a convenient argument against the agile methods
suitability for security engineering work [41], and even sugges-
tions that agile methods are inherently ill-suited to produce secure
software [cf. 33].
Security standards are guidelines for security implementation,
and several international software security regulation frameworks
exist. The Common Criteria [23] has been developed to quanti-
tatively evaluate security. It contains concrete instructions and
requirements for security functionality, and suggests a framework
of security objectives, to be elicited into security requirements. The
objectives are also used as a basis for security risk management
process, and form the outlines of the software system’s security
policies. Security policies are implemented by a set of security ac-
tivities and result in a phletora of functionalities which are verified
by security testing and other verification methods. Some of the
security activities bear a notable similarity with software quality
assurance activities: these include code analyses and reviews, verifi-
cation documentation and formal verification audits performed by a
external certifying entity. However, treating security requirements
categorically as non-functional reflects an insufficient understand-
ing of what software security is, and how it is implemented in the
software, and clearly departs from the security models provided by
the ISO/IEC standards [23, 24].
Agile software development is characterized by a light-weight
management model: pre-planning is minimized, teams and devel-
opers have a high degree of autonomy and the development of the
software resource itself is the primary target. Agile, as a descrip-
tive adjective itself, is a combination of values and principles first
expressed in The Agile Manifesto. Lightweightedness, in regard to
software security engineering, is particularly reflected in principle
#11, which states “[t]he best architectures, requirements, and designs
emerge from self-organizing teams.”
This particular statement has been strongly criticized by well-
known proponents of software architecture, such as Bellomo et al.
[7]. However, despite so named, in an analysis by Séguin et al. [37]
it was noted that this particular agile principle does not qualify as
a software engineering principle: it does not contain a prescriptive
statement, it is not testable, nor are its consequences observable. Us-
ing these conspicuous statements as excuses to exclude the whole
mainstream software development methodologies from being vi-
able to produce secure software appears to reflect a rather poor
understanding of both security engineering and agile software de-
velopment methods. Skill acquired through security training and
experience in security engineering is projected to have a remedial
effect [30].
2.1 SSE models in an agile context
SSE is predominantly performed by sequential models. Security
development, i.e., incorporating security functionality into the soft-
ware is an implementation task among others. In practise, however,
the security process is a formal review at a fixed point in time, not a
continual process truly incorporated into the software development
process. Injecting inspection points into the agile work flow neces-
sarily requires pre-planning and thus has the potential to disrupt
the goals of value-driven processes.
Security engineering is an established tradition, with earliest
formalized guidelines stemming from the United States Department
of Defence in the 1980s [17]. The highly formalized and mechanistic
process of evaluating a system’s security needs was performed by
applying specific evaluation criteria [18] into pre-classified data
and pre-classified users, resulting in predefined requirements of
security functionality and security assurance. This approach was
then combined with several other standards and developed into a
‘de-militarized’ version today known as The Common Criteria [14,
23].
Early computer security was entirely dependant on approved and
certified security products [45]. Government regulation eventually
mandated the use of security verification and assurance to prevent
misuse and tampering of electronic data. Security assurance, origi-
nally meant to consist mostly of electronically produced data (i.e.,
various security logs) and basic functionality descriptions quickly
extended into a complex set of security policies and even formaliza-
tion requirements for the software products implementation itself
(see e.g. Security Policy Models in [23]).
At least two commonmaturity models address also development-
time information security issues: (1) The Software Security Engi-
neering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) is the ISO/IEC’s
heavily process-oriented security management, metrics and imple-
mentation framework [24]. This model originates from the Capabil-
ity Maturity Model Integration, developed by the Carnegie Mellon
University and currently maintained by the CMMI Institute [26].
As a process model, applying the CMM-based model can be very
costly [15], and can be projected not be limited to security improve-
ment only. (2) The Open Web Alliance Security Project’s (OWASP)
open source licensed Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
contains also development-time activities, and sets best practises
for security governance, construction, verification and operations.
OWASP has previously maintained also a model specific to software
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development, the Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Secu-
rity Process (CLASP); this model has fallen out of common use and
replaced by the SAMM. SAMM also bears distinct similarities with
Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) [39]. The BSIMM
does not claim to specify security models or frameworks; it is pub-
lished annually as a list of industry’s state of information security,
surveying the current best practises in security engineering.
The SAMM, combined with OWASP’s implementation guide-
lines such as the OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks [29],
offers guidelines to build a security framework, complete with gov-
ernance and security metrics. As a framework the SAMM follows a
proven path: security strategy includes governance and metrics and
enabled by security education; this can be considered to be equiv-
alent of the Common Criteria’s Security Target. Security threat
assessment leads to security requirements, which form the basis
for security architecture. Security design and implementation (code
and software resources) are verified through analyses and reviews.
Security testing is thoroughly addressed, and this stage contains
also release criteria for the maintenance phase; this phase con-
tains issue management, environment hardenings and ‘Operational
Enablement’, providing instructions for secure DevOps (or, DevSec-
Ops). The SAMM is divided into three maturity levels, each with
specific objectives, activities, assessment criteria and expected re-
sults. These are discussed for each software security development
lifecycle phase.
2.2 Research description
Producing secure software by introducing security engineering
processes and activities to an iterative and incremental software en-
gineering process is challenging. To reverse this, the various phases
and activities in software security development are extracted from
the Microsoft SDL and the ISO Common Criteria. No specific ag-
ile methodology is used as a reference, but rather agile processes,
activities and artifacts, which are linked to the security activities.
Some of the terminology is derived from the Scrum method [36],
currently the most commonly used mainstream software develop-
ment methodology [34, 42]. The development lifecycle is divided
into six phases, and the relevant security development activities
are set into agile context. Positive and negative effects are then
analyzed from the viewpoint of achieving security objectives. The
concept of security objectives is derived from the Common Criteria,
and visualized in Figure 1.
The Common criteria provides a framework for evaluating the
security of a software-intensive product by setting a rather complex
framework. The Security Target consists of the security measures
for the software itself (Target Of Evaluation, TOE) and the operat-
ing environment; for the purposes of this study, only the security
objectives of the TOE are considered. Security objectives are met
by eliciting the security requirements, resulting in security specifi-
cation which guides the implementation of security functionality.
Some of the security functionality exists to explicitly provide secu-
rity assurance. Security assurance, such as logs, verifies the exis-
tence and effectiveness of the security functionality implemented
into the system. It also works as the basis for security metrics and
helps tracking down the potential security breaches later in the
software’s life cycle. The Common Criteria provides ten example
Table 1: Selected agile practises, processes and artifacts and
their use as reported in [25]
Code Agile processes and artifacts Usage
A1 Iterations 84.2%
A2 Iteration planning meetings 76.6%
A3 Iteration backlog 75.5%
A4 Product backlog 76.1%
A5 Daily meetings 69.6%
A6 Iteration reviews/retrospectives 72.3%
Agile practises Usage
AP1 Coding standards 81.2%
AP2 Test-driven development (TDD) 75.0%*
AP3 Simple design 74.5%
AP4 Continuous integration 73.9%
AP5 Refactoring 73.9%
AP6 On-site customer 49.5%
AP7 Pair programming 45.1%
AP8 Planning game 27.7%
* Value separately calculated from the result data.
software security activities, which are used together with activities
from SDL and SAMM.
As the software security development life cycle models are di-
vided into distinct phases, the research is listed here in relation
to the life cycle model. The life cycle models phases used are pre-
requirement, requirement, design, implementation, verification and
release. This model is in close resemblance of the SDL’s model, omit-
ting the maintenance phase, and has been used in previous studies
by e.g. Baca and Carlsson [4] and Ayalew et al. [3]. The Common
Criteria does not explicitly address the pre-requirement phase, but
that is implied to consider the setting of the Security Target and
the Security Objectives.
The agile practises, process and artifacts, into which the security
activities are mapped, are derived from common agile methodolo-
gies. These are presented in Table 1.
The upper part of Table 1 lists the agile processes and process
artifact; these can be considered the ‘core’ of agile development.
The lower part, under the horizontal line, contains the software
development practises associated with various agile methodologies,
such as Scrum and Extreme Programming (XP). The ‘Usage’ column
ranks the activity by the reported average usage.
The source survey for Table 1 has also been reported as agile
practises’ significance in reducing technical debt [21]. Managing
technical deficiencies and recognized debt holds remarkable simi-
larities to security engineering: many of the issues reported in this
study, such as inadequacy of the architecture, structure, testing
and documentation, are directly applicable to security work. In
contrast, the actual features, requirements and defects represent a
minority of the concerns for technical debt among the respondents,
while these are central considerations in security work. The agile
processes, practises and artifacts are mapped into software security
development lifecycle phases in Figure 2 in Chapter 4: the security
activities here are aligned to the activities in Table 1 by the SDLC
phases as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Simplified software security target framework (adapted from the Common Criteria [23]).
3 SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN AGILE
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
This section lists all the security activities extracted from Microsoft
SDL [22, 27], The CommonCriteria [14, 23] andOWASP SAMM[28].
The activities for each lifecycle phase are examined and their adapt-
ability to agile development and a matching agile activity are pre-
sented.
3.1 Pre-requirement
The security activities in this phase are presented in Table 2. The
pre-requirement phase in the SDL contains only one item: core
security training. For the purposes of agile development, this part
should also contain training in the agile methods: processes, ac-
tivities, tools, communication procedures, terminology and other
indoctrination. Even good software engineers may be unaware of
security issues and have a poor understanding of agile models; se-
curity engineers participating in software projects should be made
aware how mainstream software projects are conducted and what
is their work flow.
Table 2: Pre-requirement phase activities
Source Security activity Agile activities
SDL Core Security Training AP6
CC Set security target and objectives A4, AP6
SAMM Strategy & metrics
SAMM Policy & compliance
SAMM Education & guidance
SAMM Threat assessment A4, AP6
Before the projects begin, SAMM suggests building security de-
velopment strategy and roadmap, measuring the relative value of
data and software assets, and establishing security and cost metrics;
after these, the security expenditure can be assessed. SAMM also
calls for establishment of security policies and security compliance;
third and from the development process point of view the directly
most important category at this stage is security education and guid-
ance for all people relevant for the software and security processes.
SAMM also places threat assessment onto level of organizational
practises rather than project specific; a well-build organizational
threat assessment framework should be able to address project-level
security issues as well, and create the necessary input for security
requirement gathering. At the third maturity level, SAMM advises
to develop and deploy compensating controls for the threats. The
threat assessment phase also provides the risk lists to be assessed
in the security development projects.
In the CC framework, personnel trained in security is a part
of the overall Security Target. Security training of the individuals
is one of the Security Objectives to be fulfilled before the project
begins. Other security objectives are typically application depen-
dent and more difficult to generalize. However, skill is an universal
requirement in both software development [10] as well as security
engineering [see e.g. 30].
As this phase precedes the initiation of the development process,
there are no directly applicable agile practises: communication with
the on-site customer (AP6) may be started already at this point,
and the security items added into a rudimentary version of product
backlog (A4). Security training is an essential prerequisite, as skill
and knowledge forms the base for all security engineering work [cf.
30].
3.2 Requirement
Requirement phase activities, presented in Table 3, contain activities
necessary for security requirement elicitation. The SDL deals with
the requirement phase activities at quite high level, and does not
provide concrete resources, guidance or tools to perform them. SDL
also suggests that security requirements and risks are defined only
once in the project, although it is doubtful that they will remain
static throughout the project. SDL’s approach of setting quality
gates is hardly security specific at all, yet this is something that
can be addressed through agile practises of Coding Standards. The
Common Criteria also stays at rather abstract level, and defines
two types of security activities: definition of Security Functional
Requirements (SFR) and Security Assurance Requirements (SAR). In
the ISO standardization framework fulfilling both these requirement
types is essential in achieving the security objectives, and verifying
this.
Table 3: Requirement phase activities
Source Security activity Agile activities
SDL Establish Security Requirements A1, A4
SDL Create Quality Gates/Bug Bars A1
SDL Perform Security and Privacy A1, A4
Risk Assessments
CC Definition of SFR and SAR A1, A4
SAMM Security requirements A1, A4
SAMM’s security requirement activities give a logical process
how to gather and elicit security requirements: partially it relies
on the business requirements, which are then evaluated against
the compliance guidance for security requirements; this has been
created in the pre-requirement phase. At the second level, an access
control matrix is created, and the security risk list from previous
phase used to complement the list of security requirements. At
third level, SAMM calls for business-oriented security activities of
security management for supplier contracts, and an audit program
for security requirements.
Agile software development is all about change. Effectively this
means efficient and continual requirement management. In Table 1
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Table 4: Design phase activities
Source Security activity Agile activity
SDL Establish Design
Requirements A1, A3, A4, AP3, AP6
SDL Perform Attack Surface A1, AP3
Analysis/Reduction
SDL Use Threat Modelling A1, AP3
CC Cross-analysis of TOE A1, AP3
designs
CC Vulnerability analysis and A1, AP3
flaw hypothesis
CC TOE design analysis against A1, AP3
the requirements
SAMM Security architecture A1, AP3, AP6
SAMM Design review A1, AP3
the only agile activity directly addressing requirement elicitation
and prioritization is the Planning Game [6]. With 27.7 % adoption
rate this technique, originating from the XP methodology, sets an
example how requirement elicitation is done iteratively. Security
requirement elicitation techniques have been surveyed by Tondel
et al. [40], although this study does not address the issue specifically
from agile software developer’s point of view.
Requirement elicitation process must be thorough and systemat-
ically identify all the relevant security functionality and assurance
requirements; iterative approach (A1) directly supports this process.
Agile methods are extremely efficient in prioritizing the implemen-
tation queue: identified items are given workload or complexity
estimates, and are then placed into the product backlog (A4). Work
items will also get assigned an explicit Definition of Done (DoD).
Eventually, depending on their priority, they will be picked up for
the iteration backlog, get implemented and verified. Quality of the
requirements is typically ensured through rigorous validation pro-
cess: methods, such as INVEST for user stories (natural language
requirements) and SMART for backlog items [44] are used to review
the requirements and transform them into implementable features
and functionality.
3.3 Design
Design-time activities are listed in Table 4. Both SDL and CC are
again at quite high abstraction level, and both backtrack to require-
ment elicitation and requirement management. SDL also recom-
mends threat modelling. Based on the tool provided1, Microsoft
has a sufficiently lightweight approach to this task. However, mod-
eling a large software system with multiple servers and interfaces,
and maintaining that model through the iterations may become a
burden; also, the model should be reviewed as any other artifact in
order to maintain a credible security tool.
SAMM contains two categories for this phase: the security ar-
chitecture and a design review. Security architecture consists of
a list of practical procedures: first, maintaining a list of recom-
mended software frameworks and applying security principles to
the design; second, security services and infrastructure are to be
1https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=49168, ref. 19. Feb. 2018
identified an promoted, and security design patterns identified from
the architecture. The third level does not include development-time
architectural activities; it calls for formal reference architectures
and platforms are to be established and frameworks, patterns and
platforms validated. Design review, at the first maturity level, should
include identification of attack surfaces and design analysis against
the security requirements. Requirements for the second maturity
level are inspection for complete provision of security mechanisms
and the organizational task of deployment of design review service
for project teams. Third level is again project specific, containing the
activities of developing data-flow diagrams for sensitive resources
and establishing release gates for design review.
Agile development support security design well: iterations (A1)
allow revisiting the earlier decisions and the iteration backlog (A3)
as necessary. Agile practises promote simple design (AP3); all se-
curity designing and reviews are performed under this activity.
TDD (AP2) and pair programming (AP7) convey the security de-
sign into implementation and verification phases. Iterations (A1)
implicitly offer opportunities to enhance the security design in case
the requirements or environmental factors have changed. Having
customer on-site for communication (AP6) also supports security
design process.
3.4 Implementation
Table 5 contains the security activities for the implementation
phase, necessary to achieve the security objectives. Mainstream
software engineering is increasingly dependent on a large set of
interconnected and connected tools. Programming IDEs integrate
into packet management servers and code repositories; code repos-
itories are part of Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery
(CI/CD) services, and automated unit tests are executed upon each
commit. Automated CI/CD systems deploy the tested components
into staging areas, from where the code will eventually be released
into production after integration and security testing. Although
a lot of the security-related implementation-time activity can be
automatized, a human-performed static code review is considered
very effective. Continuous integration (AP4) is a common agile
practise.
Table 5: Implementation phase activities
Source Security activity Agile activity
SDL Use Approved Tools A1
SDL Deprecate Unsafe Functions A1, AP1
SDL Perform Static Analysis AP7
CC Analysis and checking of
processes and procedures AP7
SAMM Implementation review AP7
Static reviews are the only implementation-time activity in SAMM,
and the model gives quite coherent way to conduct them: review
checklists are created, and high-risk code is somehow identified
and reviewed in detail. At second level automated analysis tools
are to be used, and the code analysis to be integrated into the devel-
opment process. On the third level, the code analysis automation
is to be made application-specific and release gates for the review
established.
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Coding standards (AP1), although established already in the pre-
requirement phase, are an important quality improvement practise.
It also directly contributes towards security by enabling code re-
views and making the source code more structured. Pair program-
ming (AP7) is a very effective quality and security improvement
practise [31]; pair programming also acts as a substitute for for-
mal reviews [13]. Iterative development (A1) gives opportunities
for refactoring (AP5) which also works as security improvement
measure; activities and practises such as daily meetings (A5) and
underlying TDD (AP2).
3.5 Verification
Security verification activities are presented in Table 6. In order
to achieve security objectives and effectively manage security re-
quirements, the iterative security verification faces two unique
issues:
(1) Returning of the failed items into the backlog, accounting
requirement and design changes.
(2) Automating the security testing, or performing it in such
manner that each potentially shippable iteration has gone
through the security verification process.
Table 6: Verification phase activities
Source Security activity Agile activity
SDL Perform Dynamic Analysis AP4
SDL Perform Fuzz Testing A4
SDL Conduct Attack Surface Review A4
CC Verification of proofs A4
CC Independent functional testing AP4
CC Test case and test result review A4
CC Penetration testing A4
CC Verification of processes and procedures A4
SAMM Security testing AP4
Test-Driven Development (AP2) is an obvious enabler for secu-
rity verification practises; proper training in security and testing
methods should help incorporating the security testing into the
software testing suite. Costly and time-consuming fuzz testing,
advocated by the SDL, can be considered a quite specialized opera-
tion, appropriate for organizations developing APIs and operating
systems; application developers should have less use for fuzzing.
The security verification phase is best covered in security en-
gineering methodologies, and has the least direct counterparts in
agile activities. Performing these security activities as part of secu-
rity assurance procurement is to be done already at the requirement
specification phase, and the security requirements inserted into the
product backlog (A4). Security verification can also be performed
during a security specific iteration. Continuous integration (AP4)
automates and helps facilitate testing; daily meetings (A5) also often
cover testing issues.
SAMM continues to rely on the security requirements also in
the verification phase: security test cases are drawn from them.
SAMM also calls for penetration testing at the basic maturity level,
an activity that requires specific knowledge and tools, and is typi-
cally performed by security engineering experts. Only at level two
does SAMM require use of automated security testing tools and
integration of security testing into development process. Similarly
to the implementation verification, on third level, the automation
is to be made application-specific and release gates for security
testing established.
3.6 Release
At the end of each iteration a potentially shippable program incre-
ment is released, and the activities in Table 7 are to be performed.
The only agile activity taking place at the release phase is the retro-
spect (A6). This quality improvement measure is directly applicable
to security engineering as well. Security engineering activities tak-
ing place at later phases of the software lifecycle are crucial to
the security objectives, but separate from the development process.
Continuous integration (AP4) also extends in the release of the
software; on-site customer (AP6) participates also in release-time
activities.
Table 7: Release-time activities
Source Security activity
SDL Create an Incident Response Plan
SDL Conduct Final Security Review
SDL Certify Release and Archive
CC Analysis of guidance documents
SAMM Issue management
SAMM Environment hardening
SAMM Operational enablement
In the Common Criteria, security is verified through two pro-
cesses: security functionality is verified by functional testing, and
security assurance by documentation reviews. At the project’s in-
ception, one of the security-related objectives is setting of the Eval-
uation Assurance Level (EAL). This level, ranging from 1 (most
basic) to 7 (the most rigorous) defines the amount of documenta-
tion to review. The formality requirement for the software code
itself increases accordingly. The development-time documentation
consists of five parallel documentation tracks, number and level of
which is increasing as the EAL rises. At EAL 1, only basic functional
specification is required. EAL 2 adds a basic design document, and
security architectural description; it also requires the basic func-
tional specification to be augmented with specification of security-
enforcing functionality. Each level brings additional documentation
requirements up to EAL 5, after which the documentation or for-
malization requirements do not increase. The maintenance-specific
documentation is not included in the development-time documen-
tation requirements.
SDL is less concerned with the internal documentation and con-
cerns on things such as certification and maintenance. This is well
in accordance to claims that majority of the cost in software en-
gineering incurs after the release phase [20]. This is reflected in
SAMM’s trio of activity categories directed at security of the post-
development part of the software lifecycle: SAMM calls for issue
management, environment hardenings and enabling the operations
teams for security, before the software can be released. The last
of these provides actual tasks for the software development phase:
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A6: Iteration 
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A4: Product backlog
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AP7: Pair programming
AP5: Refactoring
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Figure 2: Agile activities mapped into the security development life cycle.
at first level, critical security information should be captured, and
procedures (operational instructions) for typical application alerts
documented. At second level, change management procedures are
created, related to the issue management, and formal operational
security guides created and maintained. Third level again concen-
trates on the business goals, and calls for an audit program and
code signing.
4 DISCUSSION
Development-time security activities form the basis for the soft-
ware security. The security functionality, security assurance and
operational documentation are created by the development-time
processes, forming the base for the later phases of the software life-
cycle. Figure 2 gives an overview of the difficulty in direct mapping
of sequential lifecycle models to agile development practises; very
few agile activities are confined into a single lifecycle phase, and
even this division appears somewhat artificial in a dynamic agile
model.
Pre-requirement tasks are mostly policy and process oriented;
security training, training in the agile processes, and establishing
practises such as coding standards takes place in this phase – and
occasionally these practises may have to be revisited even during
the course of the implementation process. In iterative develop-
ment, the phases from here onward are iterative. The phases are
bound together by most important requirement elicitation method:
communication with the customer, reflected by “on-site customer”.
Product backlog is also established already at the pre-requirement
phase with the general requirements, which are then complimented
with the project specific items at later phases. Test-driven develop-
ment binds the phases together; pair programming, even if utilized
only at crucial points and as an “enhanced code review practise”,
is another iteration-spanning activity useful from the requirement
phase onward, until end of implementation phase.
Simple design, iteration planning, and placing the planned items
into an iteration backlog bind the requirements and design together;
implementation is augmented with daily communication between
the developers, and also availability of the customer communica-
tions. Continuous Integration, together with TDD, provides security
verification management and proper coordination with iteration
backlog by identifying the items that require rework; also refac-
tored items requiring security verification are handled through
these activities – automatically, with proper tooling. CI process
also produces the releases after the verification, to undergo any
release-phase security activity after completion of the development
processes.
Security development lifecycle models have a strong emphasis
on security verification. This is also the phase with least common
activities between the agile and security engineering activities. The
solution to this discrepancy is twofold: both strong integration of
security testing into the functional testing and CI/CD processes
is required; also, a level of pre-planning is required: the security
engineering activities required to achieve the security objectives
have to be recognized early in the development process and the
activities placed into the the product backlog.
Agile methods are geared towards requirement management
and getting features implemented and delivered; however, security
experts still keep reporting that this is not the case with security
objectives [see 41]. While value-driven agile development processes
have certain unique shortcomings, fulfilling security requirements
could be as simple as a matter of prioritization. As long as the secu-
rity personnel and security requirements are external, the security
objectives are under the threat of getting poorly realized, if at all.
This can only be changed by increasing the awareness of the se-
curity engineering processes and including the security features
and especially verification activities into the development process
itself. As long as security engineering is external to the software
development, also security objectives remain external – at the cost
of potentially inadequate software security.
5 CONCLUSION
Implementing software with security objectives requires alignment
of software engineering and security engineering processes by
infusing the security engineering activities directly into the agile
processes. This should take place on three levels: providing training
for the individuals, executing security requirement management,
and by integrating the security activities, tools and experts into
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the software development process. With an acceptable level of
preliminary planning the security-related work items are to be
placed into the product backlog, and completed at a convenient
time during the iterative development process.
Achieving security objectives in software development requires
security engineering. Software security is an investment: it requires
training, tools and time. Integrating security engineering directly
into the software development activities, rather than executing
it as detached processes, is intuitively an obvious benefit – both
economically and technically. This study has provided a framework
for this alignment, and suggested ways to overcome the potential
difficulties in this alignment process. Software development is agile,
and security engineering will have to follow suit.
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Abstract. Software security is a combination of security methods, techniques
and tools, aiming to promote data confidentiality, integrity, usability, availabil-
ity and privacy. In order to achieve concrete and measurable levels of software
security, several international, national and industry-level regulations have been
established. Finnish governmental security standard collection, VAHTI, is one of
the most extensive example of these standards. This paper presents a selection
of methods, tools, techniques and modifications to Scrum software development
method to achieve the levels of security compliant with VAHTI instructions for
software development. These comprise of security-specific modifications and
additions to Scrum roles, modifications to sprints, and inclusion of special hard-
ening sprints and spikes to implement the security items in the product backlog.
Security requirements are transformed to security stories, abuse cases and other
security-related tasks. Definition of done regarding the VAHTI requirements on
is established and the steps to achieve it are described.
Keywords: Scrum, agile, VAHTI, software security, security standards
1 Introduction
Software industry has always been under scrutiny by regulators, standardization orga-
nizations and a plethora of industry-specific and more or less general standards. The
purpose of all this has been to guarantee a certain level of evidence about certain quality
aspects or functionality of the software. Consequently, also software security is be-
coming increasingly regulated. Several security standards and audit criteria have been
established, and even more academic and commercial software development methods
have been suggested to meet the standards. A number of the development methods and
best practices have achieved a standardized status themselves. Main issue with the stan-
dardized methods is that while they provide the necessary security assurance required
for certain regulated environments and security audits, they in general do not adhere to
the agile values or ideology.
The term ‘agile’ reflects approaching the development of software using new focus,
ideology and values [3]. As opposed to the sequential waterfall model, which attempts
to maximize the efficiency by not allowing any change, and by locking down the output
of each development phase, the agile mindset anticipates change, and even welcomes it.
At the core of agile software development lies Scrum, one of the oldest, and the most
established and widely-used development approaches among agile methods [19].
The scopes of security standards can be divided into industry specific, national and
international regulations. Standardization types include standards for software safety and
privacy, control andmanagement of data, software, assets, personnel and processes, and
any other aspects of information security. Consequently, these regulations also concern
the design and development of these aspects. The main subject of this study, software
development security, can further be divided into its components: security of the used
technologies, security of used processes and methods, and, consequently, the security
of the produced software. To control the security of its information systems, the Finnish
government has published its own public security requirements, VAHTI instructions
[10]. VAHTI is the de facto standard for the governmental information systems’ software
maintenance, use and development. VAHTI instructions for application development,
published in 2013, include definite requirements regarding the development of the
software and inherently the used development method itself [9].
VAHTI, however, is not directly compatible with the mainstream agile software de-
velopment methods. Therefore, this constructive paper presents modifications to Scrum
that are needed to complete with the governmental requirements. We have identified the
VAHTI requirements regarding the development method and the development phase,
and outline the necessary mechanisms and measures to be instantiated and integrated
into Scrum necessary to meet these requirements. These means include security-related
roles, processes and techniques, done at the three security levels defined in VAHTI:
basic, heightened and high. The security modifications to Scrum are selected by select-
ing applicable security measures from international standards and established security
frameworks and methodologies. While Scrum does not define security roles or pro-
cesses, we analyse the VAHTI requirements and translate these to concrete software
development concepts to be applied to Scrum.
This article consists of following sections: in Section 2, we discuss the background
and motivation of this article, as well as cover the related work done in the field of
introducing software security mechanisms in agile methods. In Section 3, we present
the Scrum method, its key terminology and how a software project is conducted using
Scrum. Section 4 introduces the VAHTI instructions for Application Development, the
process and reasoning in selecting the key requirements from VAHTI, which are then
grouped by their security level and assigned to Scrum roles. In Section 5, we provide the
modified Scrum process to meet the VAHTI requirements. The security compliance and
security assurance is achieved by importing specific elements of established security
frameworks into Scrum.An example project structure is also provided. Finally, in Section
6, we conclude the results and discuss avenues for future research.
2 Motivation, Research Questions and Related Work
Security in its various aspects has been a key topic in information technology since the
first computers. Perhaps it is the military background of the development of computing
devices, networks and the Internet which still molds the security procedures, aiming to
be well-structured, thoroughly documented and strictly regulated— even to the point of
being rigid and a hindrance to production. On the industry side, finance and bankingwere
among the earliest to introduce computers to their business processes, and financial data
is among the most conspicuously protected information assets in any organization. With
the emergence of personal computing and near-ubiquitous Internet services, privacy
and identity protection issues have gained importance among security topics. On the
other end, security also concerns countries and governmental entities. These typically
have a special focus on the continuity of services, especially ones critical to running
the society. When comparing the compliance requirement the various security standards
and regulations are setting to the ideology presented in the agile manifesto, the task of
providing security assurance and complying with standards appears to be a non-agile,
or even an anti-agile task. Even the VAHTI instructions for application development
state that the ‘mandatory’ and ‘well-documented’ S-SDLC (Secure Software Develop-
ment Life-Cycle) should ‘define exit criteria for different development phases’, a clear
presumption that the waterfall model will be used. Against this background the key
questions in our research were:
– How to make an S-SDLC conforming with the agile mindset as much as possible?
– Selecting Scrum, the most widely-used software development method, as the refer-
ence method; how should it be modified to comply with VAHTI?
– If a requirement stated in VAHTI is considered an item in the backlog, what is the
definition of done for each of these items?
– How can the definition of done be achieved with the least security overhead?
To address these questions, we used a Conceptual-analytical research approach and
a constructive research strategy [13]. That is, in this study we analysed the integral
elements of two existing tools (i.e., Scrum and VAHTI). Based on the results of this
conceptual analysis, we present the needed modifications to Scrum that it will fulfill the
requirements set by VAHTI. This study presents only the result of conceptual analysis
and further works are needed to verify and validate the proposed model.
In extant literature, several secure software development methods have been intro-
duced. Some of these even claim to be agile, or at least use an agile method such as
Scrum or eXtreme Programming (XP) as a starting point. Fitzgerald et al. [8] have ap-
plied Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [14] to Scrum and created their
own version of the methodology to meet organization-specific security requirements. In
recent work done at the University of Oulu, Vähä-Sipilä, Ylimannela and Helenius (in
[15]) have gathered various additions and modifications to agile programming method-
ologies, such as an initial ‘sprint zero’ for security definition purposes, use of security
stories for communicating requirements, abuse cases for testing, hardening sprints and
overall modifications to Scrum’s basic structure, identifying control points crucial for
security activities. Additionally, to handle the measurably increased complexity the se-
curity requirements add to the software and the processes, even a change of paradigm
to aspect-oriented programming (AOP) has been suggested [5]. Typically the suggested
S-SDLC methods were instantiated only for a single project within a single company, if
instantiated at all.
Implementation of the security controls and tasks is a more clear-cut field: Microsoft
suggests its SDL, and even in its current published version 5.2 provides ‘SDL for Agile’
extension to their method. SDL may be considered a security framework offering a
full set of tools, methods and techniques to implement the security tasks they suggest.
Although not directly security-oriented, the Capability Maturity Model Integration for
Development (CMMI-DEV) was studied by e.g. Diaz et al. [7] regarding the relationship
of heavy software processes of CMMI’s managed level 2 processes [2] to Scrum.
Similarly, our approach was to examine industry standards and best practices, such as
SSE-CMM [12], BSIMM-V [4] andMicrosoft SDL, andmodify Scrumwith a minimum
set of items that are necessary for VAHTI compliance. In our approach, the processes are
kept as lean as possible by not striving for formal ‘maturity levels’, and by minimizing
any security overhead deemed unnecessary.
3 Scrum
Scrum is an iterative and incremental project management framework, based on the
principle that customer requirements and other agents may change during the project’s
execution, and by working in iterations, allows the team to react to the change. Scrum
gives the organization quite a lot of freedom in how to organize and execute the project,
but certain key roles and concepts are defined. This section’s introduction to Scrum is
based on the Scrum Primer book [6].
Scrum is designed promote productivity and mitigate management and governance
overhead, by e.g. giving the developers as much freedom as possible in defining and
implementing their tasks (self-organizing teams) and all but eliminating the role of
the traditional project manager. The project may still require some project and product
management functions such as financial or other reporting, but the Scrum project does
not have or need a dedicated project manager. Scrum has an emphasis on intra-team
communication, favoring team co-location or at least tight online collaboration.
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Fig. 1. The Scrum process (adapted from [6])
Figure 1 shows an overview of the Scrum process. This is a slightly modified version
of ‘pure’ Scrum, allowing redefining the product backlog during the sprints. The key
concepts of the methods are:
1. The Team consists of three core roles: Product Owner (PO), representing the cus-
tomer and stakeholders, Scrum Master, facilitating for the team and removing any
impediments, and (typically) 3-9 Developers, who as a cross-functional and self-
organizing team utilize their skills to create Potentially Shippable Product Incre-
ments.
2. Stories are product requirements often written from the product owner’s perspective.
3. Product Backlog is the list of stories, use cases, requirements and other items that
require completion in order to deliver the product.
4. Tasks and Sub-tasks are concrete steps which the teammembers create and complete
based on the backlog items.
5. In Sprint Planning, the team selects from the product backlog items that can (and
should) be completed within the next sprint. The prioritisation of the items comes
ultimately from the stakeholders, i.e., the customer. In Sprint Planning, the items are
converted into completable tasks and sub-tasks, which added to the Sprint Backlog.
6. Sprints are the iterations in which the team completes items (i.e., tasks) in the sprint
backlog within a pre-scheduled time box (typically 7-28 days). During sprints the
product backlog items may be refined, added or deleted, while the sprint backlog
remains as unchanged as feasible.
7. In Daily Scrum meetings the team members brief each other in what they did
yesterday to complete the product, what they plan to do today, and whether there
are any impediments to the work.
8. TheDefinition of Done is a set of consistent criteria to determine when an item in the
product backlog is considered ’ready’, typically after regression testing. Determined
by the Scrum master with input from the stakeholders through the product owner.
9. Sprint Review is held at the end of each sprint. In this event, the team reviews the
completed work, and also the incomplete items on the sprint backlog.
10. Sprint Retrospective is for the team to review the sprint itself and the work done
in it. It aims for continual improvement of the process, and allows for reflection on
what was done well, and what needs improvement.
As any software project, a Scrum project starts with pre-planning and requirement
gathering. The requirements are either functional or non-functional, and may come in
as user stories, regulations, or other requested features that must be implemented in the
product. These items are added into the product backlog. One key point in Scrum is
to ‘deliver value to business’ as effectively as possible. In order to do so, the product
owner, as customer’s voice, prioritizes the items that are selected into each sprint’s
backlog at sprint planning event. This way it is at least theoretically possible, that after
a few sprints (or even one) the ‘potentially shippable product increment’ can already be
utilized despite some less important features being still under development. This way
the value can be realized earlier and, as a bonus, user feedback and bug reports can be
utilized to make the end product better. In each sprint, the developers pull items into
their own work flow from the sprint backlog, entitling the term ’self-organizing team’.
In addition to sprints, research and prototype work may be done in ‘spikes’. Similar
to sprints, spikes are time-boxed efforts to produce something that contributes towards a
completion of a complex backlog item or work as a proof of concept, without necessarily
aiming to complete the item and delivering shippable features.
During sprints, environmental and requirement changes can be taken flexibly into
account, in which case the product backlog is adjusted accordingly – typically the sprint
backlog remains unchanged. After each sprint the results of the work (the potentially
shippable product increment) is evaluated, the definition of done for the product backlog
items is verified. The definition of done is an important concept in Scrum, as it is the
only way items can be removed from the backlog.
For measuring the progress of the project, agile methods utilize a number of tech-
niques. Probably the single most important technique is story points: product owner
prioritizes some items in the product backlog over others due to their business value,
and the developers evaluate them by the estimated development effort. The story points
are not directly translatable to work hours. To emphasize this, a non-linear scale such
as Fibonacci-like sequence is used. Sometimes the work estimates include an option
to declare items too complex to implement in the current sprint. Thus the story points
represent the team’s view of the required effort, subjective to their current skill set.
Scrum is an empiric method: it readily admits and submits to the fact that not
everything is known or understood, and that things will change. In security engineering,
defined methods would be preferred: a process is started and allowed to complete,
producing invariably the same results each time [20]. The waterfall model aims to this
goal, but by being excessively rigid, it introduces a very concrete risk of failure to
meet the stakeholder’s and environment’s changing requirements. Traditional old school
security engineers tend to scold the agile methods’ iterative approach as ‘trial-and-error’.
Despite this lack of acceptance, Scrum is far from unstructured: it just gives the team
more freedom in deciding the order in which the items are implemented, and possibility
to iterate on the initial requirements, much based on assumptions. At certain point
the definition of done criteria will be met, security compliance achieved and security
assurance provided. In the process of doing so, the quality of the produced software may
actually be higher than those made using sequential methods [17].
4 VAHTI instructions for application development
VAHTI instructions is a wide collection of governmental security regulations, published
by Finnish Governmental Steering Group for Information Security (Valtionhallinnon
tietoturvallisuuden johtoryhmä, VAHTI). First publications in the VAHTI collection
are dated 2001, and they exist to support the data security legislation and Finland’s
strategies for National Knowledge or Information Society1 and Information Security2.
The instructions for application development were published in 2013. Compliance with
VAHTI has been mandatory for state agencies, partners and suppliers since 2014.
VAHTI requirements for software development [9] consist of 120 individual re-
quirements, divided into 15 categories. The categories span the whole life cycle of the
application or information system, ranging from strategy and resourcing to the eventual
end of life and ramp-down of the system. Of this requirement set, only the ones most
relevant to the development process were selected for this study. The candidates for
inclusion were directly involved with either the tasks during development process, such
as security design, audits or reviews; candidates for exclusion considered organizational
issues, strategies, policies, method-independent techniques, IT environment, or issues
related to the post-development phases of the application’s life cycle such as continuity
management or system ramp-down. The result set comprises of 23 requirements consid-
ered to affect the development method directly. Table 1 shows the final selected VAHTI
1 http://www.tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma.fi/esittely/en_GB/introduction/index.html
2 http://www.lvm.fi/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=339549&name=DLFE-
10210.pdf&title=Julkaisuja%2051-2009
requirement grouped by the security level. For each requirement, the expected frequency
of the task is projected, and the role(s) responsible or affected by the task are displayed.
The only requirement directly concerning the development method, SKM-001, states
that the development process itself is required to be a Secure Software Development
Life Cycle process. The method is to be documented, development personnel trained in
its use, utilized at all times, and comply with all the security requirements.
Table 1. VAHTI requirements for development method per security level
Code Requirement name Frequency Dev SM PO
OSK-001 Security Training 1 x x
OSK-008 Additional security training after change 0 or 1 x x
VTM-005 Application Risk Analysis 1 or more x x x
TST-002 Test Plan Review 1 x
VTM-008 Threat Modeling - recommended 1 x x
VTM-010 Threat Modeling updates - recommended 1 or more x x
ESI-001 Goal and Criticality Definition 1 x x x
ESI-002 Business Impact Analysis 1 x
VTM-001 Documentation of Security Solutions 1 x
VTM-006 App. Security Requirement Definition 1 or more x x x
TST-007 Security Auditing 1 x x x
TST-009 Security Testing - recommended Every-sprint x
KTY-002 Application Security Settings Definition 1 x x
TSK-001 Architecture and Development Guidelines 1 x x
SNT-004 External Interfaces Review 1 or more x x x
SNT-006 Attack Surface Recognition and Reduction Every-sprint x x x
VTM-009 Architectural Security Requirements 1 x x
SNT-016 Internal Communication Security - if applicable Every-sprint x x
TST-001 Security Test Cases Review 1 or more x x x
TST-004 Test Phase Code Review 1 x
TST-006 Use of Automated Testing Tools Every-sprint x
TST-008 Security Mechanism Review 1 x
TST-010 Development-time Auditing 1 x x x
Dev = Developers, SM = Scrum Master, PO = Product Owner
The included compliance requirementswere selected based on their effect to development-
time activities, and grouped into following categories:
1. Prerequisites
2. Documentation
3. Code, interface and test case reviews
4. Development-time and product audits
5. Security testing
VAHTI instructions define three security levels: basic, heightened, and high, each
with cumulative security requirements. In a Scrum project, the product owner will
specify the target level, preferably using tools specified in VAHTI instructions 3/2012
‘Instructions for determining the security level of the technical ICT environment’ [1],
the state office’s own instructions, and any applicable legislation. In the next sections,
we go analyze each requirement, suggest a means to comply with it and then present the
whole VAHTI-compliant Scrum structure for all defined security levels. The security
levels are separated by horizontal lines: the first section covers the requirements for basic
level, and the heightened and high levels are below that, respectively.
Generic technical requirements, such as ‘the application design must follow secure
design patterns’, and architectural requirements, were considered external to the devel-
opment method. Also, while technology-specific training for the project personnel is
included, any organizational security awareness-type training and general risk manage-
ment activities were also considered to be out of a single development project. Also,
technical or programming technique specific requirements were excluded. These are
considered to be part of design patterns and individual developer’s proficiency and abil-
ity to recognize and utilize them. Moreover, they are depending on the characteristics of
the software under implementation. As an exception to the principle of doing only least
amount of work, the optional Threat Modeling tasks (VTM-008 and 010) were included
already to basic level - although they remain optional. For some reason, VAHTI does not
require threat modeling at all. At highest security level, this can be covered byAttack sur-
face recognition and reduction task (SNT-006), or even included in creation of secure
patterns and architecture (TSK-001, VTM-009). Similarly, a clearly implementation-
dependent requirement for Internal Communication Security (SNT-016) was included,
applicable in case of n-tier applications. It is conceivable that a vast majority of soft-
ware developed for the VAHTI high-security tier is deployed using a secure multi-tier
architecture (i.e., separate database, application, and web server components), so the
inclusion of this requirement was deemed necessary.
Majority of the tasks fall on the developers; it is conceivable that establishing a role
of dedicated security developer would benefit the team, allowing the developers to con-
centrate on their main vocation. Scrummaster, as the ‘servant-manager’, is also involved
in most tasks, albeit indirectly by facilitating the team’s work. The Scrum Master is
also directly involved in all modeling and planning tasks, reviews, and audits. Following
the agile philosophy, the product owner is engaged in development wherever deemed
beneficial: as customer’s and stakeholders’ representative, they have the best knowledge
of the software’s purpose, use and impact. In addition to the Business Impact Analysis,
which is direct input from the stakeholders via the product owner, they participate in
external interface and security testing definition tasks, as well as all the audits. These
are, after all, done to the customer’s benefit. In the next section, we execute these tasks
using Scrum.
5 VAHTI-Scrum
Scrum, as a flexible and relatively adaptable framework, defines only the very rudimen-
tary structure for software development. To achieve compliance with VAHTI, additions
and modifications are required to the requirement gathering, sprint planning and the
sprint structure themselves. Some security activities justify having a dedicated secu-
rity or ‘hardening’ sprints. These may prove especially useful just before auditions and
planned releases, if the organization has decided to use those. It is also recommendable
to arrange a security sprint, ‘sprint zero’, before commencing the actual implementa-
tion; alternatively, some security work may be completed as security spikes. Spikes
could occur at any time - mainly in the early phases of the project, so they do not have
even approximate placement on the project time line. In similar fashion, the hardening
sprints may be inserted between the implementation sprints, to prepare for audits or just
enhance security. Especially on heightened and high levels the amount of security work
can be so big that a separate sprint is justified. It is important, though, that security
elements become integral part of all the team’s work: all tasks should include some
security considerations, at least in the form of risk analysis, just as all sprints contain
security tasks.
Figure 2 presents the modified Scrum process with the additional requirement sources,
roles, security related actions during the sprints and the artifact types produced by the
security processes.
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Fig. 2. VAHTI compliant Scrum process
The modifications to standard Scrum are listed below:
– The security regulation, although working for the benefit of the stakeholders, is
considered a separate source of security requirements. The items, or tasks, added
by to the backlog by the regulation are:
1. Creating security-related documentation artefacts: application risk analysis,
threat models, security architecture, goal and criticality definition, business im-
pact analysis, security solutions documentation, application security require-
ments definition, security settings definition, and architecture and development
guidelines.
2. Security training regarding the selected platforms and technologies, such as
operating systems, database engines, programming languages and frameworks.
3. Code, test case and interface reviews
4. Security testing
5. Development time and security audits
– There should be at least one dedicated security developer in the team, preferably the
same person nominated to be responsible for the organization’s software security.
This results in separation of duties, which enhances security by reducing the amount
of group think: also somebody else than the developers themselves should design
security tests, risk analyses, threat models and attack surface analysis.
– On heightened and high security levels, all sprints contain certain amount of specif-
ically security-related work and security testing.
– Audits are performed at a predetermined point in the project. These are set after
completing the corresponding items in the product backlog. The development-time
audits on the high security level are suggested to be held at control points, which in
agile projects map to product backlog items.
– The team/organization must have nominated a person responsible for the security.
This the following subsections provide a breakdown of security roles, tasks and
artefacts on each of the VAHTI security levels.
5.1 Roles
The roles in security-centric Scrum have certain modifications to the standard, plus a
new one: the security developer. In VAHTI-Scrum, the team has at least one person in
the role of security developer. While still a developer in the Scrum terminology, this
role is responsible for security reviews, security test cases and such. It may be beneficial
to have more than just the one security developer in a project. The Scrum Master will
need a substantial amount of security knowledge and practice, or at least they need to
be versatile in adapting to the changing security requirements. Security is an on-or-off
deal: there is no middle ground in testing or auditions, and ignoring security problems
cannot be considered a sustainable idea.
Similarly to the other roles, also the Product Owner has new responsibilities. As
the stakeholder’s representative, they need to be aware of the security regulations,
legislature, customs and other rules, in addition to the normal duties. Being a product
owner in a Scrum project may very well become a full-day job on the higher levels.
5.2 Tasks
For each task, we identify the role(s) responsible for its execution (see also Table 1), and
the artefacts produced by the task.
Basic level
Security Training (OSK-001).
- The Scrum Master facilitates for (preferably certified) internal or external training and
participates when necessary. This is likely to be performed as a spike as it does not
directly contribute to the product increment.
Additional security training after change (OSK-008).
- The Scrum Master facilitates for internal or external training after the need has been
identified, and participates when necessary.
Application Risk Analysis (VTM-005).
- The team identifies the security concerns, and technology and environment specific
risks. Sources such as OWASP Top 103, Tsipenyuk et al. [18] or Howard et al. [11] in
addition to VAHTI’s own recommendations should be used to identify software risks.
The result of the analysis is used as input for threat modeling. Input mainly from the
developers, producing a risk analysis document.
Test Plan Review (TST-002)
- The person nominated to be responsible for the security reviews the test plan. The
produced review report is part of the security evidence to prove the software and process
is VAHTI compliant.
Threat Modeling (VTM-008)
- Although optional, it is recommended that a formal threat model is created based on
the application risk analysis. Done by the developers, results a threat model document.
Threat Modeling updates (VTM-010)
- Optional. When the requirements or environment changes and a new risk analysis is
performed, the threat model should be updated.
Heightened level
Goal and Criticality Definition (ESI-001)
- In practice the same requirement as Business Impact Analysis, although from the
VAHTI perspective and done by the whole team: the impact and business use of the
software is analyzed and its data confidentiality assessed. The resulting document is
used as input for security requirement definition.
Business Impact Analysis (ESI-002)
- Similar as above, but concentrates on the software’s criticality and impact on the cus-
tomer’s business. Analysis is provided mainly via the product owner.
Documentation of Security Solutions (VTM-001)
- Component level security documentation produced by the developers.
Application Security Requirement Definition (VTM-006)
- Security requirement uses the goal and criticality definition and risk analyses (op-
tionally, also threat models) as an input to define the security requirements. This is a
formalization of work that has already been done: the software is already determined
to belong to the heightened security level. Done by the whole team, involving also PO.
3 http://owasptop10.googlecode.com/files/OWASP%20Top%2010%20-%202013.pdf
The resulting document is used as input for the maintenance phase.
Security Auditing (TST-007)
- Performed by an external and independent auditor, facilitated by the Scrum master.
Mandatory parts include automated penetration testing; administrative audit to verify
the software’s maintenance processes (post development phase - does not concern de-
velopment); architectural audit from security point of view.
Security Testing - recommended (TST-009)
- While a dedicated set of security tests is not mandatory, it is our recommendation
to perform such tests to help passing the security audit. Security test case review is
mandatory on the High security level. Inconsistently, actual security testing remains
non-mandatory in VAHTI!
Application Security Settings Definition (KTY-002)
- At the end of implementation and before deployment the software settings are docu-
mented and a maintenance guide with hardening instructions is written.
High level
Architecture and Development Guidelines (TSK-001)
- This is an organizational document that defines also some coding practices, such as
exception handling. If this document does not exist, it will have to be created before
security audit. Input from the organization’s developers and Scrum masters (if several)
can be done in e.g. Scrum of Scrums, a process of synchronizing the Scrums.
External Interfaces Review (SNT-004)
- The external interfaces of the software are reviewed against the architectural guidelines.
Input from the developers, review is facilitated by the Scrum master.
Attack Surface Recognition and Reduction (SNT-006)
- All attack vectors are to be identified and security mechanisms planned accordingly.
In practice just different approach to threat modeling; formalization of the work done at
architectural planning by the developers.
Architectural Security Requirements (VTM-009)
- Based on the attack surface recognition (and threat modeling), the architecture is
analyzed against recognized attack vectors by the developers.
Internal Communication Security – if applicable (SNT-016)
- The developers should be aware of the technical environment of the software for this
one. For example, if a web application uses separate database or application servers, the
communication interfaces must be hardened.
Security Test Cases Review (TST-001)
- Review the quality of the security test cases. The cases should be derived from other
documentation and their validity and comprehensiveness is verified (i.e., sanity-checked)
. Main responsible is with the security developer.
Test Phase Code Review (TST-004)
- Dubbed informal and performed by the person nominated to be responsible for security.
Review findings are documented. Developer task.
Use of Automated Testing Tools (TST-006)
- Partially organizational requirement, as acquiring the tools may cause administrative
overhead. VAHTI specifically mentions e.g. fuzzers and code analyzers. This task is
performed by the developers; the Scrum master facilitates acquiring the tools.
Security Mechanism Review (TST-008)
- Code level review of securitymechanisms. Check list is to be derived from architectural
level documents and other relevant documentation produced during the VAHTI-Scrum
development process. Done by the developers and the security developer.
Development time Auditing (TST-010)
- One or more external audits to be performed at different phases of development.
VAHTI only states that the software’s security is to be audited, so it is to be agreed with
the stakeholders how to handle this. A good baseline would be architecture, interfaces,
security mechanisms and/or the review documentation. Involves all roles
5.3 Artifacts
Software security assurance is provided by evidence, and in most cases this means doc-
umentation: reports, plans, technical documents, memos and other document artifacts
considered relevant for security. VAHTI is not an exception to that, and pragmatically
speaking, producing the required artifacts fulfills the VAHTI Definition of Done. The se-
curity documentation reflects a significant part of work. However, the figurative security
burn down chart does not reach zero even when the last document has been finalized:
security tasks will remain a part of every sprint even after that.
The produced artifacts in a VAHTI-Scrum and their dependencies are outlined in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 is a matrix with the security levels on the x-axis and development phases
on the y-axis. Arrows indicate input; the document is a result of a process of the same
name. It should be noted that if the project is operating on high security level, the
Architectural and Development Guidelines document may and should be used as input
for other documentation. For clarity, the arrows do not cross the security level barriers
from higher level to a lower one. Items with dashed lines are optional, yet recommended.
On the bottom row, we have the external documents on higher levels: audition reports,
and input for the deployment and maintenance phases of the software’s life cycle.
6 Conclusions and future research
Software security and security regulation aim at a defined process, producing a mea-
surable, evidence-backed result. This result is called security assurance or security
compliance. In Finland, the state agencies have formalized their security requirements
into the form of collection of VAHTI instructions; these instructions also concern appli-
cation development. Standardized secure software developmentmethods have deep roots
in the waterfall era, but ‘agile’ is not the antithesis for defined processes or structured
way of working.
In our earlier work, we were interested about the adaptability of the agile methods
to the software development in general [16]: this study further utilized the findings and
analysis, and provided an example how and with what mechanisms the Scrum method
can be adapted to provide compliance with VAHTI instructions. This answers to our two
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first guiding research questions. The Definition of Done in security context is twofold:
the formal requirements may be fulfilled, and contribute to the actual DOD; security
may be considered ‘done’ only when the project finishes - or, even when the software
life cycle ends.
Naturally, this study has limitations. The presented model is based on a conceptual-
analytical approach and it has not been empirically evaluated. While we have carefully
addressed the two studied concepts and created the new model based these results, it
is possible that some of the proposed modifications can be improved. Thus, further
work is needed to validate and verify the model with, e.g., a case study conducted in an
university’ course with students or in an industrial setting.
The research field offers several complex and interesting opportunities for future
study:whilewe presented amethod to fulfillVAHTI’s requirementwith agile approach, it
would be fruitful to understand how industry is currently working with the requirements.
A qualitative case study with selected companies is planned to help identify the best
practices and methods to use.
Furthermore, benefits and drawbacks introduced to security and safety development
by agile methods should be studied. While in a quick glance, it seems that agility in
development and security of the product are competing objects that cannot be easily
achieved in the same project, an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of using agile
in secure software development should be performed. This would, furthermore, bring
an answer to the question, what are the reasons to adopt agile in the an environment
which is not the best for it?
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ABSTRACT
Combining security engineering and software engineering is shap-
ing the software development processes and shifting the emphasis
of information security from the operation environment into the
main information asset: the software itself. To protect software
and data assets, software development is subjected to an increasing
amount of external regulation and organizational security require-
ments. To fulfill these requirements, the practitioners producing
secure software have plenty of models, guidelines, standards and
security instructions to follow, but very little scientific knowledge
about effectiveness of the security they take.
In this paper, we present the current state of security engineering
surveys and present results from our industrial survey (n = 62)
performed in early 2018. The survey was conducted among selected
software and security professionals employed by a selected set of
303 Finnish software companies. Results are compared to a commer-
cial survey, the BSIMM version 8 and the similarities and distinct
differences are discussed. Also, an analysis of the composition of
security development life cycle models is presented, suggesting
regulation to be the driving force behind security engineering in
software industry.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information security and privacy of personally identifiable informa-
tion aremain concerns of all organizations involvedwith processing
or storing digital data. Security engineering—the systematic effort
to produce more secure computing environments [1]—is primarily
concerned with the protection of operating environments and the
post-development phases in the software life cycles. The overlap-
ping of security engineering with software engineering has been
nominal and more or less an afterthought. Security engineering
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covers external reviews, pre-scheduled milestones, and formal cer-
tifications, among other related processes. By and large, these do
not contribute to the primary business requirements of software.
Several maturity frameworks, software life cycle models, and
security standards have been established. The goal of these is to
guide and commensurate software development processes towards
producing secure software systems that meet formal security re-
quirements with adequate security assurance. These include the
OpenWebAlliance Security Project’s (OWASP) Software Assurance
Maturity Model (SAMM) [17], the Building Security in Maturity
Model (BSIMM) [13, 26], a generic design-oriented life cycle model
from Synopsys, and the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) from
Microsoft [6, 14]. Of these, only BSIMM claims to be based on em-
pirical observations by being created by observing and analyzing
real-world data from leading software security initiatives.
There is a lack of scholarly empirical research on BSIMM, and
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine
BSIMM from a scholarly viewpoint. This study’s research objective
is to evaluate BSIMM and Microsoft SDL against the security and
software engineering practices currently used in the Finnish soft-
ware industry, and contributes to research on the linkages between
software and security engineering.
To this end, we conducted a survey among software profes-
sionals in selected software companies in Finland and asked for
their security practises. The survey was conducted by presenting a
comprehensive list of software security engineering activities to
the survey respondents. The respondents were asked to rate these
based on their usage, and to estimate the perceived effectiveness
of these activities, and their impact upon security. The rest of the
paper is structured as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the related
work. Results are presented in Section 3 and discussed in Section 4.
Conclusions follow in the final Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Secure Software Engineering
Software engineering has primarily been concerned with the ef-
fectiveness of software development and the means to effectively
create features and functionality that fulfill the software’s primary
‘business’ objectives [7, 8]. At the risk of over-generalization, in
the grand scheme of things, security has been traditionally seen
as a secondary objective that falls to the parent field of computer
science [3]. Traditionally security engineering was seen as a part of
system engineering, a more technical and non-theoretical subject
primarily concerned with the task of protecting software systems
from security threats. If software security was recognized as an
explicit goal, it was seen as a subdivision of software quality im-
provement efforts. The actual software security was introduced af-
ter a software product had already been released and deployed. The
ARES 2018, August 27–30, 2018, Hamburg, Germany Kalle Rindell, Jukka Ruohonen, and Sami Hyrynsalmi
primary goal was to protect the operating environment, whether
computers or networks, by guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity,
and availability.
Introduction of maturity models, such as ISO/IEC SSE-CMM [9],
in the 1990s, formalized a systematic approach towards security
integrated into the software development processes. However, since
the introduction of these quality and security improvement efforts,
software development processes have undergone a comprehensive
paradigm change. Managing software project and its risks is no
longer based on careful pre-planning and evaluation (and likely
rejection) of change requests, but rather adapting to the change [2].
Another prominent trend in software development methodologies
is concentration on the functionality, or ‘value’. In this frame of
thinking, security requirements are prone to gaining less attention,
or even being dismissed as secondary. In these agile and lean terms,
anything that is not recognized as producing value, is treated as
waste [18]. Tendency to disregard, possibly without even recogni-
tion or understanding of the security requirements has proven to be
a serious challenge to software security engineering. The paradigm
change, starting in the mid-1990s, coincided with the vast increase
in Internet-connected programmable devices and complexity of
the software. This was prominently demonstrated by Microsoft,
whose Windows 95, 98 and XP operating systems suffered from an
enormous amount of security flaws and vulnerabilities [6].
This lack in software security was recognized and partially reme-
died by new efforts to mix software engineering and security engi-
neering at the development phase. A substantial early contribution
was the introduction of Security Development Lifecycle (SDLC) by
Viega and McGraw in 2002 [26]. Microsoft, learning from their fail-
ures, also published a design-centered SDLC around mid-2000s [6].
McGraw and partners later went on to introduce the Building Se-
curity In Maturity Model (BSIMM) in 2009. This model is based on
industry surveys, and provides a set of best practises for software
security development and organizational security processes.
2.2 Related surveys
Stavru [23] has pointed out certain shortcomings in industry sur-
veys in the field of software engineering. The key points of their
analytic framework are here applied to the BSIMM. First of all, we
do not know who answered the survey. The BSIMM does provide
industry verticals (business areas where the participant companies
belong) and good demographics about them, but does not clearly
state who answered and what was her role. There is a mention of
109 executives and “more than 80 individuals”, but no details are
provided about details. Nor is it clearly stated what were the ques-
tions asked. To overcome these shortcomings, our survey adheres
to the guidelines and good practises presented in [23].
The background information states that the companies have had
a Software Security Group (SSG) initiative in place for about four
years. The BSIMM does good job in providing links of how the SSG
should be constructed, what kind of experts it should contain, and
how it should be led, but tells very little of individual SSGs. The
median size of the group is stated to be 5 (smallest 1, largest 130),
and average size is 11.9 – but on top of that, all that we know is
their average age and that there are 109 of them.
Finally, BSIMM describes itself as descriptive, not prescriptive. In
other words, BSIMM provides a balanced scorecard for consulting—
thewinners and losers of a “software security popularity contest”. In
BSIMM, security activities are divided into four main domains: gov-
ernance, intelligence, SDLC Touchpoints, and deployment. The fo-
cus in our survey is in SDLC Touchpoints, introduced in McGraw’s
2006 praiseworthy book on software security [11]; its relationship
to BSIMM is further explained by McGraw in [12]. Touchpoints are
SSDL practises consisting of architecture analysis, code reviews
and security testing, the building blocks of software security en-
gineering. From a software engineer’s point of view this contains
the development-time activities and shapes the software security
engineering processes and activities. There are, however, activi-
ties involved in all four domains of BSIMM in our survey – some
directly worded after the BSIMM activities, some closely related.
Based on our results, however, BSIMM appears to provide a some-
what biased view on software security. This is likely due to the
simplified way they have chosen to report the usage of software se-
curity activities in their survey. Also the choice of respondents is an
important factor; unlike BSIMM, our survey targeted software de-
velopers in general, whereas BSIMM appears to have a strong focus
on security-oriented companies, and specifically on executives.
Software development practises in general have been extensively
surveyed in Finland [21] and elsewhere [10]. Security education and
security skills have recently been charted in Finland [22]. On the
other hand, surveys about security software development process
appear almost nonexistent. Besides BSIMM’s surveys and reports,
there exists very little evidence on how—if at all—software security
is actually implemented during software development. This gap
is unfortunate (and somewhat odd) compared to the substantial
body of empirical research on software development processes
gathered over the decades of its existence. To fill this gap, and
to provide comparability with the previous studies, our survey,
labeled “Secure Agile Survey”, was aimed to confirm the software
development practises in combination of 40 suggested development-
time security activities.
3 RESULTS
The results are disseminated by first discussing the survey design
and the activities observed. After this brief discussion, the main
empirical points are delivered by focusing on the reported use of
the activities and their perceived impact on software security.
3.1 Materials
The results presented are a part of a larger web survey on security
engineering practices and agile software development processes
currently used in Finland. The survey is structured into three main
categories: (a) the background of the respondents and their organi-
zations; (b) the typical agile software development processes used
in the organizations; and (c) the security engineering practices used.
All of these categories are linked. In particular, respondents were
instructed to consider only those software projects that were im-
plemented by using both agile and security engineering processes.
While keeping this point in mind, this paper focuses on a subset of
the security engineering practices.
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Table 1: Security activities in the survey.
Phase Source Activity
Requirement
Other Identify user roles and requirements
SDL Establish security requirements
BSIMM Create a data classification scheme and inventory
BSIMM Security requirement review
SDL Set quality gates
BSIMM Translate compliance constraints to requirements
VAHTI Define application goal and criticality
SDL, VAHTI Application’s security and privacy risk analysis
VAHTI Business impact analysis
Design
SDL, VAHTI, BSIMM Threat modeling
SDL Design requirements established
Other Abuse or misuse cases
VAHTI Architecture and Application Development Guidelines
VAHTI Application security configurations specified
VAHTI, SDL Attack surface analysis and reduction
VAHTI Application Security Settings Definitions
Implementation
BSIMM, SDL Use coding standards
SDL Approved tools
SDL Static analysis
SDL Deprecation of unsafe functions
Other Security specific hardening sprints
VAHTI External interface review
BSIMM Use automated tools along with manual reviews
VAHTI Documentation of security solutions
Verification and Validation
*VAHTI Security specific test cases
SDL Fuzz testing
*BSIMM Penetration testing
SDL Dynamic analysis
SDL Attack surface review
VAHTI Review security testing plans
VAHTI Code reviews during testing
VAHTI Automated testing tools
Release
BSIMM Code signing
SDL Incident response plan created
BSIMM Documentation required by regulations
*VAHTI Internal security audits
*VAHTI External security audits
SDL Formal certification
*VAHTI Security patch planning
Items marked with * are differently worded than corresponding BSIMM activities.
The initial questionnaire was piloted with a small set of profes-
sional security engineers and researchers. Based on their feedback,
the draft questionnaire was adjusted regarding questions that were
found to be hard to understand. After this iterative development,
the questionnaire was posted in December 2017 via email to several
Finnish software companies and engineers working in these compa-
nies. In addition, the survey was promoted online by asking people
to forward it to interested parties. This promotion included also
social media platforms. After a month, reminder messages were
sent. The questionnaire was closed in late January 2018. In total, 62
usable responses were received.
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Identify gate locations and gather necessary artifacts
Provide awareness training
Create a data classiﬁcation scheme and inventory
Translate compliance constraints to requirements
Perform security feature review
Have SSG perform ad hoc review
Ensure QA supports edge/boundary value condition testing
Use external penetration testers to ﬁnd problems
Ensure host and network security basics are in place
Identify software bugs found in operations
monitoring and feed them back to development
Use (%)
0 20 40 60 80 100Finnish survey
BSIMM v.8
Figure 1: A Comparison of Selected Security Engineering Activities
3.2 Activities in the Survey
The surveyed security engineering activities, presented in Table 1
were drawn from established models and standards, with few ad-
ditions drawn from extant literature. However, for comparing the
results to BSIMM, a number of activities were explicitly included
from the BSIMM version 8 [13]. The other activities surveyed were
based on the Microsoft’s SDL and the Finnish governmental VAHTI
framework. The inclusion of VAHTI is particularly important in
Finland, given the country’s extensive public sector, currently un-
dergoing a large-scale digitalization process (see e.g. [15]). VAHTI
instructions for software development have been created by security
professionals by collecting best practices and security activities [25].
The BSIMM promotes a “top-12” list of organizational security
activities, which are expressed as “activities that ‘everybody’ does”.
According to BSIMM’s argument, a security practise can be formed
by selecting three activities from each of their four domains; one
of these domains is a security development lifecycle model, the
SDLC Touchpoints which resides directly within the scope of our
survey. Microsoft does not explicitly state the criteria how the
activities were selected into the SDL. the model has not received
any significant changes since its creation. The focus at Microsoft
appears to have been simplicity, scalability and applicability to
various organizations and products [6]. VAHTI instructions for
software development contain a comprehensive set of security
activities, largely based on best practises; the usage and impact of
VAHTI instructions for software development has been analysed
in [20]. The activities in these models have a significant overlap,
mainly due to the generic nature of the Microsoft SDL. BSIMM
claims to be descriptive whereas VAHTI is prescriptive to the level
of a de facto national standard.
Our survey was activity and lifecycle based and the questions
were grouped by the SDLC phases. Primary purpose was measur-
ing their usage, and for activities they had used, the respondents
were asked also for an evaluation of their effectiveness. The 40 in-
cluded security activities were divided into five development phases:
requirement elicitation, design, implementation, verification and
release. Of the 40 activities five were word-for-word picked from
the BSIMM top 12 using their distinctive nomenclature. Further
five were included in or similar to the activities picked from SDL or
VAHTI. As we concentrated on development-time activities, user
training was asked giving a yes/no option regarding the security
training given by their current organization; the results may not
be directly comparable.
Activities of the SDL were also prominently featured, with 11 of
SDL’s 15 development-time activities selected, added with the train-
ing activity with the same notes as above. Rest of the activities are
selected from VAHTI, complemented with three common security
activities, selected from software security engineering literature
as reviewed in [19]. These activities are labeled as ‘Other’ in Table
1. As security activities are rather universal, there was also some
overlap with certain activities stemming from multiple sources. As
usage data of the other models does not exist, our comparison is
necessarily specific to BSIMM.
3.3 Actual Use
Most of the ten BSIMM-related activities examined were surveyed
with a Likert-scale. The only exception is a question about security
awareness and training provided by the respondents’ employers.
This question was asked with a dichotomous scale: either security
training was provided or it was not provided. A five-level scale
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was used for the other activities: a given activity was used system-
atically, mostly, sometimes, rarely, or never. For these activities,
the respondents were asked to frame their answers with respect
to those software projects that used both agile processes and secu-
rity engineering practices. The selected activities are the ones in
the Finnish study overlapping with the BSIMM’ top-12 practices,
directly available for comparison.
For comparing the survey results and the usage frequencies col-
lected from the recent BSIMM report [13], all survey answers that
indicated at least some usage were collapsed into a single category.
For each activity, the missing values were subsequently removed.
The results are summarized in Fig. 1. The comparison should be
interpreted only tentatively due to various methodological reasons,
starting from the lack of details on how the BSIMM reports are
assembled empirically. While keeping this remark in mind, most of
the ten activities align even surprisingly well between the Finnish
companies surveyed and the global software companies partici-
pating in BSIMM. However, there is a notable difference in terms
of the security awareness and training programs provided in the
companies—only about 16% of the survey respondents reported to
have received formal security training from their employers. This
observation is in stark contrast to the BSIMM results. To a lesser ex-
tent, there is a difference also in terms of identifying so-called gate
locations such as milestones and other release engineering aspects.
For all remaining activities, the usage can be reasonably interpreted
to be similar, given the comparison’s implicit but presumably wide
error margin.
Another way to look at the use of the activities is to examine how
frequently the activities were used. The original Likert-scales are
suitable for this task. The results are summarized in Fig. 2, sans the
training question with its dichotomous scale. The results are again
rather similar between the ten activities with one exception. When
compared to the other eight activities shown in the figure, ensuring
the fundamentals of host and network security was used much
more systematically. This result is not surprising. After all, doing
“software security before network security is like putting on your pants
before putting on your underwear” [13]. The Finnish respondents
seem to agree with this truism.
3.4 Perceived Impact
The use of a particular security engineering activity does not mean
that the activity would be particularly important for improving
security. For this reason, the survey respondents were also asked
to evaluate the impact of each activity upon security. As a survey
cannot answer to a question about actual security of a software
system, the term impact should be understood as the respondents’
educated opinions on the perceived impact upon security. Such
perceived impact was again solicited with a five-level Likert-scale,
ranging from a very high impact to a very low perceived impact.
There are three noteworthy observations to make from the re-
sults summarized in Fig. 3. First and foremost: for all nine activities,
the perceived impact is much higher than the corresponding use
(cf. Fig. 2). In fact, all of the activities are perceived to have at least
some impact upon security. Only a negligible amount of answers
fall into the category of very low perceived impact. Second, the
fundamental premises of host and network security match in terms
of use and perceived impact. Third, penetration testing is perceived
to have a very high impact, although this activity is only seldom
systematically used in Finland. Excluding this interesting detail,
the results largely bespeak about a mismatch between use and
impact. In other words, there is still much to improve. A possible
explanation for this mismatch relates to regulations and standards.
4 DISCUSSION
As a software development objective, security is typically imple-
mented in a way that provides various types of assurance [24], by
which it is then evaluated. Most of the software security engineer-
ing activities provide means to that end: reviews, tests, verification,
and extensive documentation produce security assurance artifacts
and act as evidence of security existence. The original idea behind
security assurance was to prove the existence of such security mech-
anisms that enforce the system’s security policies; in early security
specifications this meant primarily programmatic evidence, i.e.,
machine-produced log files [4]. Over several iterations of regula-
tion, the definition of assurance expanded to cover also various
reviews and programmer-created documentation [5].
This trend is notable in both BSIMM and the Finnish survey:
of the nine common activities, only two are direct security im-
provement activities: “Identify software bugs found in operations
monitoring and feed them back to development” (BSIMM code
CMVM1.2), and “Ensure host and network security basics are in
place” (BSIMM code SE1.2). In the software development lifecycle,
both these activities belong to phases that take place after develop-
ment. It should be well noted that feeding the found defects from
maintenance phase into the development backlog is a vital security
activity in DevOps model and links the maintenance phase directly
back to the design, implementation and verification phases.
The rest of the activities fall into category of security assurance:
two of the activities belong into domain of security testing: En-
sure QA supports edge/boundary value condition testing (BSIMM
code ST1.1) and Use external penetration testers to find problems
(BSIMM code PT1.1). Notably, BSIMM promotes the penetration
testing activities as separate from other security testing.
The rest of the activities are various reviews. At code level, expert
reviews are used to enforce coding standards and locate security
design flaws and bugs; reviews are also applied to security architec-
ture and security features. Reviews are also perceived very efficient
and cost-effective ways to improve software security [24]. The
main issue with reviews is that they are performed typically by
external personnel, which may not be available unless explicitly
required – and paid for – by the customer. This leads to two minor
conclusions about the BSIMM: first, it appears regulation-driven
with emphasis on security assurance and compliance requirements;
second, it notably promotes use of external security experts despite
one of BSIMM’s basic elements is the organization’s own SSG, or a
“security satellite”.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The foremost conclusion is clear: (a) the security engineering ac-
tivities currently used in Finland align well with the BSIMM-based
activities used in the global software industry. The reasons for this
alignment are likely also similar. Despite increased promotion for
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security and increased recognition as an important property of good
software, security engineering in software development appears
still to be driven by regulation. That is, the rationale for using the
majority of “top-12” activities surveyed can be plausibly explained
by regulation.
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The results further align ratherwell with a recent industry survey
according to which setting standards is often more important than
actually following through, external reviews are seen as important
for security, and last but not least, many companies fail to perform
desired security activities [16]. In particular, (b) the small set of
activities surveyed are actively used in Finland, but the use is still
limited compared to the perceived impact upon security. When
compared to BSIMM’s surveys, (c) security training is only seldom
used according to the results. This observation may relate to a
selection bias: according to the background information collected,
most of the respondents are professionals with more than six years
of software development experience. As all respondents have also
explicitly worked in the domain of security engineering, formal
security training may be a redundant activity for the majority of the
respondents. Finally, (d) it is worth pointing out that penetration
testing was perceived as particularly important for security. This
result is in contrast to the mentioned survey, which rather pointed
out the limitations of penetration testing when compared to code
reviews [16]. Given that penetration testing is not widely used
in Finland according to the results, the reason may relate to the
concept of perceived impact on software security. In other words,
an activity that is widely promoted by consultants and industry
associations may not correlate with the actual impact of the activity.
This remark leads to a couple of important points for both research
and practice.
First, measuring the popularity of security activities hardly con-
stitutes a maturity model. Instead of just providing a ranking, a
maturity model should describe a tangible framework for orga-
nizations to translate their security objectives and requirements
into a set measurable security activities, processes, and artifacts.
Generic security models, to-do-lists, and prescriptive processes are
necessary when the security objectives of the software develop-
ment process, and thus the software product, are based on security
regulation, laws or standards.
Second, in most software projects, security engineering activities
should be arguably based on the project’s threat models and risk
assessments, which depend on the application area, implementation
platform, and the operating environment. Instead of prescribing a
SSE process, the SSDLs would be more beneficial when they contain
a set of targeted security engineering activities. From these sets, the
software security experts would be able to pick the most effective
ones fitting their software development processes and fitting their
specific security profiles.
Software security is tightly related to the privacy of the cus-
tomers of an electronic business, and increasingly also all citizens
in an information society. Regulations will continue to drive soft-
ware security by providing a set of security objectives, but it is
in the hands of software and security practitioners to define and
implement the correct and most effective measures to achieve those
objectives. In software industry, this means setting up processes
that integrate into the development processes as seamlessly and
effortlessly as possible; optimally in the way that the benefit gained
from the security measures exceeds the cost. Building such a frame-
work should be based on universal and generic building blocks and
theoretical constructs. Further empirical research can suggest how
to put these together in a way that is beneficial in practice.
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ABSTRACT
Security concerns are increasingly guiding both the design and processes of software-intensive 
product development. In certain environments, the development of the product requires special 
security arrangements for development processes, product release, maintenance and hosting, and 
specific security-oriented processes and governance. Integrating the security engineering processes 
into agile development methods can have the effect of mitigating the agile methods’ intended benefits. 
This article describes a case of a large ICT service provider building a secure identity management 
system for a sizable government agency. The project was a subject to strict security regulations due 
to the end product’s critical role. The project was a multi-team, multi-site, standard-regulated security 
engineering and development work executed following the Scrum framework. The study reports 
the difficulties in combining security engineering with agile development, provides propositions to 
enhance Scrum for security engineering activities. Also, an evaluation of the effects of the security 
work on project cost presented.
KEywoRdS
Agile, Case Study, Infrastructure, Scrum, Security, Standard, VAHTI
1. INTRodUCTIoN
Security regulations are an important driver in various aspects of software development and 
information systems and services. Even in the cases when formal security standards or guidelines 
are not strictly required, the drive for security still guides the selection of design patterns and 
technological components, as well as the design and development work. Increasing diversity in 
development methods, technology, and the environments where the systems are used, have prompted 
organizations to follow various security standards, as well as created the need to establish new ones 
to guarantee adequate security assurance. In 2001, the government of Finland begun to issue a set of 
security regulations, called VAHTI instructions1. Compliance with the instructions is now mandatory 
for all government agencies, and the regulation is also applied to any information system and data 
connected to a VAHTI-classified system.
While the importance and use of security regulations has increased, the use of lightweight software 
development processes and methods, i.e., agile development, has become the de facto standard in 
the industry (VersionOne, 2016). While there exists a series of suggested methods how to conduct 
security engineering activities in an agile project (see e.g. Alnatheer, Gravel & Argles, 2010; Baca 
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& Carlsson, 2011; Beznosov & Kruchten, 2004; Fitzgerald, Stol & Sullivan, 2013; Ge, Paige, Polack 
& Brooke, 2007; Pietikäinen & Röning, 2014; Rindell, Hyrynsalmi & Leppänen, 2015), the empiric 
evidence is still largely anecdotal and the cases reported specific to an industry or a single company. 
The study reported in this paper is exploratory, and thus the research, by its nature, explorative. This 
study reports the experiences in agile development in a security regulated environment. The research 
objective (RO) is:
RO: Identify best practices as well as hindrances of using agile software development methodologies 
in security engineering.
The results contribute to the on-going discussion by being a result of a deep analysis of combining 
security engineering with an agile method in an industry setting. Furthermore, the result of this study 
pave the way for further work deepening our understanding on the benefits and drawbacks of using 
agile software development methodologies in security sensitive development work.
In the case described, a Scrum project was conducted with the objective of building an IDM 
system for VAHTI-compliant information systems, and a secure VAHTI-compliant server platform 
to host the systems, including the IDM. The server platform was to be used also to host software 
development projects (with certain dispensations). The project was executed during 2014 and 2015, 
and had a duration of 12 months. The development team was split into two to three geographically 
dispersed groups, with the actual amount of teams involved dependent on the tasks at hand and the 
overall phase of the project. As a standing practice with the government agency that initiated the 
building of the platform, the project was managed using unmodified “textbook version” of Scrum. 
This called for strict adherence to fixed-length sprints, well-communicated product and sprint backlogs 
and daily progress monitoring by the Product Owner and steering group. The project was under 
strict control of the Project Management Office, and schedules of related infrastructure and software 
development projects were depending on the results of this project. Compliance with VAHTI was a 
central objective of the project. In addition to VAHTI, the client agency had also their own additional 
security demands, as well as recommendations from other government agencies, most importantly the 
National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSA-FI)2. The server platform to be built was to be acceptable 
for use for all government agencies, as well as private companies or organizations requiring similar 
level of VAHTI compliance.
This paper presents how Scrum was applied for the security-related work required in the project, 
and how the project was conducted. As the study revealed that not all the objectives of using `pure’ 
Scrum were not met, suggestions are made to improve the efficiency of the development work by 
introducing rudimentary security engineering extensions to the Scrum framework. The modifications 
include a new role for a security developer, and also suggest specific security sprints and other 
security-oriented additions to the run-of-the-mill Scrum. We also discuss how the introduction of the 
security engineering activities into the project affect cost, efficiency and the conduct of the project.
2. BACKGRoUNd ANd MoTIVATIoN
The use of agile methods has become an industry practice, whereas the security standards regulating 
software development processes, such as ISO/IEC 21817 (2008) and ISO/IEC 27002 (2013) originate 
in the time preceding the agile methods. Based on the literature, and also the findings this observed 
case, the typical approach to agile security engineering is to simply start using the methodology at 
hand without formal adjustments, with the notable exception of thorough and formal approach to 
security engineering described by Baca & Carlsson (2011) and Fitzgerald & al. (2013). There are even 
well-documented cases of attempts to achieve formal ISO/IEC capability maturity level incorporating 
agile methods, such as Diaz, Garbajosa & Calvo-Manzano (2009). Unfortunately, the findings and 
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suggestions made in these studies were not directly applicable in a project that was not strictly 
restricted to software development. Instead, a more ad hoc approach was used. In this approach, the 
security-related tasks are treated simply as items in the backlog: the security requirement items are 
converted to tasks, given story points, and completed among the other items as best seen fit. When 
security items which cannot reasonably be time-boxed because of the inherent uncertainties of the 
work, or the inexperience of the team, they separated from the Scrum sprint cycle and completed in 
non-time-boxed spikes.
While the ad hoc method may succeed in achieving “minimum viable security” by complying 
with the formal requirements, it is hardly the most effective way to achieve the goals, nor does it 
provide the best security assurance for the end product. Achieving security assurance is by all means 
possible with careful planning, although lacking in proper security requirement management and 
security task pre-planning. Absence of these elements in the project management methodology tend 
to lead to inefficiencies and, consequently, delays and increased development costs. Lack of proper 
security assurance may also increase the amount and severity of the residual security risk during the 
software system’s life span.
Our argument is that by adjusting the Scrum methodology to better align with security engineering 
tasks, the security cost overhead can be reduced while the security of the end product is enhanced, when 
compared to traditional sequential security engineering practices. This is achieved by incorporating the 
security processes into Scrum activities, as opposed to treating them merely as items in the backlog, 
by introducing new security-oriented roles into the development team. By incorporating the security 
engineering activities into the development method, the full benefit of incremental agile methods can 
be utilized to achieve better efficiency ratio and, arguably, better end products.
The next subsections provide more information about VAHTI, and the use of Scrum methodology 
in development projects requiring security standards compliance. Due to similarities in the 
requirements, the same observations and recommendations we make in this paper are found applicable 
also to software safety regulations, in e.g. medical field.
2.1. Security-Augmented Scrum
Scrum is a generic framework, originally intended to manage software development projects with 
small co-located teams. Scrum suggests that the product to be completed is divided into smaller 
components, or features, based on the customer requirements. These requirements are represented 
by user stories, which are then translated into product features by the development team. Features 
are then further divided into work packages or items, which are compiled into a product backlog. 
Items in the product backlog are completed in an incremental and iterative manner during short-term 
development sprints. The team, consisting of the Scrum Master, the Developers, and the Product 
Owner as customer’s representative, determines the items to be completed during the next 2-4 weeks 
sprint, consisting of daily scrums. After the sprint, the work is demonstrated, and optionally the team 
performs self-assessment of the past sprint in a retrospect event.
In this representation the Scrum process is augmented by three major extensions, presented in 
Figure 1.
1.  The role of a security developer. The security developer, or developers, focus on the security of 
the product, and typically create or review the documentation required to pass the security audits.
2.  Security assurance provided by creating security artifacts, mostly security-related documentation. 
They consist of security training certificates required from the project team, but most importantly 
the architecture documentation, risk management plans, test plans, test reports, system’s log files 
and other evidence required by the security auditor. The audits also produce reports, which are 
part of the security assurance provided for the customer.
3.  Anticipation of and planning for security-related tasks. To better illustrate this aspect of security 
work, security engineering activities are presented as iterative tasks in the sprint cycle in addition 
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to the daily scrum. It should be noted that not all sprints may have all the security tasks, and 
if the organization decides to perform security-oriented security sprints, the daily scrum may 
entirely consist of security activities.
In a project using unmodified Scrum, such as the one used in this case, the security testing, 
reviews and audits are viewed as normal stories in the sprint backlog and executed as part of the 
daily scrum. In this view the security tests and audits are part of the product, as compliance with 
security standards and regulations is mandatory during development time. The main shortcoming is 
the difficulty or outright inability to estimate the amount of work involved in the security activities, 
which merits for giving them special treatment. By emphasizing the importance and special role of 
the security stories, compared to treating them as overhead and extra burden, is prospected to produce 
better results with higher efficiency. In effect, this will reduce the cost of the development work.
2.2. Security Regulations and Standards Applied
VAHTI is an open and free collection of the Finnish government’s security guidelines, published on 
the Internet since 2001. The aim of this regulatory framework is to promote and enforce organizational 
information security, risk management and overall security competence of various government 
agencies, and harmonize security practices throughout the organizations. As of spring 2016, the 
collection comprises of 52 documents. The following VAHTI instructions were found to be relevant 
for this project:
• VAHTI 2/2009 “Provisions for ICT service interruptions and emergencies”, FMoF (2009)
• VAHTI 2b/2012 “Requirements for ICT Contingency Planning”, FMoF (2012)
• VAHTI 3/2012 “Instructions for Technical Environment Security”, FMoF (2012)
Of these, only the document 2b/2012 is available in English. The other relevant documents are 
made available in Finnish, and their English titles translated for the purpose of this article. This 
also applies to much of the VAHTI terminology: official English translations may not exist, may be 
Figure 1. Security-oriented Scrum process and roles (adapted from Rindell, Hyrynsalmi & Leppänen (2015)
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inconsistent between documents or may change over time. As a curious example, the Finnish name 
of VAHTI board itself has changed recently, albeit the English translation has not.
In addition to the VAHTI requirements, the company responsible for building the platform is 
audited for compliance with ISO/IEC standards 9001, 27001, 27002, and 21817, as well as its own 
extensive management framework which it makes available for its clients for review. The company has 
functions in the United States, so also Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act applied. SOX is mostly concerned 
with the financial elements of the project, but still affected the work load of the Scrum Master by 
adding reporting responsibilities.
2.3. data Security in VAHTI
VAHTI classifies the information systems into three security levels: basic, increased and high. 
The server platform, where the IDM system was installed, was built for the increased security 
level. Information contained in the systems is classified into levels from I to IV, where IV is the 
lowest. Information contained in a system audited for increased security level may contain clear-
text information up to level III; in this case, however, all data was encrypted despite the official 
classification level.
2.4. About Security Engineering
The term `security engineering’ in software industry comprises of all security-related tasks within 
a software-intensive product’s life cycle. The standard’s way to categorize these activities is to 
divide them into three main process areas: risk, engineering and assurance (see ISO/IEC 21817). 
The risk process assesses the risk and aims in minimizing it by assessing threats and vulnerabilities, 
and the impact they have, producing risk information. The security engineering process uses this 
information with other security-related input to define security needs and provides solutions to fill 
them. Assurance process collects and produces evidence of security’s existence, and aims in its 
verification and validation. The ultimate goal of these processes is to identify and mitigate risk, and 
define the impact and actions to be taken when the residual or unrecognized risk is realized: what 
will happen when things break.
3. RESEARCH PRoCESS
This study follows a case study design method by Yin (2003), and a qualitative research approach by 
Cresswell (2003). For the study, we were looking for a development project that was both using agile 
methods and fulfilling VAHTI regulations. Our decision was to focus on the VAHTI regulations, as 
they are viewed to be a national standard and, therefore the number of possible cases would be higher. 
In addition, we were looking for a project which would be either ended or near its ending in order 
that we would be able to evaluate the success of the used model. Finally, the selected case should 
be a representative candidate as well as be able to produce rich information about the phenomenon 
under study.
We ended up to select a project case where identity management and verification service was 
ordered by a governmental customer who required the use of VAHTI. The development work was done 
by following a modified version of Scrum software development method. As Scrum is currently one 
of the most used development methods, the findings from this case study should be representative.
The project was executed by a mature, well-known software product development and consultancy 
company in Finland. The company has a long history of both agile methods as well as producing 
information systems for the government. By the wish of the company, the client and the interviewees, 
all participants to the project shall remain anonymous.
For this study, we held a post-implementation group interview for the key personnel of the selected 
project. We used a semi-structured interview approach where time was given to the interviewees to 
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elaborate their thoughts about the phenomenon under study. The general questions concerned the 
scope and size of the project, amount of the personnel involved, and the daily routines of the team.
Also, the security standards that were applied to the project were gathered. The security 
mechanisms developed to implement the requirements were charted, along with how they were 
presented to the client and auditors. Finally, the amount of extra work caused by the security 
requirements was discussed and roughly estimated, and the interviewees recounted their views of 
the lessons learned in the project. The interview session also acted as a retrospective for the whole 
project, where the participants were able to express their views of positive and negative aspects of the 
project and the effect the security requirements had. The results of the interview were then analyzed 
by the researchers and the key observations were emphasized.
The project was selected as a potential research target due to its strict security requirement and 
the fact that it was executed and managed using Scrum framework. The interviewees were the Scrum 
Master and the head architect of the project. They were both deemed as key personnel of the project, 
and they were able to provide insight to the project background, its execution as well as its results. 
The selected interviewees were also the only ones that persistently participated in all of the sprints 
and were involved in the project for its whole duration.
The questions posed before the interviewees were divided into three groups. First three questions 
concerned the project background (Q1-Q3); following five questions concentrated on the project 
process, security standards, and feedback on the Scrum and security (Q4-Q8); and the final two 
questions canvassed the interviewees’ views on the project results and success factors (Q9-Q10).
The questions were as follows:
[Q1:] Project subject and scope?
[Q2:] Project resources, budget, and duration?
[Q3:] Personnel locations, multi-site teams?
[Q4:] What VAHTI standards were followed?
[Q5:] What other security standards and regulation were included?
[Q6:] Other restrictions (safety, privacy, agency specific regulations)?
[Q7:] What types of steps were taken to enforce them?
[Q8:] How was the security assurance verified (audited) and audit trail maintained?
[Q9:] Did the budget and schedule hold, and what was the amount of extra work caused by security?
[Q10:] What were the lessons learned?
After the interview, some complementary questions were asked via emails to confirm certain 
details, but otherwise the initial interview session was deemed sufficient for the purpose of this study. 
Access to exact budget or workload figures, or system logs or other technical documentation was not 
made available for research: the security classification of the platform prevented using this data even 
for verification. Instead, the interviewees relied on their personal experience and notes made during 
the project, and provided best estimates on the matters in a general level accepted for publication.
4. CASE STUdy: THE PRoJECT
The agency required a VAHTI compliant IDM platform for their various information systems, and for 
users and system administration and management purposes. The platform was to be built using off-
the-shelf components, installed on common open source operating systems, and deployed onto a large 
scalable array of virtual servers. A similar IDM platform was built also to authenticate and manage 
the identities of the administrators who manage other VAHTI compliant servers and services, and 
is to be separately instantiated for regular office users as well based on the experience and solutions 
gained in this project.
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The IDM was deemed to be a critical service in respect of agency’s security, privacy and 
business requirements: while the agency had 650 internal users connecting to 450 separate server-
side computer systems, they also manage a sizable array of contractors with a total user amount of 
up to 12,000. The building project was conducted at the same time the server platform itself was 
being built, which added to the challenge in such way that all the requirements of VAHTI were to be 
met by a novel implementation.
Nearly all the design and definition work was to be completed in this project. To add to the 
challenge, the work was to be performed using Scrum, mainly to ensure steering group’s visibility 
to the project’s progress, and also to enable reacting to any unexpected obstacles or hindrances met 
during the project execution. Unfortunately for the project team, the customer also saw use of Scrum as 
a method to change the project’s scope during its execution by adding items to the product backlog, or 
removing them from there, which caused certain degree of confusion among the team and forced it to 
abandon some work already completed. These aspects of Scrum projects, however, are not a security 
issue but of a more generic field of project management, and therefore are not further discussed.
The development work consists of distinct phases, which were completed during one or more 
iterations:
1.  Definition: synthesis of the requirements, component candidate selection, risk assessment and 
analysis.
2.  Design: architecture design, definition of interfaces, component hardening plans.
3.  Development: component research, modification (i.e., hardening), and installation.
4.  Testing, Reviews, Audits and Acceptance: security testing, external audits and formal acceptance 
of the end product to be a part of the agency’s system portfolio. In effect, security assurance 
processes.
As there were no formal milestones preset at the beginning of the project, the security gates, 
such as audits, were passed flexibly whenever each feature was considered to be mature enough. This 
removed certain amount of unnecessary overhead, as a traditional fixed milestone dates may call for 
the team to work overtime, which may get costly due to pay compensations and cause delays to other 
projects due to resource shortage.
4.1. Project organization
The project involved an average of nine persons at any given time: a Scrum Master, a dedicated 
Product Owner, a Security Architect (in basic scrum, part of the development team in the role of a 
developer), and the developers split into their production teams based on location and occupation.
The service provider is a devout follower of ITIL3, a well-established and recognized set of industry 
standard best practices for IT service management. Typically for an ITIL-oriented organization, the 
infrastructure production teams reside in their own “silos”, with very little communication with other 
teams. Production teams were divided by their specialization, in this case `Storage and Backup’, 
`Server Hardware’, `Windows Operating Systems’, `Linux Operating Systems’, `UNIX Operating 
Systems’, `Databases’ and `Networks’. In addition, the IDM application specialists came from their 
own team, residing within a separate unit within the company. The project brought specialists from 
these various teams together, at least virtually --- for at least the daily 15-minute stand-up meeting. 
Due to team’s multiple physically separated locations, the meetings were without exception held as 
telephone conferences.
The teams were utilized in different phases of the project in such way that only the Scrum Master, 
security developer (i.e., the architect) and the Product Owner had personal activities in every single 
sprint throughout the project. The developers were part of a larger resource pool, and drawn into the 
sprints or spikes in various phases of the project whenever their expertise was required.
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4.2. Project Execution
Much of the work related to VAHTI regulations was done in the planning phase: it turned out that the 
client agency had compiled their own list of requirements, which was based on VAHTI but had new 
security elements added to the public requirements. This partially to compensate the dropping the 
specific requirements for VAHTI compliant application development (FMoF, 2013) in the beginning 
of the project.
The project extended over a period of 12 months, from planning phase to accepted delivery 
of final sprint. The amount of work was measured in story points, and the average velocity of each 
sprint was 43 points. Divided with the average number of the developers (9) and the length of the 
sprint (15 work days) gives a rough estimate of a story point equaling three work days. As an overall 
measure, the story points give an impression of the size of the tasks. This sort of conversion may not 
be meaningful in general and outside of the scope of a single project, as the story points are primarily 
used to compare the features (or stories) to each other within a single project. For purposes of this 
study, the fact that largest single units of security work, the hardenings, were not performed in sprints 
and therefore not measured in story points, makes pinpointing the cost of security work much harder. 
In this case, the interviewees’ estimates were the only source of the amount of workload, and although 
trusted to be reliable, exact figures would have been preferred.
From the beginning, the team’s approach to the security tasks was pragmatic, although in terms of 
Scrum, rudimentary: stories that were found difficult to time-box at the time of their implementation, 
were taken out of the sprint cycle and completed as spikes. Prime examples of such tasks were operating 
system hardenings, a task essential for the platform security: the project team allocated resources to 
these tasks, and just ran them as long as the tasks took. This resulted in a project structure presented 
in Figure 2, where there were major side tracks to the main sprint cycle. As tasks such as these were 
in the very core of the project goals, it would have been beneficial to go through the trouble or even 
adjust the Scrum structure to better accommodate these items.
The sprints are represented as the main story line. The parallel lines represent the spikes that 
were executed outside the main sprint structure. Their results (deliverables) were demonstrated at 
a sprint demo, although they were executed independently without time-boxing. There were three 
distinct task types outside the sprint structure:
1.  System hardenings, performed for each tier or environment of the system under development: 
Development, Quality Assurance (QA), and Production environments. The results obtained in 
the Development phase were not directly usable for the upper environments, whereas the QA 
environment was built to be production-like. As a result, the work done at QA phase was partly 
reusable at Production phase. Despite the technical similarities, the ITIL-guided maintenance 
models of these two environments were so great that the team proceeded in executing the 
Production environment hardenings as a spike as well.
2.  Documentation was a ubiquitous process during the development. This included risk 
management, technical architecture and technical component documentation, test plans and 
Figure 2. Project structure and spikes
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reports. Documentation comprised most of the security assurance. Complete list of VAHTI 
requirements for documentation are presented in Appendix 3 of the VAHTI instruction 3/20124. 
In this document, there are 224 mandatory requirements listed for the increased security level 
information systems. Almost all of these requirements call for some type of written evidence to 
be verified and reviewed, although most of the documentation artefacts are created in other than 
the development phase of the information system’s life cycle.
3.  Reviews and audit were performed based on the documentation and included physical testing of 
implementation.
4.2.1. Product Deployment Model
The demand for increased security (literally, the “increased level” on VAHTI security classification) 
also stated how the systems were deployed: to maintain audit trail, all changes to the production 
environment, including all server and hardware installations during its buildup, were performed 
following ITIL processes. These processes added extra levels of bureaucracy, and the team reported 
getting acceptance from the Change Advisory Board (CAB) for all changes to be made in the 
production environment had a very adverse effect on the deployment schedules. Combined with the 
policy of role separation between developers and maintenance personnel, this caused the building 
and installation of the production environment to be document-driven, bureaucratic and slow. The 
policy of separating the roles of developers and maintenance effectively prevents the `DevOps’ type 
of continuous delivery maintenance model, and would require e.g. a form of “continuous security” 
model, such as presented by Fitzgerald & Stol (2014).
In this project, the continuous delivery model was used with the lower environments, speeding the 
rate of delivery significantly. When building the production environment, the flow of work assumed 
in previous sprints was disrupted, which caused unnecessary slowness and also cost overhead. 
Documentation necessary for the maintenance personnel was to be created before the handover, and 
as such did not necessarily contain all the required information and details. Mandatory use of ITIL 
processes when building the production environment was one of the main schedule hindrances of 
the project according to the interviewees.
4.2.2. Team Structure and Tools
Depending on the items in the current sprint backlog, the team was divided in two or three 
geographically separated locations during the whole length of the project. The organizational separation 
of the developers resulted in situation, where even the persons based on the same location did not 
necessarily sit in the vicinity of each other or communicate with other team members directly. The 
central location for the project, and the physical location of the server platform was Helsinki, Finland, 
but the team members were divided on several sites. The Scrum Master performed most of her duties 
remotely, without being in direct contact with the developers except rarely. As usual in large ICT 
service companies, almost all developers were also involved in other projects at the same time. The 
overall experience of the team was deemed very high, although in infrastructure work the use of agile 
methods is not very common, and is customer dependent at best. As per this fact, most personnel were 
mostly inexperienced with Scrum, although they received basic Scrum training before and during 
the project. Use of Scrum was reflected by the use of collaboration and project management tools, 
most importantly Atlassian JIRA5 specifically customized for the agency’s use. The Scrum Master 
promoted and demanded the use of JIRA as reflecting the work performed in daily sprints. The Product 
Owner’s most visible role was following the project’s progress based on what team members reported 
on this tool. In general, the team was reported to be happy or at least content with Scrum, at least up 
until the production environment building phase where ITIL processes broke the team’s workflow.
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4.2.3. Security Story Types and Their Implementation
The requirements called primarily for well-documented software quality and component and process 
security. Most of the additional work was directly security related, and creating its documentation. 
The platform also had strict and formal requirements for availability and reliability. Outside the 
security domain, the main source of regulation-related work was duplication of all infrastructure 
into the service provider’s second data center. The data centers themselves, as well as the personnel 
administering the system and its infrastructure were subject to meticulous security screening. Proper 
level of access control was enforced, the server rooms’ CCTV system extended to cover the new 
servers, and remote connection practices were reviewed. All personnel involved with the client was 
to be security checked by the national Finnish Security Intelligence Service6. Data itself must reside 
within the country’s borders and even the infrastructure’s configuration data and work tickets in the 
Configuration Management Database (CMDB) were to be made inaccessible for personnel who are 
not security checked.
4.2.4. Technical Tasks: System Hardenings
As an infrastructure project, the main technical obstacle was securing the hardware, operating 
systems, middleware and the application (the IDM system) against security threats. The bulk of 
this work was performed by one of the interviewees, the security developer. Hardening in this case 
covered analyzing and removal, or blocking, of hardware and software features, and testing against 
the threats. The purpose is to reduce the attack surface of the platform under construction and protect 
it from both internal and external threats, as well as minimize the components where potential future 
vulnerabilities may emerge.
On hardware level, hardening means controlling the network interfaces and the surrounding local 
area network, routing and traffic rules. It also covers any and all hardware maintenance interfaces, 
typically accessible through the network. On operating system and software level, the operating 
system’s or software manufacturers, such as Microsoft, provide their own hardening instructions 
which were used as a baseline. These were combined with the best practices of the consultant 
company’s own experiences and policies, and the explicit instructions and requirements given by the 
client organization. These included uninstalling a large number of modules and services, disabling 
a number user accounts and policies, and enforcing a number of others, and restricting access and 
privileges throughout the system. The same principles were applied to each software component 
installed on the server platform.
By definition, all access rules and user validations had to be applied to the infrastructure services 
provided for the server platform; these include software and hardware patching, network access, 
malware protection, hardware and application monitoring, and backups. The inherent uncertainty of 
security testing, together with the inter-dependency of the components affected by the removal and 
alteration of the services and restriction of rights made predictable time-boxing of these tasks so 
unreliable that the team decided to execute them as spikes.
4.3. Cost of Security work
The Scrum Master estimated that the extra work caused by the regulations was approximately 25 to 50% 
of the project’s total work load. As accurate billing information was not available, this was accepted 
as the best estimate of the real cost of the security work. Most of the overhead comprises from the 
documentation of the solutions. Security-related documentation was created by all team members: 
project manager and the security developer (architect) created most of the documentation, and the 
Product Owner as the client’s representative made sure that the correct regulations were applied.
Developers were burdened by creating appropriate level of security-oriented technical 
documentation of all their work, especially related to operating system and application hardening 
procedures. The hardening process itself lasted for four months, presenting the largest tasks in the 
project. Changes to the production environment were further complicated by ITIL-based requirement 
of strict Change Advisory Board processing of each change that was made.
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5. ANALySIS ANd dISCUSSIoN
The research objective for this study is to identify best practices as well as hindrances of using agile 
software development. This case provides a good view how unmodified Scrum lent itself to a situation, 
where a large amount of regulations caused extra work with uncertainties in work estimates. Due to 
these uncertainties, or the large amount of presumably indivisible work included in some of these tasks, 
the team was simply not able to fit certain features into the sprint structure. Also, in contradiction to 
traditional security view, iterative and incremental approach to development and building forced the 
project team, steering group and also the client to rethink how the end product’s and its management’s 
security assurance was to be provided. In a sequential waterfall model the security deliverables and 
tasks were tied into the predetermined milestones, without the flexibility provided by Scrum. As 
presented in Figure 2, the project was in practice executed partly following a `waterfall’ model, yet 
without milestones fixed in advance; these waterfall processes ran alongside the main project, and 
their deliverables were then included in the project outcomes.
Based on the above, in the strictest sense the project organization failed utilizing Scrum 
methodology to create the product, although the superficial requirements were fulfilled -- customer 
was mostly interested in progress reports and the timely delivery of the complete and standard 
compliant end product. The failures were partly due to inflexibilities on both the company developing 
the system, and the client demanding a formal and fixed approach to Scrum. Sprint planning for tasks, 
for example, called for features to be completed during the sprint. When this was already known to 
be extremely unlikely, these features were agreed to be performed as spikes. In retrospect, this was 
most likely caused by the thinking that security features were perceived as overhead and not actual 
features in the product, while in reality the security features were essential to the product itself.
Even without applying any formal modifications to Scrum, at least one of the “secure Scrum” 
features, presented in Chapter 2.1 and Figure 1, was taken into use, as the project architect assumed 
the role of security developer. In practice, most of the physical work triggered by security requirements 
was done in spikes outside the sprints. When the work is done in a non-iterative way, just letting 
them run along the project, the benefits of Scrum are lost. Based on the project manager’s estimate 
of cost increase factor is 1.5-2x, caused by the security features, and thus there exists a large saving 
potential in rearranging the security work. Attempting a new approach and restructuring the work 
into iterations is recommendable in future projects. Initial spikes are acceptable, but in this case the 
team failed to utilize the experience gained from them, and continued to implement similar security 
features as spikes even after the first one. This is represented in Figure 2 by the OS hardening spikes 
H1, H2 and H3. The team defended their selected approach by stressing the inherent differences 
in the physical environment and management practices of the development, quality assurance and 
production environments, but also from the undertones of the developer’s interview, it was perceivable 
that the attitude towards using Scrum in this kind of project was negative to start with. Time-boxing 
the uncertain tasks to three-week sprints, having to perform the demonstrations after each sprint, 
and other Scrum routines were perceived to some degree as distractions from the main work. This 
mentality seemed to affect some members of the team despite the personnel was trained in the Scrum 
method and the tools necessary.
During the interview, the team was quite uniform on the key success factors of the project. They 
emphasized the importance of document management, and very strict requirement management. The 
amount of overlapping and sometimes outright conflicting security requirements even within the 
VAHTI requirements increased the Scrum Master’s workload substantially. Use of Scrum was deemed 
to have overwhelmingly positive effect, by enabling faster reaction to changes in the requirements and 
directness of the client feedback. Also the team praised the frequent sprint planning’s effect of keeping 
the team focused, in comparison to the very long spikes run during the project. In retrospect, the team 
regretted not utilizing the Product Owner more already in the beginning, as direct channels to the client 
were viewed to be very valuable during the implementation. Also, the client’s key personnel were not 
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always present at sprint demos, which caused unnecessary questions and insecurity on the client’s 
side, despite the features were already completed and already once comprehensively demonstrated.
The effect of Scrum to the efficiency of the work was estimated very positive. The extra cost 
of the security was partly compensated by the fact that rigorous testing and documentation of the 
technical solutions had also a positive impact on the quality of the work, improving the system’s 
reliability and availability. It can also be argued that the cost of security work is lower when it is done 
proactively rather than repairing an old system or trying to recover a breached one.
6. CoNCLUSIoN ANd FUTURE woRK
This study has presented a case of building an infrastructure and setting up an identity management 
software platform for a governmental customer. The customer agency had their own set of security 
regulation and requirements, namely the VAHTI instructions. In addition to the government 
requirements the service provider contracted to build the system was committed to several international 
ISO/IEC standards, as well as their own management frameworks and sometimes complex financial 
reporting rules. Both the agency and the service provider’s project management offices required 
employing the Scrum methodology as the project management framework. The research was conducted 
in a post-project semi-structural interview, and the information was gathered based on their experiences 
and notes of the project. The parties involved are anonymized, and only publicly available information 
about the project and the regulations involved was to be disclosed.
Scrum was initially applied in its standard form, with no formal security extensions. Security 
engineering activities were integrated into the product backlog, and performed within sprints whenever 
possible. During the project, the team adapted to the security work by creating a de facto security 
developer role, and many of the security engineering tasks ended to be performed outside of the regular 
sprint structure: typically, security assurance is based on evidence gained through security testing, 
which also in this case had an adverse effect on the team’s ability to schedule and time-box the items 
that were subject to these tests; these were performed as spikes instead. The same technique was also 
applied to documentation, which was performed outside the main sprints, and audits and reviews, 
which were separately scheduled one-time tasks. The results of these spikes were still presented 
in sprint demos among the other artifacts and results. The reported issues at product deployment 
in production environment prompt for developing and applying a delivery model that provides the 
required security assurance without the interruption to iterative development.
The team viewed the use of Scrum as a positive factor to project cost and quality, although 
arguably Scrum was not utilized to the maximum extent: important parts of the work were done in 
spikes outside of the main sprint flow, without attempts to utilize the experience gained from them 
to time-box the future tasks. This was seen to benefit the project, although an iterative and more 
exploratory approach to those tasks might have proved more benefits in the long term, and it is still 
a possibility that the experience gained in this project can be utilized in similar future projects. The 
project team still regarded the security engineering activities and providing the required security 
assurance to compose a significant amount of extra work: at final stages, the work load effectively 
doubled. The initial approach in this project was more or less an unmodified textbook example of the 
Scrum method, but the team applied naturally certain security extensions. Simply conducting weekly 
product backlog refinement sessions was deemed essential for the project’s success.
This project was a model case of two large entities that have decided to fit their organizations 
to work according to an agile framework. The nature of work itself has not changed, although the 
introduction of growing amount of security engineering and increasing regulation put an additional 
strain on the project’s requirement management. Agile methods have inherent preference to produce 
working solutions instead of spending time documenting them; in contradiction to this goal, the 
documentation of the solutions is a key deliverable in the field of security. Scrum will continue 
to be used by both organizations, and as the team’s experience grows, we expect also the cost of 
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the secure systems development to drop, while their quality and security gets better. Based on the 
experiences gained in this case, Scrum has shown the potential to be suitable for security-oriented 
development work. With certain additions and modifications, it can be used to provide the security 
assurance required by the regulators in the ICT and software industry. Especially when applied by an 
organization capable to adjust itself to fully utilize the flexibility of incremental agile frameworks, 
instead of partially reverting back to sequential mode of operations. We are yet to observe a pure agile 
project where security standards are in a central role: truly integrating security engineering processes 
and security assurance activities without losing the agile values and benefits gained by the use of 
those methods is still a work in progress.
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Abstract
Context: The aim of software security engineering is to define, implement and verify information security for software
products. This is achieved by introducing security engineering elements into the software development process, generally
by following a software security development life cycle model, or a security maturity model. Agile software development
methods, dominant in the software industry, are conflicting with some of the security engineering practices, and the
regulatory security requirements.
Objective: To empirically verify the usage and impact of software security engineering and accompanying agile software
development practices, currently utilized in industry software development projects.
Method: A survey (N=62) was performed among software and security engineering practitioners, regarding their usage
of 40 common security engineering practices in accordance with agile software development activities, processes and
artifacts. For the used security practices, the perceived security impact was asked. The results are reported using an
analytic framework drawn from extant literature, and research suggestions are provided.
Results: Use of agile software development has an effect on the selection of security engineering practices. The perceived
impact of the security practices was lower than the rate of usage would imply, suggesting a selection bias caused by
either peculiarities in the security engineering practices, or difficulties in applying the security engineering practices into
the iterative software development work flow.
Conclusions: Security engineering in software development mostly conforms with agile practices. Agile usage correlates
with usage of security engineering: when the use of activities categorized as security engineering practices increases, the
use of agile practices is also more systematic. The use of security engineering is concentrated in implementation phase.
Results show a discrepancy between the usage and perceived security impact of the activities, indicating a need for better
integration of security engineering methods and tools into the processes and toolchains in software development.
Keywords: survey, security engineering, agile software development, software security, security standards, security
assurance
1. Introduction
Software security in software development is imple-
mented by utilizing security engineering activities and pro-
cesses [72, 39, 2]. These security practices are performed
in conjunction with the software development processes,
presumably by following a security development life cycle
or a thoroughly-implemented security maturity model. In
agile software development, currently predominant in the
software industry, the development processes are not al-
ways predetermined, nor are they necessarily predictable
at the start of the project. This premise renders prescrip-
tive security models less applicable, and potentially even
detrimental to the software development process, setting
constraints to the flexibility gained through the use of agile
methods and principles [cf. 61, 68, 51].
Security is recognized to be an essential characteristic
of “good” functional software. It is also increasingly a
regulatory requirement. As a result, security engineer-
ing – traditionally thought to be mainly a maintenance
concern – is increasingly integrated directly to software
development. Software security aims to production of se-
cure software products, with less security flaws and prefer-
ably more security-enhancing features. It also concerns
the production of development-time security assurance for
various stakeholders – customers, regulators, the manage-
ment, and security auditors. Software security engineer-
ing techniques have much in common with software quality
improvement efforts, and share many principles with those
aiming for software safety.
Security incidents and threats are a significant factor in
determining the cost of creating and maintaining a soft-
ware product, throughout its lifetime [42]. Security of a
software product is typically implemented by a progression
of security-related activities: setting security objectives,
eliciting security requirements, creating a security archi-
tecture and design, implementing the security features,
and finally verifying the implementation. Rudimentary
security assurance consists of various security-related doc-
uments, such as security architecture and technical docu-
mentation, and, for example, implementation of a security
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logging system. Regulation and extensive security require-
ments may call for additional security assurance. This
comes in form of formal security reviews, penetration test
and other security testing reports, and security audits [see
e.g. 27].
In order to produce software that not only complies with
security regulations, but also provides effective security so-
lutions and mitigates the security risks, software security
engineering builds the security directly into the software.
On the other hand, software development organizations
are under strict budgeting and scheduling restraints, re-
sulting in a high demand for increased efficiency and ef-
ficacy. To date, it is not known how software develop-
ment organizations achieve this in general: case reports
typically involve rather specific security needs calling for
special measures, which in themselves may be interesting,
but less useful outside that specific context. This survey
was set up to find out how state of the art software devel-
opment and security engineering methods are applied in
the industry. The survey concentrates on the individual
activities used in agile software development and software
security engineering, extruded by common security devel-
opment life cycle and maturity models. To provide context
for the security engineering activities, also the prevalent
agile practices from the most used software development
methodologies were surveyed.
This article reports the results of an industry survey, in
which the usage of 40 common software security practices
was surveyed in combination of 12 agile practices. The
research target was to establish how security engineering
is implemented in agile software development processes,
and to find out how the various security and software en-
gineering practices are interrelated. To gauge the effect
of the security practices, also their perceived impact was
asked. The survey was conducted among selected employ-
ees of 303 software development companies in Finland, in
the end of 2017 and in the beginning of 2018. The re-
spondents were software development practitioners profi-
cient with security engineering. This is reflected by the
reported requirement for compliance with formal security
regulations in 40% of the respondents’ projects, and with
67% performing software development under specific secu-
rity guidelines.
The results reveal the specific security practices in the
industry and their security impact. The software industry
has adopted the agile practices thoroughly, and security-
intensive software development is not an exception: the re-
sults implicate that security engineering practices largely
conform, and are used in concert, with the agile practices.
Agile usage correlates with usage of security engineering:
the use of security engineering practices increases the use
of agile practices. However, the perceived security im-
pact of these activities does not correlate with their level
of use, and especially regulation-driven activities are seen
as an inefficient security measure. The software security
development life cycle models in general are largely cus-
tomized, with several suggested security practices being
abandoned. In industry context, the selection of security
engineering practices appears to be made based on their
suitability and compatibility with the prevalent software
development practices.
The next chapter provides theoretical background and
motivation for the survey. Research methods and the re-
search questions, and the design and structure of the sur-
vey, and description how it was conducted are presented
in Chapter 3. The survey’s results are presented in Chap-
ter 4, and the results are discussed and the conclusions
presented in Chapter 5, with practical and research impli-
cations, and considerations for future research.
2. Background
2.1. Software security engineering
The purpose of software security engineering is to miti-
gate security threats to the software and data assets [39, 2].
The goal of ensuring availability, integrity and confiden-
tiality for authorized users involves a scheme of security
policies, which are implemented into software security fea-
tures during software development, and producing the re-
quired security assurance. As a means to increase soft-
ware dependability, software security engineering aims to
guarantee the correctness of software, computer networks,
and computer systems in adverse situations. The core
issues software security engineering is set to resolve are
well-known – and recurring – issues in software implemen-
tation and design [66], and typically addressed by “check
lists” [45, 55, 26]. Software security engineering provides
means to systematically address these security issues in
software development.
In formal security management models, security in soft-
ware is achieved by defining and implementing security
controls, enforcing predefined security policies. Policies, in
turn, are derived from the organizational, normative and
technological context in which the software is developed
and, eventually operated. Software security engineering
is part of larger security engineering scheme, and is used
to ensure the necessary security mechanisms are in place
within the software itself, and not as an afterthought, de-
tached from the asset it is supposed to protect [2].
Software dependability is achieved through such means
as fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, and
fault forecasting [3]. Various software errors, whether
caused by accident or malice, are a generic example of
dependability threats. From the dependability aspect, se-
curity engineering also increases fault tolerance by aiming
to prevent errors, both intentional and accidental, and by
providing additional mechanisms to recover from errors in
a controlled manner. In software development, the errors
can be caused by faulty requirements, caused by design
flaws, or be introduced in the implementation phase as
software bugs. If these latent or dormant security errors
are not detected during the development time, these may
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later expose software weaknesses that may lead to vulner-
abilities, which in turn may be exploited during the actual
operation of the software.
Software security engineering is targeted to elements
within the software system boundary, and the interfaces
between the software and its environment and its users:
humans, or other systems. In the software life cycle,
it takes place during the software development life cycle
phase, containing processes linked to other phases [cf. 1].
In information security, the assumed stance is generally
reactive: software security engineering, on the other hand,
aims to proactively mitigate the security risk by reducing
the threats to a software system’s security. Common char-
acteristic of security faults, such as implementation bugs
introduced during development, is their persistence, re-
quiring constant maintenance activities. Eliminating such
faults already in development requires significantly less re-
sources than later in the life cycle [49]. In contrast, errors
in hardware, user errors, and other faults in the operating
environment are of a more transient nature and mitigated
by means independent of the protected system assets [25].
Systemic security assurance is the means to provide
proof of the implementation and existence of security. It
mainly consists of documentation of the technical security
features and security architecture, and the procedural se-
curity instructions. In addition, a number of security ver-
ification techniques may be used. These techniques, such
as various forms of security testing, security reviews and
security audits, seek to detect these flaws and errors, and
to accumulate the required level of assurance. Security as-
surance requirements may be normative or organizational,
form the proof of existence and functionality of the se-
curity controls used to enforce security policies. In the
technical context, security assurance can also be utilized
e.g. for security metrics and monitoring, as well as for
incident detection and security forensics.
Security assurance has a significant role in security reg-
ulation. Historically, the primary goal of software security,
in the context of software development, has been to pro-
vide the regulator or the procurer – such as a bank, a
branch of government, or a military organization – suffi-
cient proof of security [76, 77]. In addition to the reviews
and verification, the security policies at higher security
levels may include security audits, performed by exter-
nal auditors, regarding the processes, tools and personnel
involved in software development. The security proof is
not restricted only to the technical software, but also to
processes and personnel for protection against “malicious
insiders”. The Secure Software Engineering Capability
Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) [29], an ISO/IEC standard,
claims to contain the best practices in security engineering,
aiming to formalize the security work into an exhaustive
set of security processes. This standard defines 129 secu-
rity processes in 22 process areas, 11 of which directly con-
cern software development activities. The other 11 process
areas are organizational and management processes.
To make the investment in software security more feasi-
ble for software development organizations, other less de-
manding maturity models have been developed. An ex-
ample of such is the openly available Software Assurance
Maturity Model (SAMM) [46], claiming to be “agile ag-
nostic”. Complimented with a diverse set of open-source
tools also provided by the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP), the SAMM offers a security framework
for organizations seeking to improve their security, but not
formally required to comply with SSE-CMM’s maturity
levels. Developers and organizations are encouraged to
tailor their own processes and perform only the necessary
security improvements. The design and implementation
of secure software is guided by industry best practices,
published in the form of security checklists, and “don’t
do”-lists [45, 55, 26].
A multitude of national and domain-specific security
regulation guides the security work [21, 49]. In Fin-
land, where the survey was performed, a comprehensive
set of information security instructions has been issued by
the Government Information Security Management Board
(Finnish abbreviation: VAHTI [69]). These instructions
are de facto regulatory security requirements when work-
ing with the government information systems. The in-
structions include a three-level maturity model for secu-
rity in software development [70]. This specification also
contains a Software Security Life Cycle (SSDLC) model,
and was used as one of the sources for security practices
in the design of this survey.
Created explicitly to improve the security of software
products, SSDLC models offer concrete security activi-
ties directly in contact with the software development
processes. This model of security improvement, signifi-
cantly simplified from the maturity models, stems from
the work performed at Microsoft to improve the security
of the Windows operating system. This led to the pub-
lication of Microsoft SDL [72]. The life cycle approach
was further refined, resulting in the Touchpoints for Soft-
ware Security, with elaborate discussion and instructions
for applying them in a software development organiza-
tion [39]. This model also forms the development life cy-
cle model included in the Building Security In Maturity
Model (BSIMM). Microsoft later made an effort to adopt
the SDL for agile development, although in a very rudi-
mentary manner [24, 40]. The SAMM and also SSE-CMM
contain elements that can be used to constitute an SS-
DLC. In ISO/IEC standardization, software security is for-
malized in the Common Criteria [28], which also includes
elements of an SSDLC. All of these were sources for the
VAHTI specification, and were used as sources from which
the activities were selected for this survey. These security
life cycle models are the main source for security engineer-
ing practices in this study.
2.2. Related work
In software development, agile methodologies promote
and provide the ideals of flexibility and freedom [7, 58],
an approach inherently different to the ones promoted by
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the maturity models, predating the agile methods. Even
though the agile ideals were initially criticized due to their
perceived contradictions with the older process-oriented
approaches [67, 43], agile principles have been successfully
adopted also to the regulated areas of the software in-
dustry, with extensive safety and security requirements.
The iterative methods also contain inherent mechanisms
for continual performance and quality improvement, and
agile principles build upon – and simplify – that tradi-
tion [see 60]. Agile development has enabled new continu-
ous delivery models, such as DevOps, which considerably
shorten the maintenance cycles and, in security work, the
delivery of security improvements. However, in regulated
environments, DevOps has also some definite challenges,
reflecting the challenges of introducing agile practices and
organizations [34]. Outside the case studies of singular or-
ganizations or projects, very little empiric research exists
on how security engineering has been adapted to the agile
software development, or vice versa.
As agile methods gained popularity, applying security
engineering methods and models into agile software devel-
opment was seen challenging [73, 15]. Even recent em-
piric research indicates troubles in the adoption of ag-
ile methods in security-intensive contexts, indicating or-
ganizational or technical difficulties [68]. The ideals of
a lightweight organization, non-deterministic execution of
development actions, and the unpredictable trajectory of
development and related processes, create a contradiction
with the basic premises of the more deterministic security
development models. As an offshoot of the security engi-
neering tradition, even many of the security practises in
the SSDLCs are inherently difficult to integrate into agile
work flow. Furthermore, security regulation may impose
requirements also for the development process, such as for-
mal process audits, or compel the use of a maturity model
either formally or semi-formally. A fundamental mismatch
between formal security engineering and software develop-
ment has promoted many attempts to combine CMM with
agile processes [59, 61]. Agile processes can even be ben-
eficial for reaching formal maturity levels, with examples
of even CMM level 5 – the highest – adapted, while still
retaining at least some agile characteristics in the soft-
ware development process. However, applying a high-level
CMM in an agile organization is characterized by heavy
customization of the typical agile processes: the goal is to
augment the processes with various “non-agile” elements
while, still attempting to preserve the core agile princi-
ples and values. This combination is not easy to achieve:
rigid and formal processes and protocols will cause over-
head and organizational micromanagement, significantly
reducing the velocity of development work.
The challenges being well known, aspects of software se-
curity engineering in the agile context have been examined
in a body of previous work. Early contributions for agile
software security engineering were mainly theoretical con-
cepts how to perform and manage agile software security
engineering. Examples of such research were suggestions
for security architectures in agile development Chivers
et al. [13], Ge et al. [18], as architecture work is deemed
one of agile methods’ weak points [9, 60]. Similarly, sug-
gestions for producing security assurance using Extreme
Programming (XP) were made by Beznosov and Kruchten
[11], also providing outlines for providing assurance at vari-
ous phases of security development life cycle: requirement,
design, and implementation assurance, including the use
of security testing. Use of misuse cases, one of the security
engineering activities included in this survey, was reported
by Kongsli [33]. Tondel et al. [65] performed a review of
security requirement elicitation. In support of continuous
delivery, Ben-Othmane et al. [10] focused on finding and
acceptable a level of continuous software security using
agile methods.
A major research challenge centers around the issue of
how to integrate the security engineering practises, ma-
turity models, and activities required to comply with re-
lated standards into the flexible agile work flow [50]. The
main objective is not to maintain ‘agility’ as such, but to
produce as secure software as necessary, as efficiently as
possible. The quality-improving mechanisms in agile de-
velopment – iterative work, retrospectives, constant refac-
toring and continuous integration – work towards both of
these goals when producing secure software[6]. Also the
software security life cycles in agile context have been a
frequent subject in software security research [4, 12, 5].
General challenges in adaptation of security engineering
into agile development have been identified [20], prompt-
ing further research in the subject. An effort regarding
the utilization of software security engineering was focus-
ing on the relationship between security engineering usage
and security education [47].
Also some related surveys have been performed. Survey
by Licorish et al. [35] provided information about the rela-
tionship of technical debt management and agile practices.
Producing secure software requires high software quality,
and the technical debt management and other quality im-
provement techniques share many characteristics with se-
curity improvement. Notably, the agile software develop-
ment practices selected to that survey are directly com-
parable to the ones in this security survey. In Finland,
a survey concentrating on agile and lean usage was con-
ducted by Rodr´ıguez et al. [54], focusing on agile method
usage. Both of these surveys had a specific focus on ag-
ile software engineering, although neither of these studies
touched the subject of software security. In another related
survey in Finland, Savola [56] concentrates on information
security skills; this governmental survey describes the se-
curity education background and skill gaps in information
security work. In that study, the overall security skill level
was deemed adequate, but lack of work force sufficiently
skilled in security was reported a problem by 60% of the
companies, prompting an increase in security education.
Training and security awareness has been found to have a
direct positive effect to the use of security practises [42].
The Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)
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contains an annual industry survey (for the last survey
see [63]). Reporting in BSIMM is limited to usage frequen-
cies, and the respondents are mostly in executive position.
The reported fact that all the companies participating in
the BSIMM survey have an established software security
group provides a homogeneous set of respondents, possi-
bly suggesting a sampling frame bias. Focusing on com-
panies with notable security investments may also cause
bias in selection of security practices. These include ex-
cessive usage of activities required to pass formal secu-
rity audits not only for the software product, but also for
the development organization – a rare requirement even
in security-intensive software development. BSIMM also
makes a claim not to be prescriptive, yet it contains clear
recommendations for software security engineering in the
form of 12 core activities “everybody” does. These 12 ac-
tivities were among the 40 software security engineering
activities selected for this survey, with distinctly different
reported usage compared to the BSIMM results [53].
Apart from a small web survey (N=46) concerning the
general adoption of security life cycle usage conducted in
2010 [19], no surveys about industry use of the security
engineering practices in software development are known.
The survey reported in this article fills this gap in research.
3. Research design
Research described herein executes a survey on a tar-
get population of software engineers, software security
specialists and other direct participants of the software
development processes. The survey measures and corre-
lates perceived use and impact of established security en-
gineering activities and agile software engineering activi-
ties. Targeted population is characterized via sections of
the survey prompting respondents’ personal (experience,
education, role, amount of applicable software develop-
ment projects, and specific security training acquired) and
organizational (company size, application area and possi-
ble regulations applied in projects-under-delivery) back-
grounds [see 75, 48].
On a higher abstraction level, in addition to activities
taken during the software development process, the re-
spondents were asked to name the agile methodology they
have used, if any, and also any security regulation or guide-
line they have been following. This provided contrast, and
further reassurance, for the queried activity-specific an-
swers. For ethical reasons, the respondents could opt out
from answering the background questions.
3.1. Research questions
The objective of the authors’ research undertaking was
to understand the relationship between software engineer-
ing and security engineering practices, and their reciprocal
impact. Three research questions were specified to reach
the objective:
RQ1: How is security engineering implemented in soft-
ware development?
Security in software development consists of security en-
gineering activities. These activities work towards improv-
ing the security of the software product by directly ad-
dressing security-related issues (e.g. vulnerabilities) and
enforcing security policies. Security policies include the
direct security mechanisms, such as authentication and
encryption, and the means to provide security assurance,
such as logging and various types of security documenta-
tion.
Hence, security engineering in software development
must be implemented by executing the specific security
engineering activities at suitable parts of the software de-
velopment life-cycle. A baseline for security engineering in
contemporary software development is pursued by posing
RQ1.
The question is addressed by selecting 40 software devel-
opment security practices from ISO/IEC Common Crite-
ria, Microsoft SDL, BSIMM and VAHTI. The practices are
divided into five groups which represent the various phases
in the selected security development life cycle models. For
each group, a set of questions in the survey query how
systematically the practices are used.
RQ2: What is the perceived impact of software security
activities with respect to their (level of systematic)
use?
Having established how security engineering is executed
as part of contemporary software development in RQ1, we
must establish if the execution actually meets the goal of
increasing security. Hence, RQ2 prompts the perceived
impact for the exercised software security activities. Fur-
ther, the question must also be sensitive to the level of the
security activities’ systematic use, as this impacts attained
level of security. To further motivate RQ2, software secu-
rity consists of several types of activities, but a software
project typically cannot incorporate all of them. Finding
the most effective security activities is crucial to producing
secure software in a cost effective manner.
This question is addressed by further prompting the per-
ceived security impact on top of the level of systematic use
for the pre-established 40 software development security
practices. The survey is constructed in a manner which
allows the respondents to only be prompted the impact
for those activities they have previously indicated some
level of use as part of their contemporary work.
RQ3: Does usage of agile practices and security engineer-
ing activities correlate?
As previously discussed (see Section 1) the iterative and
incremental agile software development is an ill-match to
many security engineering models that require a level of
up-front design; possibly diminishing agility. However, ag-
ile software development is deemed an effective way to pro-
duce software even in demanding environments, it enjoys a
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high global adoption rate according to latest surveys, and
as such agile development projects constantly have to re-
spond to heightened security demands. As RQ1 and RQ2
establish the state of security engineering in contemporary
software development, RQ3 adds to this by exploring pos-
sible correlations between reported level of systematic use
of agile software development activities and the security
engineering practices.
Further, finding dependencies or correspondences be-
tween software development and security engineering prac-
tices allows the design of efficient and flexible processes to
develop secure software; adding to RQ2’s efficiency con-
siderations. Addressing RQ3 also clarifies any differences
between software development processes with and with-
out security elements. This is an important catering as
software development processes are quite well-researched
whereas research on software security development prac-
tice remains scarce.
This question is addressed by directly asking the re-
spondents for the perceived level of systematic use and
development effect for each agile activity, and comparing
the attained result with activities found in the analysis of
RQ2.
3.2. Survey design
The survey was designed to provide directly quantifiable
data on the research questions [31]. All questions related
to the research questions were answered on a 5-step Lik-
ert scale. In certain questions there was also an option
to elaborate on the answers using a free text field. To
make the answers more commensurable, the respondents’
professional background, some company details, and the
application area were also inquired. To broaden the knowl-
edge gained through the survey, also some company details
and existence of any security certifications were asked. To
gain the necessary knowledge about the agile and security
practices, the respondents were asked to concentrate on
the last project containing both of these elements.
The design of the survey is presented in Figure 1.
The survey consisted of three main sections. To main-
tain objectivity in a quantitative survey, some information
was gathered about the respondents (overall experience,
role, experience with agile security development projects).
Organizational information consisted of organization size,
the security certifications obtained by the organization,
and the application area or the respondent’s latest project
with security constraints. The main part of the survey con-
sisted two questions about agile practices, processes and
artifacts, and of security engineering activities divided into
five security development life cycle phases. For each se-
curity engineering activity the respondent had used, also
their opinion about the effectiveness of the activity was
asked.
The design was considered sufficiently accurate from the
technical point of view, with anticipation of a potentially
detrimental effect to response rate, caused by its length
and specific focus on software security. These concerns
were tested with a 20-person pilot group, resulting in one
explicit concern about the length of the study. Based on
the feedback, some corrections to the wording of the ques-
tions were made. The structure and overall design of the
survey remained unchanged. The answers of the industry
practitioners belonging to the pilot group were considered
fit to be included in the final results. Before submitting
the invitations, the survey design was assessed from the
viewpoints of its validity, reliability, applicability, consis-
tency and neutrality [see 62].
3.3. Scales
The agile and security engineering practices were sur-
veyed using the following five-fold Likert scale:
5. Systematically used throughout the projects
4. Mostly used throughout the projects
3. Sometimes used during the projects
2. Rarely used during the projects
1. Activity was not used
This scale was selected based on a premise that the de-
velopment process is not fixed in agile software develop-
ment. Therefore, the value five is phrased with the word
“systematically’ rather than with the word ‘always’. Oth-
erwise the scale was designed to be comparable to the ones
used in existing surveys (notably Synopsys Software In-
tegrity Group [63]). The same scale was used in the ques-
tionnaire for all security engineering activities.
The questions regarding the impact of security engineer-
ing activities were designed to provide data on the activ-
ities the respondent had used. As the questionnaire was
conducted online, the design allowed certain dynamics to
be introduced. To keep the questionnaire as short as pos-
sible and to save the respondents from unnecessary rep-
etition, these questions were hidden by default. As the
respondent reported activity usage above 1 (Activity was
not used), the question for the impact of this activity was
made available. The scale for these questions was a slightly
altered 5-point Likert scale:
5. Very high
4. High
3. Moderate
2. Low
1. Very low
The options for evaluation were chosen based on the
selection of the sample. The respondents were consid-
ered to be practicing software professionals, and only a
small proportion of the 40 security practices would be
used by a given respondent. The answering process was
streamlined by hiding the unused activities, and simplify-
ing the answering process by limiting the options to only
positive values. The selection of security practices was
based on established industry practices, not a hypotheti-
cal framework. The underlying assumption was that the
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Figure 1: Survey design flow chart with connected research objectives.
non-effective practices, or the practices having an adverse
affect to security, would not be used in the industry con-
text.
3.4. Selection of processes, activities, and artifacts
The agile activities, processes and artifacts are the ba-
sic elements from Extreme Programming (XP) and Scrum.
These were further augmented with more general organi-
zational work practices and processes that are typical to
agile software development. Many of these stem directly
from the classical Agile Manifesto [8]. More importantly,
the sixteen agile work practices are exactly the same as
the ones used in a recent study on technical debt [23],
sans retrospectives that were omitted. Examples include
test-driven development, refactoring, continuous integra-
tion, iteration backlog, and rest of the usual suspects.
Security activities were selected from four main sources:
(a) the Microsoft SDL model (12 activities), (b) the
BSIMM surveys (12 activities), (c) the Common Criteria
(ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009), and (d) the Finnish governmen-
tal security framework VAHTI. In addition, three activi-
ties were identified from previous research [see 51]. The
distribution of these activities is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Security practices in each SSDLC phase
Phase Practices
Requirement 7
Design 7
Implementation 8
Verification 9
Releases 7
There is a considerable overlap in the practices in the
life cycle models used as source. The Common Criteria
is the oldest source in the selection. VAHTI, the most
recent work, consists only of activities defined in the ear-
lier models, and does introduce any of its own. Security
practices selected from VAHTI represent the “basic” level,
the lowest acceptable by the standards of the Finnish gov-
ernment. VAHTI remains a recommendation, not an au-
dited standard; the auditing is performed by applying the
national Information Security Audit Tool for Authorities,
KATAKRI 2015 [30].
As the context of the survey were Finnish software prac-
titioners, the naming of the security activities was, in
cases when modificated, following the VAHTI nomencla-
ture. Not all of the associated terms are rigorously defined
even in existing research [64]. Nevertheless, the descriptive
names for the activities should be understandable to the
audience targeted in the survey. To further increase the
familiarity among the respondents, the descriptive names
were formulated to conform with the Microsoft’s SDL and
the annual BSIMM surveys.
3.5. Survey implementation
The survey was conducted as an invitation-based online
survey. There were two types of invitation: a public web
link and targeted links for personal e-mail invitations. The
invitees were collected by three methods:
1. A public invitation to the survey was sent to a mailing
list containing contact persons of 340 Finnish software
companies.
2. A subset of this list containing the web addresses of
303 of these companies was composed; the companies’
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web pages were then accessed and further public e-
mail addresses were extracted from the contents of
these pages.
3. A further subset of 69 companies from the list of
303 companies were targeted by searching the corre-
sponding employees from LinkedIn, resulting in total
of 1,436 targeted e-mail invitations.
This multi-stage approach was selected for several rea-
sons. First, the initial public invitation was sent as a
part of the Finnish Software Entrepreneurs Association’s
monthly news letter. This news letter was targeted mainly
to the Chief Executive and Information Officers of software
companies, who were asked to forward the questionnaire
to their employees – not considered the best approach to
reach the targeted audience of security and software spe-
cialists, but considered important to promote the topic
and gain acceptance for the potential use of work time to
answer the question. At the time, the association had ap-
proximately 340 member companies receiving the newslet-
ter. Additionally, the newsletter was sent during holiday
season following a premeditated schedule which could not
be affected. The public invitations (method 1) were con-
sidered potentially ineffective, and the manual invitations
were sent to targeted persons (method 2). The manual
process was further refined by involving the use of LinkedIn
search (method 3). The idea was to spread the question-
naire to as many persons in the targeted audience as pos-
sible. The targeted invitations were sent within a time
frame of two weeks to ensure uniformity of the answers.
This two-week period was added to the time the survey
was kept open.
A similar use case of social media was described by Mid-
dleton [41]. The people search in LinkedIn service was
performed using the company name as their current em-
ployer. The e-mail addresses were composed in three prin-
cipal steps:
1. The company’s website explicitly stated their e-mail
addresses were in the form ‘name@domain’ or ‘first-
name.lastname@domain’.
2. The search result contained the person’s full name.
3. The person’s job title did not clearly indicate they
do not work in the field of software projects: this
excluded non-technical executives, finance, human re-
lations, and sales and support personnel.
Using methods 2 and 3, the survey link was sent to 1,436
e-mail addresses. The survey service did not provide re-
ports of failed deliveries, so the actual coverage cannot be
reliably known.
The survey remained open for a period of six weeks, with
a reminder message sent to the targeted respondents after
three weeks. A public reminder was not sent, as the timing
of the next monthly newsletter was deemed too late. When
a targeted questionnaire was answered, the targeted link
closed by the survey service and could not be reused, a
mechanism promoting the reliability of the results.
3.6. Response rate
The survey link was opened 546 times, and 114 re-
sponses were given giving a response rate of 21% of this
total. Altogether, 63 respondents finished the survey; 48
of these answered after the initial call, and 15 after a re-
minder sent to those not yet responded three weeks after
the initial round. The survey was open for a 6-week pe-
riod from December 2017 to January 2018; an extended
period was seen necessary to compensate for the holiday
season, as the invitations were sent to the respondent’s
work e-mail addresses, and potentially not reached their
targets for several weeks. This tactic was validated by the
increase of 31% in responses after the post-holiday season
reminder message. One single case of vandalization was
removed from the result set, producing a total of 62 viable
responses with all questions answered.
4. Results
In this chapter, the results from the survey are presented
against the research questions framed in Chapter 3. First
subchapter presents the respondents’ background and or-
ganization, and the following three provide an analysis of
the results, based on the three research questions respec-
tively.
4.1. Background
4.1.1. Experience, education, and organizations
The respondents are generally well-educated and highly
experienced in software engineering. Only about five per-
cent reported no experience in software development – and
as much as 77% reported six or more years. Roughly about
a half of the respondents have a master’s degree, a little
below one third have a bachelor’s degree, and about fifteen
percent have been trained at the highest doctoral level.
The respondents work in diverse organizations. About
39% worked in organizations with less than fifty employees
and about 35% in organizations with more than 250 em-
ployees. This range presumably reflects the current struc-
ture of the Finnish software industry. The same applies to
the type of software produced. Most (69%) of the respon-
dents are developing web and cloud applications. The rest
are mostly working with desktop and client-server applica-
tions, embedded software, and mobile applications. A few
specialized domains are also represented, including video
games, smart cards, and consulting.
4.1.2. Agile development
The primary targets of the survey were full-time em-
ployees involved in technical software development roles.
According to the breakdown in Table 2, this targeting suc-
ceeded well: software developers account for about forty
percent of all respondents. By also taking the relatively
high educational levels and long work experiences into ac-
count, the sample can be considered well-representing for
empirically evaluating the three research questions – after
8
all, the security engineering activities surveyed are fairly
technical in their nature.
Table 2: Project roles
Role Share (%)
Developer 40
Architect 22
Project manager 10
Executive 8
No projects 5
Security specialist 3
Product owner 2
Team leader 1
Table 3: Development methodologies
Methodology Share (%)
Scrum 30
Scrum-Kanban 28
Custom agile 17
Kanban 14
Other 3
Do not know 5
No answer 3
The respondents were also queried about the particu-
lar agile methodologies used in the security-constrained
projects they work with. The predefined list of method-
ologies provided to the respondents was assembled based
on a recent industry survey [71]. The results summarized
in Table 3 show no surprises: Scrum and its variants are
currently the most popular agile methodologies in Finland.
In contrast to other surveys [35, 71], none of the respon-
dents reported working with XP or some variants of it.
While these details about agile methodologies are inter-
esting on their own rights, the bottom line is that only a
negligible amount of the respondents appear to be working
with some non-agile software development methodologies.
Insofar as the scope is restricted to Finland, it is safe to
say that agile software development is almost universally
used today. The point is particularly important for the
survey at hand: there exists no widely used polar opposite
for empirical comparisons. In practice, software security
engineering is mostly carried out in agile software devel-
opment settings just like software development in general.
But while practically all of the respondents are working
with agile projects, there is still some variance in terms
of the actual agile work practices. To query such prac-
tices, the respondents were asked to evaluate the use of
sixteen different agile practices on a similar five-fold Lik-
ert scale used for the security activities (see Section 3.4).
When compared to an earlier survey [35], the adoption
rates of these activities appear almost consistently higher.
Inherently agile items are prominently used. The exam-
ples include product and iteration backlogs, refactoring,
iterations, iteration planning, and continuous integration.
More generic ones – such as coding standards and open
office space – are also very popular. On the side of less
frequently used practices are daily meetings, collective
code ownership, 40-hour week, simple design, pair pro-
gramming, on-site customer, and test-driven development.
That said, even these less frequent activities are still used
in the majority of the respondents’ projects.
4.1.3. Standards, regulations, and constraints
A fundamental pillar of agile software development is the
explicit involvement of customers throughout the software
development processes. According to Table 4, this pillar
manifests itself also in the typical security constraints im-
posed upon the software projects surveyed. In other words,
many of the projects have constraints that are context-
specific and related to customers’ particular security re-
quirements. While another survey would be required to
evaluate whether customers are using formal standards for
their requirements, it seems that the use of formal stan-
dards is generally limited at least on the development side.
A large amount of the security constraints are also defined
by the software development organizations themselves.
Table 4: Standards, regulations, and security constraints
Standard, regulation, or constraint Share (%)
Customer’s self-designed constraints 29
Self-designed constraints 29
VAHTI 10
ISO 27000 series 9
KATAKRI 7
Others 6
ISO 15408 (Common Criteria) 4
RFC 2196 (Site Security Handbook) 4
None 2
These are important points because a fundamental prob-
lem with formal security standards, such as the Common
Criteria, is the omission of business processes that should
arguably drive the whole security engineering [2]. In this
sense, agile practices can patch the limitations of secu-
rity standards and checklist-style guidelines. Nevertheless,
also standards and regulative frameworks are used albeit
less frequently than self-designed security constraints. It
is also important to emphasize that no single standard or
framework is used exclusively, and national frameworks
are slightly more common compared to international ones.
The point about national frameworks is particularly note-
worthy because much of the existing research has focused
on international standards and guidelines used by large
multinational companies. Another point is that national
frameworks and regulations presumably continue to fur-
ther intensify the already pronounced proliferation trend
impairing security standards, frameworks, and guidelines.
Finally, the survey questionnaire contained also a spe-
cific question about whether the respondents’ organiza-
tions had at some point obtained at least one security cer-
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tificate through a formal auditing process. Only 18% of the
respondents answered positively to this question. While
this observation is partially explained by the sample’s im-
balance toward web development and cloud applications,
it also tells about the generally limited use of formal audit-
ing in the current software industry. In fact, the eighteen
percents can be actually interpreted as a quite large value.
4.2. Security engineering in software development (RQ1)
The primary research question about the use of secu-
rity engineering activities is best answered by framing the
activities with the five distinct life cycle phases: require-
ments, design, implementation, verification, and release
phases. The following presentation proceeds accordingly.
4.2.1. Requirements phase
Security requirements engineering is essential to security
engineering. The use of activities related to requirements
is also among the highest in this survey. According to
the results summarized in Fig. 2, the most frequently used
activities in this phase are concentrated on the business
value side of the requirements elicitation process.
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Figure 2: Security engineering activities at requirements phase
The most used security engineering techniques during
this phase are simple processes: eliciting security require-
ments, defining the goal and criticality, and performing
business and risk analyses. All are fundamental elements
for software security. These activities also produce results
that translate directly into the efficiency of software devel-
opment and the economic value of the software produced.
Of the security artifacts, security architectures appear to
be only sometimes produced and reviewed. This observa-
tion is a small surprise because security architectures are
specifically emphasized in the Common Criteria’s security
assurance requirements. Accordingly, security architecture
should be the first strictly security-related assurance doc-
ument to be produced during software development.
There are also a few other surprises. Data classifica-
tion schemes and creation of quality gates are the least
used; these activities were never used by 35% and 42%
of the respondents, respectively. These observations differ
from the BSIMM’s annual surveys. For instance, creat-
ing data classification schemes is one of BSIMM’s twelve
core activities which, according to BSIMM, “everybody
does” [63]. The explanation for this diverging result may
be simple, however. According to the free-form comments
about the survey’s design, some respondents commented
that data classification schemes are nowadays typically
created through use cases. Although use cases may be
problematic in the security and safety contexts [22], these
are still a highly typical characteristic of agile software de-
velopment and may thus explain the results. The preva-
lence of agile development may also explain the limited
use of quality gates – an activity suggested by the Mi-
crosoft SDL. In a sense, these can be seen as antitheses of
agile software development; the enforcement of additional
policies may constrain the ideals of flexibility and freedom
endorsed in agile development. Furthermore, it is notewor-
thy that compliance constraints are not widely translated
into requirements. A potential explanation may relate to
the relatively infrequent use of formal standards and reg-
ulations (see Table 4). Because self-designed constraints
are commonly used by the respondents sampled, it may be
that many of the common compliance questions have been
translated into unified requirements shared in all projects
of a given development organization.
4.2.2. Design phase
The design phase refers to the work required to translate
requirements and abstract architectures into plans for con-
crete software features and functionality. In other words,
the technical context of the software produced is clarified
and aligned with the results from the requirements elic-
itation phase. This alignment involves the updating of
the risk analysis with technical risk definitions and miti-
gation plans. The general software architecture is typically
also designed during this phase. By implication, the de-
sign phase is often seen as particularly crucial for security
engineering [21, 49]. In terms of concrete security engi-
neering activities, this phase involves threat modeling and
attack surface recognition, among the other related tasks.
When agile software development is used, many of these
activities are carried out using security stories and misuse
cases [37, 38, 57]. Like in conventional agile development,
these activities are used to create security-related tasks
to a project’s iteration backlog. Given this general back-
ground, the design phase activities are depicted in Fig. 3.
Application security configurations, design require-
ments, and guidelines for the software architecture and
application development are the most frequently used se-
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Figure 3: Security engineering activities at design phase
curity design activities. Also abuse and misuse cases are
rather frequently used. As these are similar to activities
performed in most agile software development projects in
general, it seems that adding a security flavor to these
common activities is not difficult. In contrast, security
settings, threat modeling, and attack surface analysis are
explicitly related to security engineering. These are also
rather infrequently used according to the results. For in-
stance, almost one third of the respondents had never used
threat modeling – even though it is promoted by practi-
cally all development life cycle models. There may be also
a certain causal logic behind the results. When threat
modeling is not done, attack surfaces are not known, for
instance. A further examination also reveals that threat
modeling was seldom used by those respondents who rarely
defined security configurations.
4.2.3. Implementation phase
When an agile software development project enters into
the implementation phase, the developers working with
the project pick up allocated tasks from the project’s iter-
ation backlog. Contemporary software development is typ-
ically highly automated. Various tools are used to develop,
debug, test, and commit the produced software code and
configurations into a repository. Many of these implemen-
tation tasks are also directly integrated into development
environment (IDE) applications. Furthermore, the tool
sets currently used, such as ones suggested by NIST [44],
include various effective means to improve software qual-
ity, including review functionality and tools for static anal-
ysis [14, 74]. The security engineering tasks during im-
plementation reflect these activities and tools thereto. In
addition, security documentation, coding standards, and
many related activities are typically present in the imple-
mentation phase. The results regarding the eight surveyed
implementation phase activities are illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Security engineering activities at implementation phase
Coding standards are frequently used among the respon-
dents surveyed. This observation is not surprising be-
cause these are also a part of the common agile principles.
The tools used for development are also frequently agreed
upon alongside security documentation and static analy-
sis. These observations seem logical in the sense that cod-
ing standards, common tools, and static analysis are fre-
quently used irrespective of whether the context is explic-
itly related to security. Therefore, the more noteworthy
results again relate to the activities that are only seldom
used. In particular security reviews with automated tools,
reviews of external interfaces, and security specific harden-
ing sprints are only infrequently used. Regulation aspects
may again explain these results. For instance, security
hardening sprints have been promoted in the safety con-
text as a way to ensure regulatory compliance [17]. How-
ever, for agile projects dealing with less strict compliance
requirements, the use of hardening sprints may constrain
the development akin to quality gates, especially in case
these do not relate to auditing or one-shot verification. In
other words, these hardening sprints may introduce a cer-
tain anti-agile “security gate” into otherwise flexible devel-
opment work. After all: if the members of an agile project
have already built security in, why would they do it over
again? However, as will be soon discussed, the answer to
this question is not straightforward.
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4.2.4. Verification phase
At the security validation and verification phase, soft-
ware security is verified by testing it against software weak-
nesses that may lead to software vulnerabilities. The
implementation of the security requirements specified is
validated by this process. In iterative software develop-
ment, the potentially production-ready release candidates
are further selected as the result of the verification and
validation processes. The surveyed activities behind these
processes are shown in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Security engineering activities at verification phase
The results are heavily balanced toward testing. With
code reviews thrown in, the most frequently used verifica-
tion activities include the use of automated testing tools,
security specific test cases, and, to a lesser extent, pen-
etration testing. These results underline the test-driven
ethos of agile software development as well as the con-
temporary trend toward automation. Although the sur-
vey design does not allow to draw definite conclusions, it
seems that many of the commonly used activities during
the verification phase align with the implementation-time
activities such as static analysis. Such alignment is also a
typical problem because traditional security (safety) engi-
neering emphasizes post-development testing, whereas ag-
ile practices concentrate on development-time testing [22].
To some extent, this potential problem is also visible in
the results shown: the auditing of the development-time
testing practices is the least used activity. That said, it
should be recalled that formal audits have been a rare
requirement in the projects the respondents have worked
with. Finally, it is worth to emphasize that not all testing
techniques are equally used: dynamic (run-time) analysis
and fuzzing are only rarely used by the respondents and
their projects.
4.2.5. Release phase
The release phase retains many of its traditional func-
tions in a security development life cycle. Even though
the extensive use of continuous integration and continuous
delivery practises have somewhat blurred the boundaries,
many questions related to maintenance must be still ad-
dressed. Regulatory requirements also constrain the trend
toward full automation of release engineering [34]. Thus,
in practice, the security activities performed at this phase
include auditing the product to be released, producing se-
curity assurance and documentation for maintenance and
operations, and ensuring that different operational secu-
rity mechanisms are in place. The results regarding the
surveyed release-time activities are shown in Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: Security engineering activities at release phase
The most used activity at the release phase relates to
work required to ensure that host and network security are
in place. Given the contemporary deployment practices,
this work presumably involves also addressing the secu-
rity questions related to cloud computing platforms [78].
Host and network security essentials can be further seen
as prerequisites for other security requirements [53]. The
respondents also commonly produce documents required
by regulations. In a sense, this observation indicates that
security engineering practices can augment the typically
minimal documentation produced in agile development.
When combined with the relatively frequent documenta-
tion activities during the earlier development phases, the
results presented do not seem to support the conclusion
that agile software development would exclusively rely on
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“ad hoc, inaccurate, incomplete, or non-existing documen-
tation” [16] at least in security matters. On the side of
rarely used release-time activities, different audits and cer-
tificates have been only seldom used in the projects the
respondents have worked in. As these are typical activi-
ties imposed by regulations and other external constraints,
the explanation is again partially related to the sample
characteristics. On the other hand, these observations can
be also interpreted to reflect a generally low demand for
audit-related security assurance.
4.3. Perceived impact versus use of security engineering
activities (RQ2)
The survey design provides means to compare the use
of the activities in each of the five distinct development
phases with their perceived impact upon software secu-
rity. To provide a concise but sufficient overview, the Lik-
ert scales (see Section 3.3) can be used by subtracting the
average numerical values between the use and perceived
impact of each activity. In other words: for a given ac-
tivity, a positive value means that on average the activity
was used more frequently compared to its perceived im-
pact. A negative value in turn tells that the average use
of an activity was “less” than its perceived impact might
instruct. The results from the subtractions are visualized
in Fig. 7. Although the figure should be interpreted only
tentatively due to the rather mechanical comparison, four
general but important points are still warranted.
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Figure 7: Use and perceived impact of security engineering activities
First, the activities are very poorly aligned in terms of
their use and perceived impact. In the ideal case most
of the activities would be located around the value zero
on the y-axis. As can be seen, only a very few activi-
ties satisfy this coarse numerical optimum. Some of the
subtractions even yield values outside of the [−1, 1] range.
Given the five-fold Likert scales used for the subtractions,
such values indicate a particularly large mismatch on av-
erage. Second, however, the amounts of negative and pos-
itive values are roughly comparable. Therefore, it cannot
be concluded that the use of security engineering activities
would be systematically subordinating to their perceived
impact. Third, there is no apparent pattern in terms of the
five distinct development phases. No particular phase is es-
pecially misaligned; the general mismatch applies to some
activities in all software development phases. Last, there
are indeed a few activities that seem to be particularly
misaligned. While agile practices may explain a portion
of these particular misalignments, another portion may be
explained by time and resource constraints as well as the
type of software typically produced by the respondents.
Consider fuzz testing as an example: building and con-
figuring an efficient fuzzing framework and toolchain re-
quires a substantial amount of time. In research, as in
practice, a typical fuzz testing period is 24 hours for each
tested software instance [32]. As fuzz testers keep finding
software crashes also after that, a fuzz test suite should
be applied for an extended period of time – from sev-
eral days up to one week. The required effort and the
time restraints tend to conflict with a typical agile work
flow. Such a conflict may also explain the misalignment
reported: even though the respondents perceive fuzzing
as an efficient way to improve software security, they also
acknowledge the limited use of this testing technique.
An analogous explanation may apply to security related
hardening sprints. As was briefly noted in Section 4.2.3,
these may be difficult to apply without breaking the agile
work practices – even though the potential impact of such
sprints is acknowledged by the respondents. Another ex-
ample would be host and network security for which time
and resources are frequently allocated, although the ac-
tual impact of such allocations seems limited according to
the respondents. Given that most of the respondents are
also dealing with web applications and cloud platforms
(see Section 4.1.1), it may be that the requirements for
host and network security can be replicated across mul-
tiple projects. Another explanation may be that tradi-
tional security aspects are over-emphasized at the expense
of software security.
Whatever the actual explanations may be, the results
are sufficient to underline a general mismatch that pre-
sumably originates from different context-specific factors.
Agility is one but not the only factor. Given that a mis-
match is evident already with the forty activities surveyed
in this paper, questions related to context-specific prioriti-
zation are apparent with more comprehensive frameworks
such as BSIMM. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to
software security. Nor do the solutions with perceived im-
pact necessarily equate to actual software security.
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4.4. Correlations between agile practices and security en-
gineering activities (RQ3)
The survey questionnaire does not contain explicit ques-
tions on how the respondents perceive or understand the
linkages and challenges between agile software develop-
ment and security engineering activities. An indirect sta-
tistical analysis is still possible, however. By following ex-
isting research [23], a concise exploratory overview can be
presented by correlating the common agile practices and
processes (see Sections 3.4 and 4.1.2) against the use of
the security engineering activities. To examine such corre-
lations, some linear combinations are required due to the
large number of variables; in total, there are 16 variables
measuring agile practices and processes, and as many as
40 measuring the use of security engineering activities.
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Figure 8: Degree of agility
A sensible approach is to combine the sixteen agile vari-
ables into a unified “sum variable” by using the arith-
metic mean of the individual variables. There are three
reasons why such a combination is reasonable. First, the
combined variable is statistically highly sensible according
to Cronbach’s classical measure for internal consistency
(α = 0.79). Second, the combined variable is easy to in-
terpret. By reversing the scale such that higher values indi-
cate more systematic use of agile practices and processes,
the combination provides a straightforward measure for
an organization’s “degree of agility”. Third, combining
the agile practices and processes is contextually reason-
able. As can be seen from Fig. 8, all of the organizations
surveyed are agile, but some are more agile than others.
By further reversing the scales of the security engineering
variables, the correlations between these and the organi-
zational degree of agility are summarized in Fig. 9.
All but two of the coefficients shown are positive – it
should be also remarked that only one coefficient has a
negative sign in an auxiliary ordinary least squares regres-
sion. Increasing degree of agility tends to thus slightly
increase the use of security engineering activities. Eleven
of the Kendall’s τ -coefficients are statistically significant at
the conventional p < 0.05 threshold (see Table 5). Among
these is the rank correlation coefficient for security specific
hardening sprints. To augment the earlier discussion, it
should be therefore noted that such sprints seem to be used
in those particular organizations that are especially agile in
their software development. That is: if there are adoption
problems, these cannot be generalized to all software de-
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Figure 9: Correlations between the degrees of agility and use of
security engineering activities
velopment organizations. Increasing organizational agility
tends to also slightly increase the use of generally unpopu-
lar activities such as external interface reviews and devel-
opment time process security audits. These are generally
interesting findings because a common folk wisdom would
entail negative correlations; that less agile or more rigid
organizations would be more likely to use security engi-
neering activities outside of the standard agile toolbox, or
even as parallel processes [52]. In contrast, the results in-
dicate that organizational rigidity tends to decrease the
use of the activities surveyed.
The magnitudes of the coefficients are small, however.
Because all of the security engineering variables measure
essentially the same phenomenon, a Bonferroni correction
is also justified. After this correction is applied, only two of
the coefficients are statistically significant (p < 0.05 / 40).
These are coding standards and security reviews with au-
tomated tools. The first of these is spurious: coding stan-
dards are included as a specific item in the question about
agile practices, and, therefore, it is also a part of the com-
bined agility variable. The second one holds, indicating
a higher degree of agility increases the use of automated
tools for security reviews. This observation makes it rea-
sonable to tentatively conclude that particularly agile soft-
ware development organizations may succeed better in the
adaptation of security engineering practices into their ex-
isting agile development processes. High degree of profes-
sionalism, inherent in organizations utilizing security en-
gineering, may also be a factor in adaptation of advanced
agile practices.
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Table 5: Statistically significant correlations between the degrees of agility and use of security engineering activities
Activity Phase τ -coefficient p-value
Penetration testing Verification 0.198 0.045
Static analysis Implementation 0.198 0.046
Security specific hardening sprints Implementation 0.207 0.042
Architecture and application development guidelines Design 0.231 0.019
External interface review Implementation 0.232 0.012
Development time process security audits Verification 0.233 0.021
Code reviews during testing Verification 0.236 0.017
Deprecation of unsafe functions Implementation 0.238 0.015
Ensure host and network security basics are in place Release 0.239 0.019
Coding standards Implementation 0.331 0.001
Security reviews with automated tools Implementation 0.380 < 0.001
5. Discussion
Three research questions were posed in Chapter 3 to
gauge the objective of understanding the relationship be-
tween software engineering and security engineering prac-
tices, and their reciprocal impact. A questionnaire survey
was designed to collect empirical data which was presented
and analyzed in Chapter 4. This section discusses the at-
tained results in more detail, by going over the key results
directly associated to the research questions, implications
for the industry, and, implications for the research commu-
nity. Afterwards, possible limitations and caveats affecting
the survey and attained results are noted prior to closing
conclusions.
5.1. Key results
To summarize, the benefits of agile methodologies have
been realized in all aspects of software development, and
security critical areas are not an exception to this general
rule. The degree of agility tends to grow along the sys-
tematic use of security engineering activities. Also, the
higher the degree of agility is reported, the more special-
ized the security engineering activities get. The results
also show an increase in the use of agile practices in or-
ganizations facing formal security requirements. Another
essential finding was the perceived impact of the security
engineering practices which in most cases correlated neg-
atively with their use. Some of the most efficient software
security engineering practices receive much less usage than
their impact suggests.
For each research question, we note the key results to
be the following:
RQ1: Security engineering in software development is
dominated by agile methodologies and activities.
Agile software development focuses on requirement
engineering, implementation and testing, whereas
the focus of security engineering appears to be in
verification when judged by the number of sug-
gested techniques. Based on the results, however,
implementation-time security engineering practices
were the most used, appearing to correlate well with
the extant software engineering practices. Use of ver-
ification techniques heavily concentrated into few key
practices.
RQ2: Perceived impact versus use of security engineer-
ing activities was directly asked from the respondents.
This was analyzed by comparing the frequency of use
of a security engineering practice to its perceived im-
pact, producing some interesting outliers. The most
basic security engineering practices were deemed ef-
fective, and were also most used; however, the more
specialized security practices received much less usage
than their perceived effect would suggest.
RQ3: Correlations between agile practices and security
engineering activities is positive: degree of agility
grows with increased use of security engineering prac-
tices. Formal security requirements tend to increase
the level of agility. This analysis also supports the
findings of RQ1, with significantly increased use of
implementation and verification phase security engi-
neering practices in the most agile organizations.
5.2. Implications for the industry
The survey was conducted to provide information about
the established practices of software security engineering.
The demand for software security and assurance of secu-
rity’s existence is increasing from the perspectives of the
regulators and the software users. This is best achieved
by introducing security elements into the software from
the very beginning of its life cycle [49].
The findings suggest that security engineering in soft-
ware development is mostly performed by experienced and
educated personnel – implying adeptness – in various or-
ganizations, especially producing web and cloud software
exposed to the Internet. Agile methods are prevalent also
in security work, and not only that: they are most utilized
in the most security-intensive projects.
Regulation is a main driving force in security work, al-
though not the only one, and the results imply a need for
improvement in the mechanisms how security regulation
is enforced. Especially the security assurance regarding
15
security policies and security enforcement mechanisms ap-
pears a bottleneck. Formal compliance requirements have
strayed quite far from the practical work done in day-to-
day software development. This has an implication that
certain process-related security improvement practices, al-
though effective, remain mostly unused in mainstream
software development projects. It is understandable, how-
ever, that formal or semi-formal process and documenta-
tion reviews are performed only under direct regulatory re-
quirements. The aim of regulation should be improvement
of software security, not conforming with formalities. De-
velopment of security regulation itself might benefit from
a more frequent update and release cycle.
On the other hand, the scheduling and resourcing pres-
sures of the software development projects also affect the
application of security practices. Tools, and tool-based
activities (automated security tests, fuzz testing, dynamic
analyses) are prevalently underused. Efficient but very
rarely used hardening sprints are an extreme example of
this. An increasing amount of organizations dedicate work
and even whole sprints to technical debt [23], but only a
small minority of 7% does the same for security.
5.3. Implications for the research community
The activities contained in the Software Security Life
Cycle models are almost universally utilized; however,
the models themselves are rarely, if at all, adapted as a
whole. They remain a mere security engineering frame-
work, from which the practitioners pick and choose the
practices deemed most suitable for their work. However,
as the impact measure reveals, use and perceived impact of
the practices correlate quite poorly. This can be attributed
to several possible factors, but the main conclusion based
on this observation is two-fold: firstly, software develop-
ment organizations should be more proactive in updat-
ing their processes, but, secondly, the research community
working on software security development models and cer-
tificates should pay high attention to their adaptability.
Further, a trend in the application of specific security
activities to software development can be observed from
the results presented in Section 4.2: security activities ex-
ecutable as part of normal software development activities
are more systematically used. For example, ”Establish se-
curity requirements” can be done as part of Scrum’s back-
log formation, or the use of ”Coding standards” and ”Code
reviews during testing” are in line with agile principles and
notes on software craftsmanship [36].
This is an expected observation, but one which impli-
cates targets that require further examination. Firstly, it
should be established which security activities are synergic
(i.e. the security activity can be implemented more effi-
ciently as part of a software-development-practice-defined
activity). Findings from here could be used to motivate
and better design security-built-in software development
practices in the future.
Second, are the synergic security activities used solely
to provide security for the software projects, or do they
require additional–explicit–security activities to retain ad-
equate levels of security in the project. The results can be
used to argue for or against the usage efficiency of synergic
security activities: secure software development life-cycles
have linked activities for the reason of ensuring exhaustive
hardening; organization may use singular activities with-
out this knowledge and attain significantly lower levels of
security than expected.
Third, contrasting the synergic and non-synergic secu-
rity activities, it should be possible to understand the im-
pact on software development efficiency. For example, for
the sake of arguing for or against the use of particular set
of self-defined security constraints, the development orga-
nization should have knowledge about the level of security
attained and the development efficiency attainable via the
use of particular set of security activities.
To facilitate the three points described above, further
empirical data needs to be gathered. This includes both
quantitative development efficiency data, and static secu-
rity breach analysis data, as well as qualitative data on
the stakeholder’s argumentation, relating to how security
is defined and attained in their software projects. Direct
interviews with the security practitioners, combined with
a series of industry surveys for various target groups will
provide an excellent overview of the specific best practices
and the needs for further development. The studies should
also be conducted in a wider than a national scope within
one country to allow comparison.
5.4. Limitations and caveats
Surveys have inherent non-response and sampling frame
biases, and produce self-reported results. With these lim-
itations, this survey illuminates the state of art in an area
not previously researched in the selected context. In this
particular survey, several precautions were taken to miti-
gate the limitations. First, the respondent’s relevant back-
ground details were asked extensively to ensure the exter-
nal validity. On this subject, two things were noted: (a)
the respondent profile appears very similar to other recent
surveys conducted in the same industry (software develop-
ment) and country (Finland); (b) the respondents answer-
ing this survey, de facto software security practitioners,
were somewhat biased towards the most experienced and
educated groups. This may also be taken to represent the
actual situation in the industry.
To obtain quantitative and analyzable data, the answer
options were necessarily limited to a set of predefined val-
ues. Certain answer options were derived from previous
industry surveys to achieve better, or in some cases even
direct comparability. In the security engineering part of
the questionnaire, the answer options were selected from
security engineering life cycle models and standards claim-
ing industry prevalence. Many of these claims not directly
validated in this study, and in general industry context.
The amount of agile and security practices was deemed
quite near the upper limit of practically answerable, 56
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options in 7 questions, accompanied by 5 optional (usage-
based) questions for the 40 options for security impact
(see survey design in Chapter 3.3). These questions were
noted to be the part where most non-respondents stopped
answering, based on the statistics provided by the survey
service. Even this extensive set of practices does not, how-
ever, guarantee that the entire field of security engineering
practices were covered: some industry best practises, cre-
ated by practical experience, may have left unrevealed.
Furthermore, the validity of the survey’s construct was
subject to a necessary compromise between usability and
thoroughness. Open text fields were used extensively, and
the lack of free-text additions to the answering options is
taken to support the selections made in the survey’s de-
sign. Overall feedback from the recipients ranged from
neutral to positive. Finally, the revealed correlation be-
tween agility and security practices does not imply causal-
ity, nor does it exclude external factors possibly affecting
both. This makes several hypotheses possible, to be tested
in future research.
5.5. Conclusions
This article reports the findings of an industry survey
about software security engineering practises used in con-
junction with agile software development practises. The
survey was conducted among software development prac-
titioners in Finland in early 2018.
The use of these practises was surveyed using precom-
piled lists using a five level Likert scale. The queried se-
curity engineering practices were identified from several
software security life cycle models; agile practises were de-
rived from previous industry studies. For each used se-
curity engineering practise, the respondents perception of
its security impact was asked. This produces a clear and
unambiguous picture of the current use of security engi-
neering in agile software development, and the perceived
effect on the software security, presented in Chapter 4.
Agile practices are prevalent among the respondents. In-
troduction of security practices appears to correlate with
increased use of agile. Extant software security develop-
ment life cycle models do not appear to guide the security
engineering work: instead, practices appear to be selected
in conjunction with the software development practices.
Security engineering in software development conforms
with agile practices. Agile usage correlates with usage of
security engineering: when the use of activities categorized
as security engineering practices increases, the use of agile
practices is also increased. The use of security engineering
is concentrated in implementation phase. Results show
a discrepancy between the usage and perceived security
impact of the activities, indicating a requirement for better
integration of security engineering methods and tools into
the agile software development processes and toolchains.
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